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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Rebecca Lindsay Hastings 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of History 
June 2020 
Title: Oil Capital: Industry and Society in Baku, Azerbaijan, 1870-Present 
 
 
This dissertation is a historical study of the city of Baku, Azerbaijan, and its oil 
industry from the 1870s to the present, covering the tsarist Russian, Soviet, and post- 
Soviet eras. The history of the Baku oil industry offers a clear, focused example of the 
social and physical effects of the imposition of external parties’ financial and commodity 
demands on an urban-industrial setting. Baku as an urban environment, comprising not 
just the physical elements of the city but also its sociocultural communities, has 
embodied priorities imposed on the oil industry that have shifted as the global importance 
of oil and natural gas has grown, as those commodities’ uses have changed over time, and 
according to successive regimes’ respective political and economic ideologies. Despite 
the extra-regional connections that have contributed to Baku’s incongruous nature 
relative to its surroundings, in every era the city has remained to some degree engaged 
with its Azerbaijani and Transcaucasian contexts, including ethnic relations, geography, 
and geology. Throughout successive administrative eras, the city’s population grew and 
shrank, diversified and grew more homogeneous; interethnic and labor relations eased 
and raged; the city’s architecture and physical layout altered according to authorities’ 
tastes, ad hoc additions, industrial booms, innovations, and stagnation; the state of the 
natural environment deteriorated (according to modern standards) almost continuously, 
v  
an unobjectionable or perturbing process, depending on the prevailing attitudes of the 
period. Using a synthesis of archival and published sources, this study investigates the 
extensive degree to which the character of the city, and its residents’ experience of it, 
hinged on its status as an oil capital. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Late in the thirteenth century CE, the Italian explorer Marco Polo, sitting in a 
Genoese prison, related to author and fellow inmate Rustichello da Pisa accounts of his 
journey to East Asia in the preceding decades. Among the fantastical phenomena that 
Polo described was a curious geological process at work in the southern Caucasus: 
On the confines toward Georgiania there is a fountain from which oil springs in 
great abundance, insomuch that a hundred shiploads might be taken from it at one 
time. This oil is not good to use with food, but ‘tis good to burn, and is also used 
to anoint camels that have the mange. People come from vast distances to fetch it, 
for in all the countries round about they have no other oil.1 
 
An exoticism for Europeans of the time, the natural oil wells of the Absheron Peninsula 
had shaped daily life and economic connections in the city of Baku for centuries at least.2 
And for centuries after Polo had passed through, Baku and its oil remained for Europeans 
much as depicted in his travelogue: a place of vaguely Eastern location, a substance 
emitted from the earth in a peculiar way and used a great deal in a small corner of the 
world for heat, light, and the relief of mangey camels. Even if, as has been suggested by 
scholars, Marco Polo himself did not witness all the phenomena he claimed to, his 
account demonstrates that well before the modern era this region was known for its 
geological curiosities. 
 
 
 
1 Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo, trans. Henry Yule, ed. Henri Cordier (London: John Murray, 
1920, book 1, chap. 3, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Travels_of_Marco_Polo/Book_1/Chapter_3. 
 
2 Cordier notes in his annotations that the location described in Polo’s account is likely the Absheron 
Peninsula specifically, given the use of the term “ship-loads,” the lack of other major oil centers located on 
water in Transcaucasia at the time, and corroboration from contemporaneous accounts that major powers of 
the Middle East and Central Asia imported oil from the Absheron region. Ibid. 
2  
By the late nineteenth century, however, Baku was known as one of the world’s 
primary oil centers, producing roughly half of global oil output.3 Where pre-industrial 
producers had once dipped up oil from shallow hand-dug pits throughout the Absheron 
Peninsula, oilmen of the nineteenth century used steam-powered drills to delve deeply 
into the earth. As oil gained value among industrializing states, Baku became (then) one 
of the world’s few prolific sources of the substance. Only the United States, where oil 
drilling had begun in Pennsylvania in the mid-nineteenth century, rivaled the crude oil 
production and refining capacity of the Baku region. Into the twentieth century, as land- 
based wells increasingly failed to satisfy, oil extraction moved out into the Caspian Sea, 
dozens of oil platforms following indications of undersea reservoirs. Over the course of 
the past 150 years, tanker ships, railways, and pipelines carrying oil products and natural 
gas have spread out from eastern Azerbaijan across the Caucasus Mountains to the Black 
Sea, north into Russia, and farther west into Turkey and beyond. 
The geographical focus and the driving concern of this dissertation is Baku and its 
environs. Changes in the Baku urban-industrial environment over the past century and a 
half are largely a reflection of the imperatives of successive regimes of private and state 
oil industry leaders, most of them resource-covetous nonnative centers of power. The 
period of Azerbaijani independence following the breakup of the Soviet Union, during 
which Azerbaijan gained full control of its own oil industry, offers a telling contrast to 
more than a century of domination by extra-regional authorities. The history of the Baku 
oil industry offers a clear, focused example of the social and physical effects of the 
 
 
3 Heinrich Hassmann, Oil in the Soviet Union, trans. Alfred Leeston (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1953), 147-148. 
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imposition of external parties’ financial and commodity demands on an urban-industrial 
setting. Until recent decades, the Baku oil industry was uniquely concentrated, confined 
to the Absheron Peninsula; even today, with Azerbaijan’s expanding offshore drilling 
commitments, its resources are less geographically extensive than most other oil sites, 
and Baku remains the industry’s home. In addition, the absence of any other major 
industry in the area allows for relatively straightforward connections to be made between 
control of the oil industry and the development of the urban-industrial region. 
Baku as an urban environment, comprising not just the physical elements of the 
city but also its sociocultural communities, has embodied priorities imposed on the oil 
industry that have shifted as the global importance of oil and natural gas has grown, as 
those commodities’ uses have changed over time, and according to successive regimes’ 
respective political and economic ideologies. The result has been the metamorphosis of 
the Baku urban-industrial scene in phases, which lend this dissertation its chronological 
structure. The Baku oil industry grew remarkably quickly in the mid- to late nineteenth 
century, expanding from the ancient Turco-Persian Inner City and sprouting from the 
previously thinly inhabited wastes of the Absheron Peninsula. In the early twentieth 
century, the industry suffered a series of crises that revealed its vulnerability to both local 
and global unrest. Following its revival by the Soviet regime, the Baku oil industry made 
immense material contributions to Soviet endeavors, including the development of 
offshore oil extraction in the mid- to late twentieth century. Finally, in the post-Soviet 
era, Azerbaijan dramatically reclaimed its hydrocarbon resources in the interests of the 
newly independent nation. Throughout these eras, the city’s population grew and shrank, 
diversified and grew more homogeneous; interethnic and labor relations eased and raged; 
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the city’s architecture and physical layout altered according to authorities’ tastes, ad hoc 
additions, industrial booms, innovations, and stagnation; the state of the natural 
environment deteriorated (according to modern standards) almost continuously, an 
unobjectionable or perturbing process, depending on the prevailing attitudes of the 
period. The character of the city, and its residents’ experience of it, hinged on its status as 
an oil capital. 
Until the post-Soviet era, Baku was shaped substantially by the investments, 
decrees, and conflicts of external powers as they sought oil, as well as oil industrialists’ 
demands for labor, infrastructure, and transportation. The primary driver of industrial 
expansion until the breakup of the Soviet Union was the desire of non-Azerbaijani states, 
companies, and individuals to reap financial and political benefits via the exploitation of 
the natural resources surrounding Baku. Even now, Azerbaijan relies on large foreign 
investments and international consortia to take full advantage of its own oil and natural 
gas resources. The Baku region has produced billions of tons of oil products and trillions 
of cubic feet of natural gas, enriching private citizens, state officials, and the region itself, 
only with the intervention of distant seats of power and finance. 
Particularly in the view of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Western 
Europeans, the situation of the Baku oil industry was interpreted in ethno-national or 
racial terms—that is, Western help was needed to build up the Baku oil industry because 
Russians by nature lacked a sense of enterprise, and Azerbaijanis were too “simple” and 
unindustrious to become involved in complex or long-term business dealings.4 Nearly 
 
 
4 For instance, A. Beeby Thompson, The Oil Fields of Russia and the Russian Petroleum Industry: A 
Practical 
5  
ubiquitous in these sources (and in many more since) is a fundamentally utilitarian view 
of Azerbaijan’s natural resources—because it was possible to profit from oil and natural 
gas, they must be exploited to the maximum—and an accompanying assumption that 
industrial development was correct and beneficial, not just desirable but inevitable, 
according to a narrow understanding of progress and modernity. Baku was not fated to 
undergo industrial development—nor, of course, was this an inherently positive 
occurrence. The oil history of Azerbaijan offers a telling juxtaposition to Alison Flieg 
Frank’s history of the failed oil ventures of Austrian Galicia in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. In that case, inattention from the Austrian state, disorder on the 
oil fields and within the industry, and failure to develop transportation all contributed to 
the withering of the Galician oil industry by the end of World War I; ultimately, this lack 
of outside political and economic intervention caused the industry to remain 
underdeveloped to a fatal degree. Among Frank’s arguments is the assertion that known 
oil reserves do not “set in motion a predetermined set of events or course of 
development,” and that the development of an oil industry is “determined not by History 
or Progress, but rather by the social, cultural, political, and economic context of the 
 
 
 
 
 
Handbook on the Exploration, Exploitation, and Management of Russian Oil Industries (New York: D. 
Van Nostrand Company, 1904), 375; J. D. Henry, Baku: An Eventful History (London: A. Constable, 
1905), 151-152; “Despatch No. 43 from Mr P. Stevens, British Consul, Batoum, to the Marquess of 
Lansdowne, Foreign Secretary, London, 12 September 1905,” in Oil Resources in Eastern Europe and the 
Caucasus, British Documents 1885-1978, Volume 1: 1885-1919, edited by A.L.P. Burdett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 179-181. This interpretation has persisted in some more modern works 
that appear to parrot the discriminatory views common in European sources from the time. For instance, 
Robert W. Tolf describes the Nobels as “industrial miracle makers in a primitive land,” and local 
Transcaucasians as “brutal,” “barbaric,” “degenerate,” and money-grubbing. Robert W. Tolf, The Russian 
Rockefellers: The Saga of the Nobel Family and the Russian Oil Industry (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1976), xi-xii. 
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specific time and the specific place in which it rose and fell.”5 The Baku oil industry 
“succeeded” because its oil and gas resources were plentiful enough to avert exhaustion 
even after decades of profligate exploitation; because imperial Russian and Soviet 
authorities took a dedicated interest in its success, attention that included developing the 
infrastructure needed for a booming energy industry; and because large numbers of 
oilmen have poured in capital and other resources.6 
The “outside” or “nonnative” parties discussed in this dissertation vary 
significantly from one era to the next. During the Russian imperial period, nonnative 
intervention in the oil industry entailed mass investment and development by Western 
European entrepreneurs—that is, extranational intervention. The involvement of the 
Russian government, centered in St. Petersburg, also constituted form of outside 
intervention: extra-regional and non-Azerbaijani. Decision-makers and other authorities 
from St. Petersburg to Baku were almost exclusively Russians rather than 
Transcaucasians. In the Soviet era, non-Soviet players participated in the restoration of 
the Baku oil industry in quite limited ways, and it was rather the Soviet regime based in 
Moscow that controlled capital and decision-making related to the Baku oil industry.7 
 
5 Alison Flieg Frank, Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 7. 
 
6 In this dissertation, I use terms such as “progress” and “development” with neutral intentions, indicating 
growth, increasing complexity, technological modernization, etc. It is not my intention to portray the 
elaboration of the modern oil industry as inherently positive. 
 
7 The “foreignness” of Soviet authorities in this context is a matter of open debate. I agree with the 
assessment of Jane Burbank and Mark von Hagen that the Soviet regime inherited a “habit of imperial 
governance” from its predecessor in “assumptions about the nature of the populations on Soviet territory 
and how they should be governed.” For my purposes, a categorical stance on this issue is not necessary; it 
is sufficient to argue that the Soviet center’s relationship with Azerbaijan did retain “imperial” features, in 
significant part to capitalize most effectively on natural resource exploitation. Jane Burbank, Mark von 
Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev, Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700-1930 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2007), 2. 
7  
Soviet rule involved a heavily Russianized elite imposing directives on a largely non- 
Russian community. Thus, the Soviet era did include elements of nonnative, although not 
extranational, intervention in the development of the Baku oil industry. 
It has been only in the post-Soviet era that Azerbaijani oilmen and officials have 
assumed a truly authoritative hold over national resources, but maximum exploitation has 
required massive investments from and cooperation with foreign companies such as 
British Petroleum (BP) and ExxonMobil. Although Azerbaijan’s importance in the world 
oil market has dropped dramatically since the early twentieth century, the hydrocarbon 
industry of the Baku region remains the single largest contributor to the country’s GDP.8 
Much of this new national wealth has been guided by the state into the military, often 
skin-deep improvements to the Baku region, piecemeal infrastructural projects, and the 
pockets of the rich and powerful. Very unlike independent oil enterprises in countries 
such as the United States and Canada, and the larger oil-producing states in the Middle 
East since the mid-twentieth century, Azerbaijanis have never possessed the capacity to 
operate and expand this industry on pace with other major oil centers without outside 
intervention. 
This study will contribute to the broader history of the oil industry in the modern 
era, both worldwide and in the former Soviet Union, where oil remains lucrative for 
several countries. A number of surveys of the history of oil contribute to our 
 
8 Azerbaijan produced roughly 1% of the world’s crude oil in 2016, and roughly 0.04% of natural gas in 
2017. “Country Comparison. Natural Gas – Production,” The World Factbook 2020 (Washington, DC: 
Central Intelligence Agency, 2020), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world- 
factbook/fields/269rank.html; “Country Comparison. Crude Oil – Production,” The World Factbook 2020 
(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2020), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 
factbook/rankorder/2241rank.html; Alexande Zotin, “Azerbaijan: A Thirty-Year Fairy Tale,” in Managing 
the Resource Curse: Strategies of Oil-Dependent Economies in the Modern Era, eds. Vladimir Grigoryev, 
Andrey Movchan, and Alexander Zotin, 36-46 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017). 
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understanding of broad trends and the impact of oil in the modern era generally, but 
regional studies have begun to uncover more compelling lessons about the effect of this 
commodity in the modern world.9 In a general way, this study fits into what the authors 
of the recent collection Petrocultures term the “energy humanities,” which “position oil 
and energy as the fulcrum around which many of today’s most pressing social, economic, 
and political issues must be analyzed and understood.” The themes of Petrocultures’ 
essays largely have to do with the ways that oil has shaped politics, philosophy, and 
everyday life in oil-consuming societies; the book is therefore fairly West-centric and in 
some cases lacks historical depth. However, the authors call for further work with 
attention to oil’s impact on individual communities, an approach that adds necessary 
dimension to energy humanities.10 Studies of the oil industry at the regional level 
acknowledge the impact of political context, indigenous interactions, and physical 
environment in a way that broad surveys cannot. 
 
9 For general studies, see: M A. Adelman, The Genie out of the Bottle: World Oil since 1970 (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1995); Peter Maass, Crude World: The Violent Twilight of Oil (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2010); Leonardo Maugeri, The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World’s Most 
Controversial Resource (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2006); Brian C. Black, Crude Reality: 
Petroleum in World History (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012); Mark Mau and Henry 
Edmundson, Groundbreakers: The Story of Oilfield Technology and the People Who Made It Happen 
(Peterborough, England: Fast-Print Publishing, 2015). Regional studies have tended to focus on the Middle 
East and the Americas. See Jorge Salazar-Carrillo and Bernadette West, Oil and Development in Venezuela 
during the 20th Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004); Patricia Vasquez, Oil Sparks in the 
Amazon: Local Conflicts, Indigenous Populations, and Natural Resources (Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press, 2014). During the Soviet era, several Western scholars did contemporary studies of the state 
of the Soviet oil and gas industries, which are excellent sources for quantitative data, but are generally 
limited to that data and to brief time periods. These include Robert W. Campbell, Trends in the Soviet Oil 
and Gas Industry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Robert W. Campbell, The Economics 
of Soviet Oil and Gas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968); Robert E. Ebel, The Petroleum 
Industry of the Soviet Union (New York: American Petroleum Institute, 1961); Robert E. Ebel, Communist 
Trade in Oil and Gas: An Evaluation of the Future Export Capability of the Soviet Bloc (New York: 
Praeger, 1970); Vagit Alekperov, Oil of Russia: Past, Present, and Future (Minneapolis, MN: East View 
Press, 2011). 
 
10 Sheena Wilson, Adam Carlson, and Imre Szeman, eds., Petrocultures: Oil, Politics, Culture (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017), 3, 4, 9-11. 
9  
Despite the extra-regional connections that have contributed to Baku’s 
incongruous nature relative to its surroundings, in every era the city has remained to 
some degree engaged with its Azerbaijani and Transcaucasian contexts. Importantly, 
between the early nineteenth century and the end of the twentieth century, Baku was the 
most concentrated point of contact between the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples, two 
groups that have seen no effective resolution to their longstanding interethnic conflict. 
Relations between them have recurrently affected the operation of the oil industry. 
Relevant also are the specific geology and geography of the Baku oil industry, including 
its position on a landlocked sea, in a landlocked country, and in a difficult middle ground 
between continents and empires, as well as the close concentration of its major inland 
fields and the location of a number of rich fields under the Caspian seabed. These 
realities have caused governance, demography, architecture, and urban-industrial 
planning to manifest change in ways specific to Baku. 
In other respects, however, the evolution of the Baku oil industry corresponds 
with major elements of modern fuel-seeking narratives in the histories of other oil 
centers. On that note, a useful reference is Timothy Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy. 
Mitchell emphasizes that the processes involved in obtaining oil energy, which in crucial 
ways relate directly to the properties of oil itself, have tended to result in common power 
dynamics. In broad strokes, this dissertation reinforces the idea that the oil business 
results in modes of power that stem from the particulars of its extraction, processing, 
transportation, and consumption.11 The “oil rush” that rapidly populated Baku in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries bears a strong resemblance to the flood of oilmen 
 
11 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (London: Verso, 2011), 1-2. 
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and laborers into Pennsylvania and California (as dramatized in the 2007 film There Will 
Be Blood) during the early boom years of those industries. Most of the major investors in 
the early American oil industry were East Coast plutocrats rather than local 
Pennsylvanians, Californians, Texans, and so forth, just as most of the capital that fed the 
early Baku oil industry came from wealthy Europeans.12 The distinct ethnic stratification 
of industry personnel in Baku in nearly every era also appeared in Persia, where Britons 
struck oil at the beginning of the twentieth century and used local labor to keep it 
lucrative.13 As elaborated in Myrna I. Santiago’s The Ecology of Oil, the creation of the 
Mexican oil industry of La Huasteca in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
involved the intervention of successive state administrations seated in distant Mexico 
City, a complete reorientation of business in the region toward foreign oil tastes, and 
distinct ethnic stratification within the Huasteca oil industry (European and American 
executives, “white” middle-managers, and a working-class composed of competing local 
and non-local Mexican laborers), all developments that broadly mirror those in the Baku 
oil industry.14 In post-Soviet Azerbaijan, profits and other benefits derived from the oil 
industry are channeled primarily back to the state, international oil companies, and a 
handful of private citizens; this unequal distribution of wealth has parallels in any number 
 
 
12 Paul Sabin, Crude Politics: The California Oil Market, 1900-1940 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005). 
 
13 Touraj Atabaki. “From ‘Amaleh (Labor) to Kargar (Worker): Recruitment, Work Discipline and Making 
of the Working Class in the Persian/Iranian Oil Industry,” International Labor and Working-Class History 
No. 84 (Fall 2013): 159-175. Hannah Appel’s work on central Africa also highlights ethnic stratification in 
oil industries there. Hannah Appel, The Licit Life of Capitalism: U.S. Oil in Equatorial Guinea (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2019); Hannah Appel, Arthur Mason, and Michael Watts, eds., Subterranean 
Estates: Life Worlds of Oil and Gas (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015). 
 
14 Myrna I. Santiago, The Ecology of Oil: Environment, Labor, and the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1938 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 6-7. 
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of other undemocratic oil states, including Nigeria, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.15 Local 
forces in every case have shaped these oil centers in unique ways that contribute to our 
broader understanding of oil in history, but they can nevertheless be fitted into a broader 
framework that is itself telling. 
Ultimately, however, this is an urban history, exploring the manifestations of 
global (or, in the Soviet context, national) demand for oil in a city that in many ways 
exists to produce the commodity. The history of Baku as a city, including its physical, 
social, and political elements, cannot be separated from the history of the oil industry, 
both global and local (and vice versa to a significant degree). That is, no single element 
can be separated from the others. The growth of the city depended on the growth and 
increasing importance of the oil industry until the mid-twentieth century. In every era, the 
oil industry has shaped Baku’s character. In every era, however, the imperatives of the oil 
industry have had to contend with local context, including regional interethnic relations, 
customs, geography, climate, and pre-industrial history. Baku’s urban development 
results from the meeting of these various external and local forces. Along those lines, this 
dissertation joins other studies of Russian/Soviet cities dominated by a single industry, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 Maass, 55. 
12  
which unearth expressions of governance and large-scale economic concerns in 
individual urban centers.16 
Further, this study will enter into scholarship regarding the imperial Russian, 
Soviet, and Azerbaijani oil industries, as well as scholarship on Azerbaijan’s historical 
development more generally, by considering this history across a broad chronology, 
including several successive regimes. The first formal histories of the Azerbaijan region 
were produced largely by Soviet historians in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
Soviet historiography usually bears the mark of the political imperatives of the era, 
framed by Communist Party-approved rhetoric and often anchored by the revolutions of 
1905 and 1917, the Russian Civil War, and the 1920 Bolshevik takeover of Baku. 
Although the restricted ideological atmosphere in which Soviet studies were produced 
must be kept in mind, they are valuable for a familiarity and immediate expertise with the 
Baku oil industry that cannot be replicated.17 Western industry-related pieces produced in 
the Cold War years similarly offer perspectives on the Baku oil industry informed by 
 
16 For instance, Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865-1923 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2007); Matthew J. Payne, Stalin’s Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Socialism 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001); Paul Stronski, Tashkent: Forging a Soviet City, 1930- 
1966 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010); Daniel R. Brower, The Russian City Between 
Tradition and Modernity, 1850-1900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Alexander A. 
Martin, Enlightened Metropolis: Constructing Imperial Moscow, 1762-1855. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013); Joseph Bradley, Muzhik and Muscovite: Urbanization in Late Imperial Russia. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985); James H. Bater, St. Petersburg: Industrialization and Change 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1976); Patricia Herlihy, Odessa: A History, 1794-1914 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
17 V.A. Beliaeva, Trudovoi geroizm rabochikh azerbaidzhana v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny 
(1941-1945 gg.) (Baku: Aznefteizdat, 1957); V.A., Dinkova, ed., Neft SSSR (1917-1987 gg.) (Moscow: 
Nedra, 1987); “Respublika nefti—respublika khimii,” Khimiia i zhizn: nauchno-populiarnyi zhurnal 1 (Jan. 
 
1967): 30-33; Z.A. Samed-zade, V.E. Akhundov, E.N. Khanlarov, et al., Ekonomicheskoe i sotsialnoe 
razvitie 
 
Baku (1981-1985) (Baku: Kommunist, 1982). 
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contemporary expertise.18 Some of the most useful scholarship generated during the 
Soviet era, by either Soviet or Western scholars, consists of natural and social scientific 
studies related to the industries. 
Ideological context remains an important consideration also in studies that have 
issued from Azerbaijan and Russia in the post-Soviet years, but this scholarship benefits 
significantly from specific regional awareness and immediate access to archival sources. 
A.A. Igolkin’s series of quantitative-heavy studies focusing on the Soviet oil industry 
faithfully channel the wealth of relevant archival material in Moscow.19 The wide- 
ranging work of historian Leila Aliyeva on the detrimental legacies of oil extraction in 
Azerbaijan conveys her valuable local perspective on such issues as the physical effects 
of abandoned oil communities and the connections between Baku’s oil history and 
Azerbaijan’s EU status.20 Farkhad Jabbarov, of the Azerbaijani National Historical 
Museum, draws substantially on original archival research in his studies.21 The 
contributors to the website Nash Baku (Our Baku), particularly historians Irina Rote and 
Tatiana Speranskaia, have amassed, edited, and dedicatedly analyzed a variety of primary 
sources available nowhere else.22 
 
 
18 For instance, works by Campbell and Ebel. 
 
19 A. A. Igolkin, Otechestvennaia neftianaia promyshlennost v 1917-1920 godakh (Moskva: Rossiiskii 
gosudarstvenyi gumanitarnyi universitet, 1999); A. A. Igolkin, Sovetskaia neftianaia promyshlennost’ v 
1921-1928 godakh (Moscow: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi gumanitarnyi universtitet, 1999); A. A. Igolkin, 
Neftianaia politika SSSR v 1928-1940-m godakh (Moscow: Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk Institut Rossiiskoi 
Istorii, 2005). 
 
20 Leila Alieva, ed., The Baku Oil and Local Communities: A History, trans. Emil Gazi (Baku: Qanun, 
2009). 
 
21 Farkhad Jabbarov, Bakinskaia neft’ v politike sovietskoi Rossii (1917-1922 gg.) (Baku, 2009). 
 
22 https://www.ourbaku.com/index.php/Заглавная_страница. 
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The work of several Western historians over the past several decades has 
informed much of the remaining context for this dissertation. Ronald Grigor Suny was 
one of the first English-language historians to move beyond outmoded considerations of 
Transcaucasian history. His monograph The Baku Commune, 1917-1918 was important 
in extending understandings of the Russian Revolution in what became the Soviet 
periphery, with a clear focus on nationality and social class.23 Tadeusz Swietochowski 
has been one of the more prolific writers on modern Azerbaijan, with several monographs 
that together cover issues of identity, ethnicity, nationality, and politics in both northern 
and southern Azerbaijan (Iran).24 In Jörg Baberowski’s large 2003 study of the Caucasus, 
Der Feind ist überall, the oil industry is a presence insofar as it relates to his broad 
themes of early Soviet power, identity, and control in Azerbaijan.25 Immensely valuable 
has been the wide-ranging work of Audrey L. Altstadt, including The Azerbaijani Turks: 
Power and Identity under Russian Rule, the first major English-language monograph on 
Azerbaijan’s general history to emerge in the post-Soviet era, and The Politics of Culture 
in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1920-1940.26 
 
 
23 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune, 1917-1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972) and "Nationalism and Social Class in the Russian Revolution: 
The Cases of Baku and Tiflis” (Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center, 
Washington, D.C., 1980). 
 
24 Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920 (1985); Der Islam under die Entwiklung 
nationaler identitat in Aserbaidshan (1989); Russia’s Transcaucasian Policies and Azerbaijan: Ethnic 
Conflict and Regional Unity (1992); Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition (1995); and A 
Historical Dictionary of Azerbaijan (1999); Azerbaijan (2004). 
 
25 Jörg Baberowski, Der Feind ist überall. Stalinismus im Kaukasus (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 
2003). Here I will also be using the Russian translation, Vrag est vezde. Stalinizm na Kavkaze (Moscow: 
Rossiiskaia politicheskaia entsiklopediia [ROSSPEN], 2010). 
 
26 Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1992); Audrey L. Altstadt, The Politics of Culture in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1920-1940 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2016). 
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Three dissertations alone constitute the bulk of recent and archival-based English- 
language scholarship on Baku’s oil industry specifically. This relatively recent work has 
considered aspects of this history in greater depth over fairly small periods of time, 
yielding valuable insights about the industry according to narrower themes. In “At the 
Center of the Periphery: Oil, Land, and Power in Baku, 1905-1917,” Nicholas Lund 
discusses the decline of the Baku oil industry in the late imperial period, which stemmed 
from a breakdown in consensus between state and private interests over how to manage 
the oil industry.27 Sara Brinegar’s dissertation, “Baku at All Costs: The Politics of Oil in 
the New Soviet State,” picks up after Azerbaijan’s forcible incorporation into the Soviet 
Union in 1920. She argues for the oil industry’s importance in early Soviet state-building; 
for the Soviet state, oil was a means of entering foreign markets and international politics 
in an unsettled and vulnerable period in its history.28 Finally, Jonathan Sicotte’s recent 
dissertation, “Baku: Oil, Violence and Identity, 1905-1927,” centers on the effects of 
industrial development on the city of Baku, connecting political identity and a “shift in 
material circumstances” to violence in early twentieth-century Baku.29 These works have 
begun to piece together a history of the Baku oil industry that provokes attention and 
demonstrates the subject’s potential to contribute significantly to various historical 
narratives, particularly relating to the role of the Baku oil industry in the high politics and 
economic developments of the late tsarist and early Soviet eras. 
 
27 Nicholas Lund, “At the Center of the Periphery: Oil, Land, and Power in Baku, 1905-1917” (PhD diss., 
Stanford University, 2013). 
 
28 Sara G. Brinegar, “Baku at All Costs: The Politics of Oil in the New Soviet State” (PhD diss., University 
of Wisconsin-Madison, 2014). 
 
29 Jonathan H. Sicotte, “Baku: Oil, Violence and Identity, 1905-1927” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 
2017). 
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This dissertation balances a synthesis of secondary source research with primary 
source research in published, archival, and online sources. I drew on my language 
training in French, Russian, and Azerbaijani to delve into both primary and secondary 
sources. A number of French-language travelogues and other studies from the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reflecting a further European perspective on the 
early Baku oil industry, added to the first two body paragraphs of this dissertation. I used 
my research of Azerbaijan state archives documents, nearly all of them in Russian, to 
provide some institutional perspective for multiple eras of the Baku oil industry’s history. 
Furthermore, a number of Russian-language sources from Russian, Azerbaijani, and 
Soviet authors gave me access to archival and other unpublished information that offered 
both institutional and on-the-ground viewpoints regarding urban and industrial 
development in every era. Finally, my training in Azerbaijani not only eased my way in 
archival research, but also allowed me to connect with recent literature by Azerbaijani 
scholars on that country’s history. 
This dissertation addresses a much broader chronological scope than these 
studies, illustrating changes and continuities across several quite different eras of local 
and international administration, politics, social tableaus, and economic environments. 
This long view allows me to draw out cyclical patterns and regime-limited elements of 
Baku’s long oil history, demonstrating that while certain urban-industrial developments, 
such as labor migration, ethnic stratification, extra-regional intervention, and 
environmental damage, have stemmed from the city’s existence as an oil producer, others 
are the result of repeated turnovers in administration since the late nineteenth century— 
architectural styles, urban planning approaches, and the degree of state versus private 
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control have all shifted according to regime. The goal of this broad chronological 
approach is to understand the ways in which industrial-scale oil extraction affects 
upstream oil communities regardless of administrative regime, while showing that a 
particular regime’s ideology and other circumstances can nevertheless deeply affect the 
lives and experiences of those living in oil-producing sites. 
Presented in chapter two is a range of themes that reverberate in the history of the 
Baku oil industry from the late nineteenth century until the present, tracing the sequence 
of alterations that this urban-industrial site has undergone in the past century and a half in 
order to meet global cravings for oil and natural gas. Industrial development in late 
nineteenth-century Baku demonstrates that its oil industry was dominated by outside 
interests from the beginning; the nature of oil extraction in the modern geopolitical 
context prompted intervention from distant seats of power and finance. The 
administrative arrangement of the late imperial Russian period permitted a multitude of 
foreign industrialists and investors to drive development of the oil industry while the state 
itself largely limited its intervention to leasing, permits, and moderate infrastructural 
development. The urban environment of the Baku area underwent drastic transformations 
as the uses and importance of oil and natural gas changed, including alterations of the 
physical environment, both built and natural. Included in this change of urban 
environment was the population itself—Baku grew from a lightly mixed population of a 
few thousand in the mid-nineteenth century to a diverse boomtown of well over one 
hundred thousand at the turn of the century, the product of mass labor migration. 
The unusually violent results of labor migration from across western Eurasia in 
the heated political environment of early twentieth-century imperial Russia is the focus of 
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chapter three. Like other major urban-industrial centers of the empire, Baku became 
susceptible to labor unrest around the turn of the century, but interethnic conflict—the 
result of exceedingly rapid population growth and unequal treatment of various ethno- 
national groups by private and state authorities—complicated the situation. The primary 
clash was between Muslim Azerbaijanis and Christian Armenians; their mutual hostility 
led to the Transcaucasia-wide Armeno-Tatar War (1905-1906) and aggravated the events 
of the 1905 political and labor revolutions. Relevant here is Rogers Brubaker’s 
exploration of instances in which ethnicity “happens,” or is most salient, in the context of 
a single city (his exemplar is Cluj, Transylvania).30 Azerbaijani national movements 
flared into existence primarily in Baku under the Russians’ intrusive domination, deriving 
strength for nationalist claims from the grievances of the Azerbaijani underclass in Baku, 
as well as from clashes with Armenians and Russians. Baku’s character as a rowdy 
industrial town drew labor organizers of all kinds, including radicals such as the 
Bolsheviks and a number of ethnicity-specific organizations, making it a hotspot for the 
politically discontented in the unsettled years before the 1917 revolutions. It was this 
interethnic violence and labor unrest that repeatedly devastated the Baku oil industry 
between 1901 and 1920, reducing output to nearly nothing at times, pushing infuriated 
entrepreneurs and investors to eye other emerging oil centers, and ultimately driving 
away foreign industrialists. 
After the Bolshevik takeover of Baku in 1920, of course, foreign capitalists had 
little presence in Baku. Following years of destruction and neglect after the February 
 
 
30 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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Revolution, the Baku oil industry needed intensive rebuilding if it were ever to produce 
more than a trickle of oil. This task fell to the new regime, which nationalized the 
industry immediately. Chapter four covers the reconstruction of the Baku oil industry 
between 1920 and 1928, particularly addressing changes in the urban environment in this 
period of transition from old regime to new, from capitalism to state socialism. Although 
this era was filled with partly-failed industrial experiments and half-completed 
architectural projects, ultimately the Baku oil industry was again rendered useful as an oil 
center to a major industrializing power—the Soviet state. Control over oil as a 
commodity was now entirely domestic, funded and administered by hierarchies that ran 
upward to Moscow; however, Baku was yet again being maneuvered to serve the needs 
of a distant seat of power. 
This trend reached its apex during the First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932). In 
chapter five, I use themes of labor migration and ethnicity in the Baku urban-industrial 
scene to illustrate the local consequences of pitched industrialization during the first three 
Five-Year Plans. Urban change in this case involved far more than physical 
transformation of the Baku area. A second major wave of labor migration brought 
hundreds of thousands of newcomers into contact with the ideologically straitened, 
challenging environment of Soviet industry. Interethnic relations in this period calmed, 
but tensions remained. A relatively new nationalities policy, in combination with rigorous 
keeping of the peace by new law enforcement bodies, effectively tamped down open 
interethnic conflict even as unequal treatment persisted—Russians and Russian culture 
continued to dominate Baku, an indication of the oil industry’s value to Moscow and of 
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leaders’ continuing doubts about locals’ ability to run the industry according to the state’s 
desires. 
Baku’s desirability and the importance of oil to industrialized warfare is evident 
from belligerents’ focus on the oil center during World War II, the subject of chapter six. 
The city and industry were radically upended during the war. Baku served Soviet wartime 
demands by churning out fuels for military vehicles, refitting factories to produce 
weapons, parting with thousands of conscripted laborers, and recruiting tens of thousands 
of women, minors, and retirees to work in the oil industry. Following early wartime 
enthusiasm and optimism, the mood in Baku turned bleak as the extreme vulnerability of 
the city to violent invasion became clear, prompting a piecemeal evacuation of equipment 
and personnel across the Caspian Sea. Baku’s position as an oil center during a modern 
war put a target on its back. Allied Powers, particularly the British and French, made 
plans to run aerial bombing raids over Baku, recognizing its significance to the Soviet 
war effort. Following the onset of Operation Barbarossa, Axis Powers targeted Baku not 
to cripple its industry but rather to claim its oil to make up for their own fuel shortages. 
The success of that effort would have had calamitous consequences for Allied Powers, 
but it was ultimately stymied by Allied victory at Stalingrad. 
The targeting of Baku during the war called attention to the industry’s 
vulnerability and the drawbacks of Soviet oil’s concentration in Transcaucasia. Even 
before the end of the war, Soviet authorities began to develop oil and natural gas 
extraction elsewhere in the country, including the Urals region. The state’s attention 
elsewhere, the Baku oil industry gradually declined in importance between the mid-1940s 
and the end of the Soviet era, as covered in chapter seven. Baku continued to play other 
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roles in the Soviet oil scene, manufacturing most Soviet oil equipment, hosting the 
Soviets’ early experiments with offshore extraction, and training and educating the 
country’s premier oil experts, but its centrality to the Soviet oil business had clearly 
diminished, as made evident by the exodus of Russian workers to more promising 
opportunities. The city’s character changed remarkably as a result, its urban development 
now relatively disconnected from its status as an oil center. The “nativization” of Baku in 
the late Soviet era was a social, political, and cultural process that in many ways 
portended its post-Soviet future. 
Finally, chapter eight will address the post-Soviet era of Baku oil, a period in 
which trends old and new have emerged. This period of Baku’s history has been 
characterized very generally by a relatively steady upward climb from violence, poverty, 
and uncertainty toward peace and prosperity. The era began with severe clashes between 
Azerbaijanis and Armenians that resulted in horrific massacres and the expulsion of 
nearly all Armenians from Baku, the (likely) final bloody episode in that part of Baku’s 
history, but not in Azerbaijan’s. In the early 1990s, the oil industry reached its lowest 
point in nearly a century as Azerbaijan was ripped from the Soviet system and compelled 
to make the most of its oil industry independently. As in the imperial Russian period, the 
participation of foreign oil companies has become essential to the Baku oil industry’s 
ability to produce according to its maximum potential. Otherwise, Azerbaijan has taken 
sole possession of its oil via the state-owned national oil company SOCAR (State Oil 
Company of the Azerbaijan Republic); although the Baku oil industry is still developing 
according to the requirements of the global oil market, much of its revenue now 
percolates down into projects and services that benefit Azerbaijanis and the nation of 
22  
Azerbaijan, albeit unevenly. For the fourth time, Baku has undergone remarkable 
physical changes, as towering buildings of glass and steel rise around the Turco-Ottoman 
Inner City, and among the classical imperial Russian and modernist utilitarian Soviet 
structures. 
In the modern era, oil has become a resource that requires the convergence of 
immense systems of capital, manpower, expertise, and infrastructure for basic operations, 
let alone profitability. Only the world’s largest superpowers have had the capacity to 
operate lucrative oil industries entirely independently. The social, political, cultural, and 
physical effects of this convergence, as it has evolved over the past century and a half, are 
embodied in Baku, among the oldest and densest oil centers in the world. The oil industry 
and urban development of Baku have been inextricably linked for much of the city’s 
history, making it a site where regional circumstances and international priorities have 
come face to face. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
“PROSPERITY LIES AHEAD”: DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
THE BUILDING OF THE BAKU OIL INDUSTRY, 1872-1901 
 
Baku is a city not only of the present, but also of a wide future; the city is more 
American than Russian; it grows as in a fairytale—not by the day, but by the 
hour. The most attentive administrative measures must lag behind its rapid growth 
and unstoppable new needs. Arising before one’s eyes are new districts, whole 
new streets…In short, Baku is the Marseille of the Caspian Sea, the central 
trading port of the entire eastern Caucasus, ruling simultaneously over the Persian 
and Turkmen shores of the Caspian. 
—Evgenii Markov, Rossiia v srednei azii (1901)31 
 
Less than a century before European investors began turning their attention to 
Transcaucasia, the Absheron Peninsula had been for Europeans little more than a 
curiosity for travelers. Baku was a convenient stopping point while traversing the 
Caucasus, and its natural pools of crude oil and continuously burning gas seeps had 
offered an exotic diversion for Europeans passing through since at least the late thirteenth 
century CE.32 French merchant Jacques-François Gamba, who stayed in the city briefly 
while on business trips between 1817 and 1820, made a point of paying a visit to what 
then amounted to the tourist hotspots: the centuries-old Zoroastrian temple containing an 
 
 
 
 
 
31 Evgenii Markov, Rossia v srednei azii: ocherki puteshestviia (St. Petersburg, M. M. Stasiulevich, 1901), 
113. 
 
32 Earlier Western and current Azerbaijani historians have claimed that fifth-century Greco-Roman 
historian Priscus of Panium passed through Baku, citing his mention of “the flame that arises from the 
underwater rock”; in his translation of the works of Priscus, John Given concludes that Priscus’ route could 
not have taken him anywhere near Baku. See Priscus of Panium, The Fragmentary History of Priscus: 
Attila, the Huns, and the Roman Empire, AD 430-476, trans. John Given (Merchantville, NJ: Evolution 
Publishing, 2014), 69, 90; Sabit Bagirov, “Azerbaijani Oil: Glimpses of a Long History,” Perceptions: 
Journal of International Affairs 3, Vol. 1 (1996): 1. 
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“eternal fire,” as well as nearby oil lakes and hand-dug oil pits.33 Gamba noted that Baku 
was small and clean, with a diverse population of “Tatars,” Armenians, and “Persians.”34 
George Keppel, on his way to India from England on a sightseeing tour in the 1820s, 
made similar observations, describing Baku as “pleasantly situated on the peninsula of 
Abosharon” and a “neat, though small sea-port town, built entirely of stone.” Its 
population, then about four thousand in his estimation, consisted of mainly “Tatars” and a 
few Armenians.35  These travelogues, and others like them, indicate that before oil 
became a commodity valuable on a global scale late in the nineteenth century, it was 
significant only on a local level in the Absheron region. For outsiders, Baku oil and 
natural gas were essentially tourist attractions, not worth a journey in themselves. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, this region and its resources had 
acquired great geopolitical and economic significance in the world. Oil became valuable 
to modernizing and industrializing states, and Baku offered plenty of it. This chapter 
recounts the emergence of industrialized Baku, focusing predominantly on developments 
that followed the Russian government’s changes to Baku land leasing policies in 1872. 
 
 
33 Jacques-François Gamba, “Baku,” in Le Voyage en Russie: Français aux XVIIIe et XIXe Siècles, ed. 
Claude de Grève (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1990), 739-741. 
 
34 “Tatar” or “Tartar” was an early ethno-religious designation that covered roughly the people now known 
as “Azeris” or “Azerbaijanis” – for the sake of clarity, I will be using “Azerbaijanis” to refer to the Turkic 
Muslims of what is now Azerbaijan, but I recognize that this is not a completely accurate designation for 
this time period, given that Azerbaijan as a separate territory was essentially a creation of the Soviet state. 
In addition, so as to avoid confusion with the Persian ethnic group, I will be using the term “Iranian 
Azerbaijanis” to refer to the Turkic Muslims of the northern Persian Empire. Almost without exception, 
past and modern writers’ use of “Persians” in Baku in the Imperial Russian era refers to those from the 
northern part of the Persian Empire, now northern Iran, who did not belong to the Persian ethnic group (as 
we conceive of it). 
 
35 George Keppel, Personal Narrative of a Journey from India to England (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea & 
Carey, 1827), 298-299. Russians were by then present in the Baku region (conquest by the Russian Empire 
took place about 1806, and possession by the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813), but likely still would have been 
nearly always isolated in their garrison at the point when Gamba and Keppel traveled through. 
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Between that year and about 1901, the Baku oil scene grew in nearly every sense: acreage 
under exploitation, oil production, population of workers and other inhabitants, the 
physical size of the city, transportation, domestic and foreign investment, and so on. This 
period was followed by nearly two decades of rough ups and downs in the early twentieth 
century, as covered in chapter three. In the final few decades of the nineteenth century, 
however, Baku was rapidly developing into one of the Russian Empire’s most valuable 
industrial centers. One purpose of this chapter is to explore the rise of the Baku oil 
industry as the result of Russian authorities’ reactions to the emerging global market for 
oil products and, more critically, as the result of Western interventions. Following the 
theme of foreign influence on the industry and its surrounding community, I will narrow 
in on the ways in which nonnative actors initiated processes of economic growth and 
change that took Baku from a peripheral stopover to a lively urban-industrial center 
increasingly geared toward capitalist European imperatives. The Russian government was 
of course the ultimate authority when it came to leases, other permissions, and much of 
the infrastructural development associated with the growth of the oil business, but the 
industry would not have become competitive on a global scale by 1901 without the 
investments and entrepreneurship of (primarily Western) Europeans. 
The interpretation of early Russian industrialization here enters an ongoing 
discussion regarding the degree to which the Russian state was the primary driver of 
industrialization within the Russian Empire. Especially before the industrialization 
policies instituted by Sergei Witte in the 1890s, Russia lagged considerably behind other 
European powers in this respect. Alexander Gerschenkron argued that in more 
“backward” countries, such as the Russian Empire, the state had to take a much greater 
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role in prompting industrialization than in more “advanced” countries, such as Britain.36 
Per John P. McKay’s summary of this “statist interpretation,” in Russia “the state itself 
substituted for the ‘missing prerequisites’ of autonomous market demand, accumulated 
private capital, enterprising businessmen, and skilled labor.”37 Although a number of 
historians still ascribe to the basics of this interpretation, studies of individual industrial 
sites in the Russian Empire have complicated the statist interpretation, showing that, in 
some cases, domestic initiative and wealth could fuel industrialization, and that European 
intervention was far from rare.38 In Baku, market demand, private capital, enterprising 
businessmen, and skilled labor were all present by the 1880s, but from largely foreign 
sources. One of the Russian state’s greatest interventions in stimulating industry in Baku 
was its completion of the Transcaucasian Railway, and this development came only after 
years of lobbying and financial contributions by foreign-owned oil interests. 
The developments of this era demonstrate that, from the start, the oil industry of 
Baku required intervention from distant seats of power and finance in order to become 
profitable. The Nobel brothers were the most famous and prolific investors of this early 
period, but numerous other European entrepreneurs jumped in as they came to understand 
the potential lucrativeness of the oil business in Baku. Through the activity primarily of 
private oil companies, the region became figuratively and literally invested with 
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importance, crowded with British-owned oil derricks, German-run refineries, and 
Swedish-funded railroads and ships. Over several decades at the end of the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth century, this multitude of foreign industrialists 
and investors, seeing themselves as the most capable exploiters of oil, and glimpsing an 
excellent opportunity to make a profit, attempted to reorient the once isolated and modest 
Baku oil industry toward international markets, adjusting it to meet external needs as well 
as their own. Baku metamorphosed at their touch, as tens of thousands of laborers 
migrated to work in the oil industry and associated enterprises, new neighborhoods 
(bright and modern, grim and shoddy) arose according to the needs of industry, the region 
began to drip and smolder with industrial pollution, and advances in transportation 
connected Baku more directly to the outside world. 
 
 
Pre-Industrial Baku 
 
It was not until the mid- to late nineteenth century that Baku’s oil held much 
interest for anyone but those living near the Caspian. For locals, oil and natural gas were 
a ubiquitous part of life and had been for millennia, since humans began congregating 
along that part of the Caspian Sea’s shores. Some hundreds of thousands of years ago, 
humans were attracted to the area’s coastal caves and (then) abundant flora and fauna.39 
As powerful states emerged in Eurasia, the Absheron region became strategically 
significant as a crossroads on land and a sheltered harbor on the Caspian Sea. Before the 
nineteenth century, humans did not come to Baku because oil existed there; they were 
attracted to the area for other reasons, and oil became a part of their lives. 
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After centuries of alternating conquests by Turkic and Persian powers, in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the region that is now Azerbaijan drew the attention 
of the Russian Empire as it attempted to extend its influence southward at the expense of 
the Ottoman and Persian empires. Peter the Great briefly held the western shore of the 
Caspian Sea, including Baku, during the second Russo-Persian War (1722-1723), as did 
Catherine the Great during the third Russo-Persian War (1796); on both occasions, the 
territory was soon returned to Persia, and the local impact of Russian administration was 
slight.40 It was only during the fourth Russo-Persian War (1804-1813) that the Russian 
Empire managed to secure Baku (as well as much of the rest of Transcaucasia) from 
Persia by the Treaty of Gulistan (1813), which established the border between Russia and 
Persia along the Aras River, today the border between Azerbaijan and Iran. Fifteen years 
later, during the fifth Russo-Persian War (1826-1828), Persia surrendered the rest of 
Transcaucasia to the Russian Empire by the Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828). The 
Caucasus was divided into several gubernii (provinces) administered collectively under 
the Imperial Russian Viceroyalty of the Caucasus.41 
Until the 1840s, Azerbaijan remained under military administration, and Baku 
housed a Russian garrison, but Russian authorities allowed the semi-independent 
khanates that had long held effective power in the region to retain a fair amount of local 
autonomy in order to ease the transition to Russian rule. However, the Russian state 
incrementally undermined the khans’ authority in the first half of the nineteenth century 
by adding its own recruits to local administration and rearranging territorial lines. This 
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trend intensified as the Caucasus Viceroyalty moved to eliminate military administration 
in favor of civil administration mid-century. By the eve of industrialization in Baku, the 
Viceroy of the Caucasus and the Governor of Baku, always ethnic Russians, dominated 
politically.42 
The relationship between the imperial state and Baku in the tsarist era was almost 
indisputably colonial, per widely accepted definitions in the context of the Russian 
Empire.43 Baku and the rest of Transcaucasia were under the political and military control 
of the central Russian state, which deemed these regions backward and uncivilized, 
useful for their resources, strategic location, and other additions to imperial might. 
However, the Russian Empire had conquered the Caucasus primarily for geopolitical 
reasons, and only secondarily (a distant second) as another colonial extension that could 
produce raw materials for the imperial center.44 
Oil extraction before the mid-nineteenth century was small in scale. If oil was not 
already seeping organically to the surface of the earth or sea, extraction was often a 
matter of simply digging a shallow well by hand, dipping up in hide or wooden buckets 
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the fluid that seeped to the surface, and transporting it to reservoirs in hide bags.45 Left to 
sit out in the elements for a time, this crude would self-separate: water and dirt sank to 
the bottom, and the remaining oil split into a few usable oil products with diverse 
applications. Baku oil, particularly a substance called by some “white naphtha” (possibly 
akin to mineral oil), was used for a variety of ailments. According to nineteenth-century 
English oil expert Charles Marvin, “externally applied, it is of great use in scorbutic 
pains, gouts, cramps, &c.” When ingested, he claimed, white naphtha helped with kidney 
stones, “disorders of the breast,” sexually transmitted diseases, and headaches.46 The 
most common use for oil products in this period was for heating, lighting, and cooking. 
Baku’s primary oil export for a long period was lamp oil traded to Persian cities.47 In 
comparison to other fuels, it was evidently not of high quality (Alexandre Dumas père: 
“even when pure, [Baku naphtha] gives off thick smoke of a disagreeable flavor, which 
does not preclude it from being used from Lenkoran to Derbent”), but it had the 
advantage of abundance. Beyond its uses as medicine and for household fires, Baku oil 
was used by locals as a grease for carriage wheels and the like so that Muslim residents 
would not have to touch pork fat. It could be added to a kind of cement mixture for 
construction.48 Varnishes and lacquers benefited from its addition.49 Any surface that 
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needed waterproofing, including food containers, might have oil rubbed into it. In order 
to mitigate the dustiness of Baku streets, city workers sprinkled oil about as a 
dampener—this kept the dust down for perhaps two weeks at a time, according to British 
traveler Edmond O’Donovan, but when the mess was disturbed by a particularly strong 
wind, oil particles stuck to one’s clothes and “no amount of brushing or washing can 
remove it.”50 
Natural gas was also useful to locals, but given the unfeasibility of transporting 
natural gas over any great distance before the twentieth century, its use was necessarily 
entirely local. Inhabitants had long utilized natural gas in the making of lime; after 
quarrying limestone abundant near Baku, lime producers dug pits in locations known to 
seep natural gas, set the gas alight, and poured crushed limestone into the rudimentary 
kiln. Gamba noted “fifteen to twenty lime kilns” near the hand-dug oil wells he visited.51 
Using basic piping systems, or by strategically constructing domiciles, locals might tap 
into natural gas seeps for household cooking, heating, and lighting.52 Finally, the 
connection between natural gas fires (first produced when natural gas seeps were ignited 
by lightning, then by human-made ignition sources) and the practice of Zoroastrianism in 
the area is unknowably old. Numerous travelers through the area visited a “fire temple,” 
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likely the site now known as Ateshgah (“fire house” in Farsi), a structure of unclear 
origin apparently intended for worship by Zoroastrians and other South Asian religions.53 
Following the domination of Transcaucasia by the Russian Empire, oil extraction 
continued, but for several decades it barely exceeded pre-conquest levels.54 The Russian 
state tended to view oil and natural gas as resources of minor importance, and there was 
little interest in its products, including kerosene, beyond the peninsula.55 In the global 
context, this attitude was unremarkable—until the point when fossil fuels became 
abundant, profitable, and easy to transport, local resources (wood, coal, sheep fat, animal 
droppings, etc.) and/or whale oil were the first preference in communities the world 
round. 
Until 1821, oil operations in Baku were under the direct control of treasury 
officials in St. Petersburg, an arrangement that proved unsustainable. The complexities of 
the enterprise even in those early years required more dedicated, local attention in order 
to turn a profit for the state. The government of Alexander I (r. 1801-1825) over several 
years began to implement a leasing system that was only a partial modification of the pre- 
1821 system, and similar to the Crown’s treatment of its forest and mineral resources. 
Under the “Lease System,” the Crown rented out plots of land for four years at a time— 
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each lessee thus had just four years to explore the plot, drill or dig wells, marshal laborers 
and equipment, and construct derricks. This arrangement meant that lessees had little 
incentive to invest heavily in a particular plot, which led to destructive and wasteful 
extraction practices.56 Under this system, a succession of tax farmers won concessions 
from the state to collect royalties and rent.57 
Russia’s oil enterprise remained stunted for years after Baku oilmen drilled the 
first deep well around 1860. Drillers in Pennsylvania achieved the same feat in roughly 
the same period; however, American oilmen experienced few of the limitations imposed 
on oil entrepreneurs in Baku by the Lease System. Marvin blamed the state monopoly 
and tax-farming arrangement.58 In July 1866, Charles E. Stewart noted just two sets of 
drilled wells fully in operation, one of them in Balakhani, the other in Surakhani, and two 
refineries.59 Several years later, Cunliffe Hippisley Marsh also noted just two refineries.60 
In his study of the Russian Crown’s pre-1872 leasing system, historian Joseph A. 
Martellaro concludes that it was altogether “short-sighted,” plagued by ineffective short- 
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term goals, corruption, and a general failure to develop commercially, and indeed some 
imperial Russian authorities stationed in Transcaucasia seemed to think along the same 
lines.61 Henry Morton Stanley, traveling through Baku in the year before he located 
David Livingstone in Africa, one evening had a deep conversation with General Nikolai 
Stoletov, who complained freely about the state of the oil industry, inhibited as it was by 
lack of government initiative, “Russian apathy,” and timid merchants.62 
In regard to oil, the imperial Russian government was limited in its ability to push 
industrialization. The state persisted in treating oil as any other natural resource to be 
exploited, even as it became clear that demand for oil products was increasing by the 
moment, and that the resource required new approaches to industrialization: vast amounts 
of upfront capital, specific expertise, and integration into extensive economic and 
transportation networks. In order to remain competitive in the oil trade, the Russian state 
took a step back, encouraging local and foreign initiative to take the reins, while it limited 
itself largely to regulatory and transportation matters. 
 
 
Opening the Baku Oil Industry 
 
The Russian government was prompted to change the way it handled the Baku oil 
industry by the realization that a rapidly growing market for kerosene was emerging both 
in the Russian Empire and in other industrializing states, but that American products 
effectively monopolized it.63 Baku’s production was gradually increasing every year, but 
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it was not terribly profitable. Its production and profitability seemed especially meager in 
comparison to the American oil industry, which was expanding much more rapidly 
because of economic and legal structures set up in that country that allowed for greater 
and more rapid investment, as well as the development of infrastructure and technology 
to take advantage of the resource. Witnessing American investors and oil companies 
making massive profits on the resource, in part by selling to Russian subjects, Russian 
officials in the 1860s began the long and tedious process of considering a change from 
the Lease System to a more productive and profitable arrangement. The new system 
ultimately drew entrepreneurs and investors from all over western Eurasia. 
In 1872, Russian officials announced new regulations that were intended to 
encourage private enterprise. 3300 acres of Crown oil-bearing land administered by the 
Mining Department (sectioned into regular twenty-seven-acre plots) around Baku would 
be available for auction and long-term leasing.64 The development of this “Auction 
System” represents the Russian state’s most consequential intervention into the Baku oil 
industry. Leases would be semi-permanent, and although the state still formally owned 
the land itself, lessees now exercised true rule of capture, meaning that they legally 
possessed all oil and/or gas brought to the surface. The new system was designed to 
increase revenue for the Russian state: the auctions themselves directly provided revenue, 
and the predicted increase in kerosene production would provide more product for state 
excise taxation.65 As the number of interested parties increased, as the Russian state 
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became more comfortable with the new system, and as exploration for oil expanded, 
officials made thousands more acres of land available for auction in subsequent years. 
Most came from state lands set aside for oil exploitation; some acreage had once been 
allotted for agricultural use by nearby villagers, now seized for the state’s purposes as 
auctioning oil land became more profitable.66 The state also granted large plots in reward 
for service to officials and elites, some of whom sold the land to private owners as soon 
as they received it.67 In every case, the price depended greatly on a plot’s proximity to 
proven oil sources.68 
The outcome of the first oilfield auctions, which took place between February and 
December of 1872, represented a great success for nearly every party involved. The 
Russian government raised nearly three million rubles in that year’s auctions alone; by 
contrast, over the preceding fifty years it had collected just six million rubles via tax 
farming and its own development of oil fields.69 The opportunities offered by the new 
system drew many interested entrepreneurs. Although several local Azerbaijani 
entrepreneurs bid successfully on the lots offered by the Russian government, the biggest 
winners by far in the 1872 auctions were Russian and Armenian businessmen. Of the 
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fifty-one plots auctioned in 1872, just five went to Azerbaijanis. The remaining plots 
were split about equally between wealthy Russians and Armenians.70 
However, few Caucasian or Russian companies or individuals had the capital, 
networks, and resources to afford the outlays necessary to develop the Baku oil industry 
to meet the level of American industrialism. Significant upfront capital was needed to 
purchase proven oil plots, and unproven oil plots posed financial risks; depending on the 
field, drilling to an adequate depth could take over a year, meaning quite a delay in 
income for the owner; drilling and extraction equipment was expensive and usually had 
to be imported from abroad; and Russia’s wealthy were still generally unused to 
investment practices already long-established elsewhere in Europe and North America. 
Entering the “downstream” components of the industry (refining, transportation, and sale) 
was in some ways more accessible to locals because it involved less risk, but only the 
giant companies had the resources and connections to achieve full vertical integration. J. 
D. Henry, a British journalist and editor of the publication Petroleum World, noted this in 
his observations of the nineteenth-century Transcaucasian oil industry: “Russia, 
confessedly poor, is not now, any more than she was a quarter of a century ago, a 
philanthropist amongst civilised nations, but she has new industrial aspirations which will 
not materialise without foreign financial assistance.”71 The Russian government and 
domestic entrepreneurs were simply not able to develop the oil resources of the region 
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very effectively; indeed, Prince Grigorii Golitsyn, the Viceroy of the Caucasus between 
1896 and 1904, urged foreign investment, noting in Russia a lack of free capital, weak 
industrial enterprise, a lack of technical knowledge, and poor business initiative.72 
As it was, foreign entrepreneurs and investors were drawn to Baku not primarily 
because of any effort on the part of the Russian government or Caucasian locals to attract 
money and interest, but rather in large part due to a glut of travelogues and pamphlets 
circulating widely in Western Europe in the mid- to late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century, advertising the enigmatic and exotic Caucasus, its many treasures, and 
the thrill of discovering a potentially lucrative opportunity in an “uncivilized” land. 
Dumas, traveling through Baku around 1858, described the region’s fledgling oil industry 
and remarked optimistically that there must exist “an immense bank of naphtha” 
underground.73 Henry Norman, a frequent visitor to Baku in the late nineteenth century, 
noted that “the mysterious processes of nature, whether animal or vegetable—probably 
the former—which produce petroleum in the bowels of the earth, have taken place in an 
unusual degree under the eastern shore of the Caucasian peninsula, where the town of 
Baku has risen.”74 Several years after Dumas, Valentine Baker, a Briton who saw himself 
as something of an explorer, passed through Baku on his way to Persia. He 
communicated images of uncultured locals, rough travel, a barren landscape beyond the 
small green garden of the Russian governor, and an oil industry just waking up, now that 
the Russians had “become alive to its value,” allowing foreigners to begin developing 
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it.75 These and numerous other published accounts similarly highlighted the strangeness 
and promise of this region for readers back home who might take an interest.76 
For their part, the Nobel brothers, who were among the first Europeans to invest 
heavily in the Baku oil industry, discovered it by chance. The family had manufactured 
arms and other military equipment for the Russian government for decades in St. 
Petersburg. In 1873, while searching for good sources of walnut wood for rifle stocks, 
Robert Nobel passed through Baku. After touring the region briefly, Robert made the 
unilateral decision to use the walnut money (extended by his brother Ludwig) to buy an 
oil refinery from a Dutchman.77 In 1875, Robert and Ludwig began buying oil-bearing 
plots; the next year, utilizing their brother Alfred’s fortune, they fell into business with 
other European investors, creating the oil giant Branobel (an abbreviation of bratev Nobel 
[“Nobel Brothers”]). By 1888, their investments represented one-fifth of all foreign 
investments in the Baku oil industry, and the company owned the majority of all oil 
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storage in the region.78 They remained a favored partner of the Russian government. In 
October 1888, Tsar Alexander III made a trip to Baku, during which he and his entourage 
inspected one of Branobel’s plants “in great detail,” strolled out along one of the 
company’s nearby piers to view its oil tankers, and were presented with a picture album 
of Nobel enterprises around the world and a cask containing samples of oil products.79 
British companies became interested in the Baku oil industry somewhat later in 
the century, but by the 1880s their level of investment rivaled that of any other European 
nation.80 In his 1875 trip through Baku, Arnold had encountered Armenian oil exporters 
who required extra capital to expand their businesses; they pleaded with him to send 
British investors to Baku, “as if such people were to be picked up in London for the 
trouble of stooping.”81 By the mid-1880s, as it happened, British investors were pouring 
money into Baku oil enterprises. In 1885, a precis from the British Imperial War Office 
evaluated the region’s potential very positively, noting that the supply of oil appeared to 
be “almost inexhaustible,” with new sources being discovered constantly. The report 
concluded, “Altogether, the petroleum industry in Trans-Caucasia bids fair to attain a 
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great development.”82 As British oil engineer A. Beeby Thompson put it, the region was 
“likely to produce for many years large quantities of oil, so that it seems probable that a 
period of prosperity lies ahead.”83 Charles Marvin’s The Region of the Eternal Fire, 
which described his 1883 trip to Baku, included recommendations on how Britons should 
pack for a trip from London to Baku, which routes to travel and when, and how to get 
into the oil business upon arrival (one may “go straight to Baku and make arrangements 
on the spot with the firms there for the opening up of business relations”).84 British 
investors responded to reports, pamphlets, travelogues, and the like by funneling millions 
of pounds into newly-formed British companies such as the Black Sea Petroleum 
Company, the Caspian Oil Syndicate, and the European Petroleum Company.85 
The development objectives of these companies in the Caucasus can be seen in 
the charters and memoranda of their formation. The Caspian Oil Syndicate, formed in 
1901, aimed to purchase crude oil and other minerals, as well as refineries, pipelines, 
ships, railways, “and all other adjuncts to or things useful for carrying on the business of 
dealers in oil or naphtha or petroleum producers.” In addition, it was given permission to 
explore and secure rights to lands and resources, employ and send out “all persons useful, 
or supposed to be useful, in examining, investigating, and exploring leases, lands, mines, 
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minerals, ores, mining or other rights and claims.”86 Similarly broad mandates were given 
to other British companies. Each of these companies, and many more throughout Europe, 
were permitted by their own governments and the Russian government great leeway in 
developing Baku oilfields according to their own interests. 
The industry’s development was not entirely under the control of European 
companies, it must be made clear. In a few cases, locals who had been involved in oil 
extraction since before the 1872 auctions effectively leveraged their holdings and 
established reputations in the community to become among the richest oilmen in the 
region. The most celebrated in Azerbaijan today is Zeynalabdin Taghiyev, an ethnic 
Azerbaijani born to a poor family in Baku’s Inner City. He became involved in oil before 
the 1870s, but saw little success until 1878, when workers hit a fountain on one of his 
properties. In 1897, he sold his company to British businessmen, not long before the 
industry hit its peak and began to decline. Having amassed tremendous wealth, Taghiyev 
invested in the construction of a number of buildings that are now Baku landmarks, 
including his former palace, now the National History Museum of Azerbaijan, and the 
Taghiyev Theater, among others. He was also noted for his philanthropy, including the 
construction of the first secular school for Muslim girls in the Russian Empire, a building 
that now houses the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences Institute of Manuscripts.87 
Notable also were Russian business partners Vasilii Kokorev and Petr Gubonin, 
who had gotten their start in the oil industry in 1858, when they founded the Transcaspian 
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Trading Company, which dealt in oil products. A few years later, they constructed one of 
the first kerosene refineries in Baku.88 In the 1872 auctions, Kokorev and Gubonin used 
their knowledge of the area to bid on and win several of the most valuable plots on 
offer.89 The next year, they created the Baku Oil Company (Bakinskoe Neftianoe 
Obshchestvo, or BNO), the first oil company in Baku to attempt any degree of vertical 
integration, controlling oil from extraction to transportation. Kokorev and Gubonin were 
soon joined at BNO by Ivan Mirzoiev, an Armenian businessman who had once acted as 
the imperial government’s tax farmer in the Baku oilfields. BNO was remarkably 
successful for several decades.90 
Of greatest concern to all oil industrialists was improving transportation, both 
passenger and cargo, and both within the Baku oil region and to markets. Poor 
transportation was the primary check on growth in this era of Baku’s industrial 
development. Before the late 1880s, ramshackle carts transported barrels of oil from field 
to refinery to ship along unpaved roads that became nearly impassable morasses of mud 
and oil when it rained. European visitors never failed to be confounded by these carts.91 
In the words of Arthur Arnold, “Where is the man who would dare to pose himself there, 
perched and caged in a little railed cart, big enough to hold one barrel of petroleum, and 
lifted so high on wheels seven feet in diameter, that another huge tub can be slung 
beneath the axle, the whole thing being painted with all the colours of the rainbow and 
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creaking loudly as it is drawn by a diminutive horse, the back of which is hardly up to a 
level with the axle?”92 Paying cart-drivers for this service was an enormous expense for 
oil producers, and so when the Nobels began to lay local pipelines, other producers soon 
followed suit (Figure 1).93 By the early 1880s, dozens of pipelines ran from various oil 
fields to refineries in the Black City and the White City, discussed below, and from there 
to transportation hubs, “winding and twisting over the undulations of the desert, bridging 
chasms on the roughest of piers, and stretching stark across the road without any attempt 
to bury themselves in the surface out of the way of traffic.”94 These local pipelines paid 
for themselves quickly, and left producers with ample funds to pay for guardhouses every 
few hundred yards along the pipelines’ routes to protect them from sabotage by out-of- 
work carters.95 
Of greater importance was the construction of a higher-volume transportation 
route between Baku and world markets. The transportation and sale of oil products was 
limited by the capacity and reach of ships on the Caspian and Volga and of carriage and 
camel trains in Transcaucasia and northern Persia. Stewart noted that when he first visited 
Baku in 1866, the only realistic routes to Baku from Europe involved either a circuitous 
train and carriage route through Russia, followed by voyages down the Volga River and 
across the Caspian Sea, or somewhat less circuitous train and carriage routes through 
Russia to Odessa or Constantinople, a voyage across the Black Sea to Batumi, a train ride 
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to Tbilisi (then Tiflis), and a carriage or horse ride across the rest of Transcaucasia to 
Baku.96 Whichever route one chose, the journey took many weeks. 
The Russian state had completed a line from the Black Sea to Tbilisi by 1872, but 
the stretch from Tbilisi to Baku remained incomplete for years afterward.97 Given that 
Tbilisi had been the seat of the Imperial Russian Caucasus Viceroyalty since 1801, the 
Russian state had pressing administrative reasons to connect the capital by rail to the 
Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi despite issues of terrain and resources.98 Baku, for its 
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Figure 1. 
Pipelines and 
railways 
connecting the 
oilfields with 
central Baku, 
1880s. Source: 
Charles Marvin, 
The Region of 
Eternal Fire: An 
Account of a 
Journey to the 
Petroleum 
Region of the 
Caspian in 1883 
(London: W.H. 
Allen & Co., 
1891), 199. 
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Figure 2. Transcaucasian Railway, 1883. 
Source: Charles Marvin, The Region of 
Eternal Fire: An Account of a Journey to 
the Petroleum Region of the Caspian in 
1883 (London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1891), 
113. 
part, was not clearly worth the expense and effort required to complete a rail line across 
hundreds of miles of narrow valleys, swamps, and desert wastes until the mid- to late 
1870s; until that point, Baku’s primary export was rather low-quality kerosene, the 
United States was producing better-quality kerosene and had already cornered the market 
even in most parts of Russia, and the tedious but adequate steamer route across the 
Caspian Sea and up the Volga River served the industry’s limited transportation needs 
(relative to the 1880s and afterward).99 
The Nobels and the French 
Rothschilds, who had entered Baku oil 
business in the early 1880s, committed 
tremendous effort and resources to 
convince the Russian government to 
permit the construction of railways 
within the Baku district and across 
Transcaucasia to Tbilisi, completing a 
connection of incalculable value to 
those who wished to transport and sell 
Baku oil (Figure 2).100  The Rothschilds 
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alone contributed $10 million USD toward the project.101 In 1883, the Russian state 
finished the railway between Tbilisi and Baku, thus completing the Transcaucasian 
Railway, which ran from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. Other stretches of Russia’s 
railway system had by then extended and improved considerably, permitting one to make 
the journey from Western Europe to Baku in less than two weeks, and entirely by 
steamship and train, allowing for vastly greater volumes of oil to be transported within 
and outside of the Russian Empire.102 
Not long after the Tbilisi-Baku stretch was completed, however, it became clear 
that the transportation of oil products by train was not going to meet the Baku oil 
industrialists’ growing needs. Trains carrying oil had to compete with other cargo trains 
and passenger trains along the Transcaucasian Railway’s single line, and the steepness of 
the line near Tbilisi (authorities had opted to run the railway right over the Surami Pass 
rather than to bore train tunnels) as well as generally poor management of the railway 
caused rail traffic near Tbilisi to run at a glacial pace and limited the quantity of oil that 
an individual train could carry.103 
The year that the Transcaucasian Railway was completed, Western oilmen and 
Russian officials were already making plans for the construction of an oil pipeline from 
Baku to the Black Sea. This was not an uncontroversial project, as historian John P. 
 
101 By mid-1880s, the Nobels and the Rothschilds were nearly direct competitors in the Baku oil scene. 
Both owned numerous wells and refineries in the area, but until the construction of the Transcaucasian 
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devoted to the Transcaucasian Railway and Batumi. McKay, “Baku Oil,” 617; Tolf, 85. 
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McKay has detailed. Fears of foreign monopoly, as well as debates about whether the 
pipeline should carry crude oil or kerosene, whether an expansion of the railway might 
suffice, and how everything might be paid for held up the pipeline project for years. 
These convolutions delayed the construction of a full Baku-Batumi pipeline until 1903, 
just two years before the unrest of 1905 halted oil production in Baku and transportation 
across Transcaucasia (discussed in chapter three). In the period between the completion 
of the Transcaucasian Railway and the Transcaucasian pipeline, oil producers made do 
with minor improvements to the railway and short stretches of pipeline here and there.104 
Despite transportation issues, the output of the Baku oil industry increased rapidly 
in the final few decades of the nineteenth century, exceeding American output by the turn 
of the century. New markets for kerosene and other oil products had opened in Russia 
and elsewhere in western Eurasia. The region’s extraction of oil and production of oil 
products increased impressively between 1872 and 1901 (Table 1). By the turn of the 
century, the Baku oil industry produced about half of the world’s oil supply. Kerosene 
remained Baku’s most important marketable product for some decades, but improved 
refining techniques yielded a greater variety of products. From crude, first benzine, 
gasoline, and other light fractions were distilled out. Benzine, commonly used in 
solvents, was shipped to Russia to be used as a detergent, while gasoline (in the era 
before widespread use of the internal combustion engine) was used locally as fuel. 
Kerosene and “solar oil” (another type of lamp oil) were then distilled.105 What remained 
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was ostatki (“leftovers”), a tarry substance that could be burned almost without smoke if 
properly managed.106 By the mid-1880s, most steamers on the Caspian had converted 
from burning coal products to ostatki, more efficient than coal and certainly more 
abundant in the area.107 
Table 1. World, US, and Russian Crude Oil Production, 1861-1900 (selected years) 
(thousands of tons)108 
Year World production US production Russian production 
1861 293 286 3 
1865 374 338 9 
1870 798 711 28 
1875 1373 1187 96 
1880 4131 3552 413 
1885 5060 2954 1916 
1890 10547 6192 3949 
1895 14271 7147 6350 
1900 20525 8596 10429 
 
Natural gas also had its uses, but it remained a local product. Locals still used 
natural gas for heating, lighting, and making lime, and by the late decades of the 
nineteenth century the presence of natural gas was known to oilmen as a useful indication 
of a rich oil reservoir below.109 Refinery owners had also begun to rely on natural gas to 
fuel their distillation operations. When Stewart traveled through Baku in 1866, and 
visited the “Temple of Everlasting Fire” at Ateshgah in the Surakhani district of Baku, a 
petroleum refinery (then one of two in Baku) had been constructed nearby to take 
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advantage of the natural gas as fuel, but the temple’s fire still burned steadily. However, 
when Stewart returned in 1881, the fire had gone out and there was no priest in 
attendance. “The engineer in charge of the neighbouring petroleum refinery accompanied 
me over [to] the temple, of which he held the key. He relit the fire, and when leaving 
carefully extinguished it, as he said he wanted all the natural petroleum gas for heating 
the furnaces of his own works.”110 The site was never forgotten, and is now a heavily 
frequented tourist attraction, but for at least a century, between the mid-1800s and mid- 
1900s, industrial needs outweighed cultural preservation. 
After a few decades of intense investment and buildup, the Baku oil industry 
came to represent one of the major centers of global oil production. Largely with the 
investment of foreign capital, the Absheron Peninsula had been made over into a 
definitive oil-producing region. It had attained great material and strategic significance, 
in that it produced an increasingly valuable natural resource for the world’s 
industrializing states. Foreign industrialists credited themselves with this 
accomplishment, indicating that Russian administrators had acted as little more than a 
hindrance to moneymaking and the access of more advanced and industrialized entities to 
the promise of oil.111 
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Labor Migration to Baku 
 
The growing industry also offered new opportunities to hundreds of thousands of 
skilled and unskilled laborers—not enrichment, but at least a living wage. Like nearly all 
industrial boomtowns, Baku’s population in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries was constantly fluctuating, but growing rapidly overall (Table 2). While many 
new arrivals came from elsewhere in Transcaucasia, large numbers trod long-established 
labor migration routes from farther north and south as well. Population growth and 
greater mobility in the western Russian Empire after the Emancipation Reform of 1861 
(which ended serfdom in the Russian Empire) meant that more subjects were leaving 
year-round agricultural work for permanent or temporary wage labor in the cities. The 
population of St. Petersburg grew from roughly 500,000 in 1860 to well over one million 
in 1897; Moscow, Odessa, and Kiev saw similar growth in that period.112 As Baku’s 
industry grew, tens of thousands of workers from the western Russian Empire made the 
journey south to find employment.113 Great numbers of workers also came from the 
northern regions of the Persian Empire due to social and economic dislocations there. 
However, although Baku and its industry became a large and diverse boomtown in the 
late nineteenth century, it was not a “melting pot” by any means. Ethnoreligious groups 
remained largely insulated from one another, both of their own accord and due to formal 
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and informal conditions of work in the industry, a trend reinforced by the enduring 
fluidity of the population. 
Table 2. Population of Baku, 1824-1913 
(selected years)114 
Year Population 
1824 ~4,000 
1870 12,191 
1879 15,105 
1883 ~50,000 
1886 86,611 
1889 ~90,000 
1897 111,904 
1903 155,876 
1913 214,672 
 
 
The majority of Baku’s population in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries had not been born there, and likely did not intend to remain there permanently. 
A study in 1900 found that nearly 70% of Baku workers had been living there for less 
than three years, and about 40% had been living there for less than one year. A further 
study in 1903 discovered that 20% of the population had arrived in the preceding nine 
months.115 Census figures from 1897 regarding the marital status of Baku residents 
contribute somewhat to this picture of a “fluid” population: 60% of men ages 20-29 were 
unmarried (compared to 8% of women in the same age group). In the 30-39 age group, 
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the number of unmarried men dropped to 20%.116 Russians and other ethnic groups who 
typically occupied skilled positions in Baku were more likely to be older and married; the 
lopsidedness of marital status within the unskilled labor population was therefore likely 
even more exaggerated than census figures showed.117 The typical unskilled laborer in 
the Baku oil industry was young, unmarried, and male, attempting to pull together 
savings or send money back home with the hope of returning to a more comfortable life. 
Although precise migration routes within the Russian Empire are difficult to 
sketch out, some conclusions can be drawn from population snapshots of Baku in the late 
nineteenth century. Aside from those workers who migrated from Persia and elite 
company personnel who traveled from Western Europe, migrant workers came from 
elsewhere in the Russian Empire. The 1897 Russian census broke down populations by 
mother tongue (rodnoi iazyk), which corresponded closely with place of origin. The 
census showed that the urban population of the Baku guberniia (65% of whom lived in 
the city of Baku proper) was majority Transcaucasian—roughly half spoke “Tatar,” one- 
seventh spoke Armenian, and there were large numbers of Georgian, Turkish, Lezgin, 
and Talysh speakers. Unsurprisingly, the majority of migrants from elsewhere in the 
Russian Empire came from the areas of greatest population concentration: the country’s 
European regions. The second-largest language group in Baku was Russian (some 
40,000, or about 23%). Other Slavic groups, primarily Ukrainians (malorusskii [“Little 
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Russians”]) and Belarusians, had significant concentrations, as did Poles and 
Lithuanians.118 
Officially, subjects of the Russian Empire were not free to move about as they 
pleased, even after the Emancipation of 1861. Peter the Great instituted an internal 
passport system in 1719 that was intended to control movement within the empire so that 
the state could maintain a stable tax base, make best use of the empire’s agricultural and 
other resources, and control who inhabited the cities.119 Part of this effort to control 
movement involved encouraging or forcibly sending workers to industrial sites to aid in 
their development, an approach later adopted by the Soviet regime as well.120 Subjects of 
the Russian Empire migrating to Baku were likely a mix of sanctioned and unsanctioned 
migrant laborers. 
Until the upheaval of the 1917-1920 period, a significant number of Baku’s 
unskilled workers were seasonal labor migrants from northern Persia. A series of 
conflicts with Russia in the early nineteenth century, repeated famines, disruptive reform 
movements, and decades of weak and/or arbitrary state control had caused widespread 
social dislocations in northern Persia by the mid-nineteenth century, prompting many in 
the region to seek either asylum or new labor opportunities in neighboring countries, 
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primarily Russia.121 Russian Transcaucasia was especially appealing—its nearness made 
seasonal migration relatively uncomplicated, and Russian Azerbaijanis were an ethnic 
group very closely tied to the ethnic Azerbaijanis of northern Persia.122 In the nineteenth 
century, migrants from northern Persia were greeted by Azerbaijanis as hamshahri: 
fellow countrymen.123 
As northern Persia was falling into disorder, Russian Transcaucasia was changing 
for the better in regard to employment. The expansion of industry and shifts in Russian 
agriculture created labor shortages in Transcaucasia and other regions of the Russian 
Empire.124 Migration rates between northern Persia (the Persian province also named 
Azerbaijan) and Baku gradually but steadily increased over the course of the nineteenth 
century; after the 1872 oil-leasing reforms, migration rates skyrocketed. It appears that 
Iranian Azerbaijani men seeking work learned of opportunities in the Russian Empire 
primarily through word of mouth, but private companies did spread word through 
advertisements in local publications.125 The Russian state attempted to regulate this 
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migration to some degree, officially requiring migrants from the Persian Empire to obtain 
visas and other permits before traveling and to register with officials upon arrival.126 
However, the greater the demand for labor in Baku, the more flexible the Russian state 
became. In 1887, the Russian government issued a law that allowed migrants from the 
Persian Empire to live in Russia for six months without the need for visas or registration. 
Documented migration rose from an average of 13,000 Iranian Azerbaijanis per year 
between 1876 and 1890 to over 56,000 in 1896. Undocumented migration rates are 
difficult to judge, but were certainly in the tens of thousands per year. In total, perhaps 
100,000 Iranian Azerbaijanis crossed into Russia each year around the turn of the 
century, one-seventh to one-fifth of them traveling directly to Baku to work in the oil 
industry and associated enterprises.127 By 1897, the total Iranian Azerbaijani population 
of Baku was in the tens of thousands.128 
There was pronounced ethnic stratification within the Baku oil industry. Iranian 
Azerbaijanis and Transcaucasian locals consistently occupied the worst jobs, such as 
diggers and bailers (Table 3). A Persian report on conditions in the Baku oil sector 
described the situation of Iranian Azerbaijani workers thus: “In [Sabunchi and 
Balakhani], in order to reach oil the depth of the wells varies between 35 and 45 metres. 
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Usually, after 30 metres of digging, the ill-fated Iranian workers cannot stand the gas 
inside and are poisoned and pass away. No information on working condition[s] is 
available, and with no knowledge of what awaits them at the bottom of the well the 
Iranian diggers accept the pay of 20 to 40 manats a day and meet their unfortunate fate. It 
is almost every day that news of the death of 4 or 5 of these diggers appears in the local 
press.”129 Many local Azerbaijanis had similar experiences, but Iranian Azerbaijanis were 
in an even more precarious position. They had very little job security, especially once 
labor and ethnic unrest began to consume the Baku region in late 1904, temporarily 
reducing oil production and therefore demand for labor; many were forcibly deported.130 
In addition, local Azerbaijanis had somewhat greater access to upper-tier unskilled and 
lower-tier skilled labor. There was also discrimination in wages, in that the same work 
earned different wages depending on nationality (Iranian Azerbaijanis earned less than 
Russians, Armenians, and local Azerbaijanis). Even in times of great labor shortage, 
Iranian Azerbaijanis continued to earn less. Iranian Azerbaijanis’ status as non-subjects 
was certainly a barrier in these cases, but the Russian state also pursued a relatively subtle 
policy of relegating Iranian Azerbaijani migrant laborers to the worst unskilled jobs in 
order to sustain barriers within the Baku workforce as a means of avoiding labor 
organization.131 
 
 
 
129 Quoted in Atabaki, 420-421. 
 
130 Atabaki, 421; Hakimian, 447, 450, 457. Russian officials may have believed that Iranian Azerbaijani 
workers were exacerbating political unrest in Baku in 1905, acting under the influence of the Russian 
Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) and later the Bolsheviks, as well as budding socialist movements 
in their own country. 
 
131 Atabaki, 417. 
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Table 3. Ethnic Composition of the Baku Oilfields Workforce (1893 and 1900)132 
Ethnic origin 1893 1900 
 % of unskilled % of skilled % of unskilled % of skilled 
Tatars (Azeris) 21.5 3 19 12.3 
Russians 13.7 54.3 10.9 42.9 
Armenians 26.4 27 24.3 30.8 
Dagestanis 19.1 1 17 2.8 
Iranians/Persians 14 - 24.7 4.7 
Others 5.3 14.7 4.1 6.5 
 
 
Because of its oil industry, Baku became one of the largest cities in the Russian 
Empire, and the second largest in Transcaucasia by 1897, after the Caucasus Viceroyalty 
capital of Tbilisi. Including the population of nearby satellite communities, it was by far 
the largest industrial center in the southern Russian Empire. Nearly all migrants came to 
work in positions directly and indirectly related to the oil industry, whether as diggers, 
drillers, and bailers out in the oilfields; refinery workers and managers; carpenters; 
clerks; geologists; or as workers in the myriad other trades that sustained the growing 
industry. 
 
 
Physical Transformation of Baku 
 
Though relatively few in number, the European oilmen who traveled to Baku to 
direct businesses, manage outfits, and work in company offices, as well as European 
Russian officials and civil servants sent by the state to oversee industrial, municipal, and 
military affairs (“career migrants” by some definitions) did distinctly alter Baku from its 
pre-industrial condition.133 Changes in the built and natural environments of the 
 
132 Ibid. 
 
133 Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Leslie Page Moch, Broad Is My Native Land: Repertoires and Regimes of 
Migration in Russia’s Twentieth Century (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2014), 13-14. 
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Absheron peninsula resulting from outside intervention were rapid and dramatic. 
Observers who traveled through the Caucasus in the late nineteenth century marveled at 
the spectacles of industry and the great progress being made in Baku’s transportation and 
habitability (by European standards) rather than the natural phenomena that had 
fascinated them in the pre-industrial era.134 Per anthropologist Tsypylma Darieva’s 
analysis, Baku came to embody the split character seen in many colonial cities in the 
Middle East: traditional Muslim neighborhoods organized around courtyards, gender 
segregation, and privacy; and European districts typified by open spaces, orientation 
toward the waterfront, and edifices that evinced wealth and grandeur.135 But urban 
development in Baku has never been separate from its industrial heart. As European 
investment in the industry grew, so did, on the one hand, the number of green spaces, 
European-style hotels and restaurants, and modern modes of transportation, and on the 
other hand, vast worker slums and dismal industrial sites, an ad hoc and decades-long 
process of altering Baku to meet the needs and desires of foreign industrialists. 
Changes brought about by the Russian presence were evident to travelers by the 
mid-1800s—before the oil boom, but after several decades of Russian administration. 
John Osmaston, a Briton taking a sightseeing trip to Persia in 1860, described Baku as 
“thoroughly Oriental in every way” but with small cultivated Russian pockets. The inn in 
which he stayed, called the Poste, was the best in Baku but still quite stark, the rooms on 
the second story arranged over reeking stables on ground level. However, after a morning 
 
134 Edward Stack, Six Months in Persia, Vol. II (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 
1882), 209. 
 
135 Tsypylma Darieva, “Reconfiguring a Public Place. Baku Promenade between Europe and Asia,” 
Comparative Studies on Regional Powers Series, no. 13, 117-132 (Sapporo: Hokkaido University Press, 
2013), 123. 
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of wandering the dusty, colorful bazaar, Osmaston dined one evening with one “Colonel 
Fragank,” a “gentleman” with a pleasant, English-style residence in Baku.136 High walls 
enclosed a garden, “a little oasis of green…only kept so by hard labour, by the constant 
working of a well, a horse, and a man.” In addition to multiple stuffed Caspian tigers 
(now extinct), the colonel’s household consisted of a wife, three children, a German 
governess, and local servants. The family spoke German and French to one another, and 
Russian to the servants. In Ostmaston’s opinion, they were all well-mannered and well- 
educated, “though so far away from all civilisation.”137 Several years later, a new hotel 
had usurped the Poste as the best lodging in Baku—the Hotel Dominique, run by an 
Italian landlord. While Baker Valentine had no complaints, Arthur Arnold and his wife in 
1875 found the same hotel’s rooms quite bare and full of sand or dust, but he made a 
special note regarding the rise of European-style houses in central Baku.138 The 
governor’s residence, a large mansion constructed along the seaside promenade in the 
mid-1860s, was of course noteworthy. A number of European travelers, including Henry 
Morton Stanley, found themselves invited to governors’ frequent soirees as distinguished 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
136 Possibly due to misspelling or poor transliteration in this account, I have been unable to determine who 
“Colonel Fragank” might have been, including his nationality or position. 
 
137 Osmaston, 233, 235, 238-239. Similarly, in the early 1870s Baker noted that the house of the Governor 
of Baku, Dmitrii Semenovich Staroselskii, had “some small gardens tended with fond and anxious care, for 
anything green is cherished at Baku.” Baker, 45. Dmitrii Semenovich Staroselskii was Governor of Baku, 
1872-1875 (“Dmitrii Semenovich Staroselskii,” Polovtsov A. A. Russkii Biograficheskii Slovar, 
http://www.rulex.ru/xPol/pages/25/353.htm). 
 
138 Baker, 44; Arnold, 123-124. 
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guests.139 It was considered the finest residence in Baku, and hosted Alexander III during 
his 1888 trip to Baku, the only time a Russian monarch visited the city.140 
The barrenness of Baku was a frequent theme in European travelogues of the mid- 
nineteenth century, but European travelers were sure to note the few green spaces that did 
exist. One of the earliest accounts to make the point was that of George Keppel, who 
grumbled that “there are no vegetables [in Baku], nor, indeed, is there a blade of 
vegetation.”141 Osmaston described the area surrounding Baku as “devoid of all 
verdure[;] nothing could be more bare and barren, and this entirely from want of rain.”142 
Per Arnold, Baku was unbearably dusty, and “there is not a tree or shrub to be seen upon 
the arid hills and stony steppe, and the odour of naphtha is never out of the nostrils.”143 
However, he complimented the “Baku Club,” an outdoor complex on the shore reserved 
for Baku’s wealthy and Russian officers stationed at the garrison across the harbor. A 
painstakingly maintained seaside garden, dotted with colorful pavilions illuminated by 
petroleum lamps, was pleasant in the evening; music and the rippling of the Caspian 
intertwined as club members dined and played card games, passing “the happiest hours of 
 
 
 
139 Stanley, 237-238. 
 
140 Soviet authorities later used the building as a sort of community center. It was demolished in 2006 to 
make way for a Four Seasons Hotel. Irina Rote, “Gubernatorskii dom (Zdanie gradonachalstva, 
vposledstvii Dom kultury medsantrud, Dom medrabotnikov),” Nash Baku: Istoriia Baku i bakintsev, 
https://www.ourbaku.com/index.php/ Губернаторский_дом_-_Здание_бакинского_градоначальства_- 
_Дом_медработников. 
 
141 Keppel, 299. 
 
142 Osmaston, 243. Also see Mounsey, who describes Baku as a place containing “nothing of interest” and 
surrounded by land with a “decidedly volcanic appearance.” Augustus Henry Mounsey, A Journey through 
the Caucasus and the Interior of Persia (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1872), 329-330 
 
143 Arnold, 126-127. 
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Figure 3. Villa Petrolia, 1880s/1890s. Source: 
https://www.ourbaku.com/index.php/"Вилла_Петрол 
еа"_-_«Villa_Petrolea»_-_поселок_служащих_ 
(Черный_город,_Баку) 
their existence” in Baku.144 Around the same period, Marsh noted that Baku had a small 
park, “all the soil of which was brought in boats from Lenkoran.” Like other European 
travelers who passed through Baku around this period, Marsh was fixated on the 
beautification of Baku’s public spaces according to aesthetic standards common in his 
place of origin, desiring the transformation of Baku into a lovely Europeanized town, the 
port “par excellence of the Caspian.”145 
By the 1880s, Branobel had constructed neighborhoods of “pretty and spacious 
houses” and administrative buildings in a complex called Villa Petrolia, “a little paradise” 
meant for its European employees. Villa Petrolia was located in a district that neighbored 
central Baku called the White City. Refreshing seaborne winds and carefully cultivated 
greenery made the neat suburb a pleasant break from the oilfields and refineries, the 
“tortuous and dirty” streets 
and bazaars of old Baku, and 
the barren deserts beyond.146 
Villa Petrolia offered 
apartments for single men and 
families, and the complex 
included a library, a meeting 
 
 
144 Ibid., 137. In 1870, Henry Morton Stanley visited an “English clubhouse” in Baku, a building “whose 
exterior was eminently respectable, and promised restful ease and comfort. A gentleman took me in, 
introduced me to the finest suite of apartments there was in the building, and gave me to understand that 
while I stayed at Baku it would be a pleasure to the club if I condescended to use the apartments.” Stanley, 
237. 
 
145 Marsh, 53. 
 
146 Boulangier, 337-339. 
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hall, and recreational facilities such as a billiards hall. The large park (now Nizami Park), 
which subsisted on imported soil and water, included flower gardens and a greenhouse.147 
Although the White City contained some refineries, they were clean and orderly, 
benefiting from wealth and expertise that only immense operations such as Branobel had 
access to.148 
The White City was the shiny side of the fundamental change that Baku was 
undergoing as a result of intensive industrialization. While central Baku and the White 
City benefited from the vast resources and beautifying efforts of oil magnates and the 
Russian state, arising from the coast of the Caspian a few miles east of Baku proper was 
an utterly dire industrial slum, a growing concentration of refineries situated for the 
convenient transport of crude oil from wells just inland. The thick, black smoke that 
poured constantly from the refineries and hovered low over them prompted the name 
“Black City.” Branobel and other major European companies had refineries in Black 
City, but blamed non-European (especially Azerbaijani and Armenian) refinery owners 
for the filth of the district. Their apparent careless running of refineries (their inability to 
“manage their smoke”) in the Black City ran in contrast to the clean, European-run 
refineries in the White City, in the eyes of these observers.149 The streets were rough and 
unpaved, ponds of distillation leftovers lay all over, the soil was blackened with oil, 
ditches running with dirty water lay along the roads, and the smell of chemicals pervaded 
 
147 K. I. Dzhafarov and F. K. Dzhafarov, “Tovarishchestvo neftianogo proizvodstva bratev Nobel,” 
Naukovedenie 1, 2001. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20131102033145/http://vivovoco.rsl.ru/VV/PAPERS/HISTORY/BRANOBEL 
.HTM. 
 
148 Boulangier, 337. 
 
149 Stewart, 416; Arnold, 129-130; Boulangier, 337. 
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the air.150 Regardless of its cleanliness, it was an industrial spectacle by any standard, 
crowded with cylindrical storage silos and towering smokestacks.151 
Interspersed among the refineries in the Black City and the wells of the oilfields, 
barracks and improvised housing spread as the industry drew more workers. In the 
oilfields, housing was almost invariably of poor quality; this was in part so that plot 
owners could rapidly deconstruct barracks if a particular section of the plot proved to be 
oil-bearing. However, the larger reason was lower-tier workers’ inability to achieve better 
working and living conditions before the turn of the century due to rapid turnover and 
weak labor organization (addressed further in chapter three). Housing was often 
segregated by religious affiliation in order to reduce tensions within the workforce.152 
To be sure, some oil industrialists were concerned to improve public services in 
the city, including those specifically for their workers. The Council of the Congress of 
Oil Industrialists (Sovet sezda neftepromyshlennikov), a body made up of several top 
Russian and western European oil industrialists in Baku, in this respect acted as a sort of 
zemstvo for the oil worker population. The council made agreements on such issues as the 
provision of hygienic barracks, canteens, bathhouses, water supply, and medical services. 
Implementation appears to have been limited, given that far from all industrial heads 
 
 
 
 
 
 
150 Boulangier, 334; Idris Aliyev and Orkhan Mamed-Zade, “History of the Baku ‘Black Gold’: Fate of the 
Communities and Formation of National Bourgeoisie,” in The Baku Oil and Local Communities: A History, 
ed. Leila Alieva, trans. Emil Gazi (Baku: Qanun, 2009), 82. 
 
151 “Chernyi gorod – fotoalbom,” Nash Baku: Istoriia Baku i bakintsev, 
https://www.ourbaku.com/index.php/ Черный_город_-_фотоальбом. 
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were represented, that the agreements were not binding, and that this body was not 
strictly a municipal authority.153 Nevertheless, not all workers lived in dire conditions. 
It is evident that Europeans were repelled and fascinated by Baku. While most of 
them loathed the discomfort of life there and avoided witnessing its most unpleasant 
locales, they found the region appealing for its exoticism, its potential to enrich investors, 
and the intense drama of the oil business. The stories of boom or bust were widely 
circulated in European investment circles, and every travelogue reveled in sensational 
descriptions of the hellish fields and factories. Especially in photography and film, a 
notable fixation was the oilfield fires that struck occasionally, usually due to an accident 
or lighting strike. In areas with proven oil reservoirs, derricks stood just a few dozen 
yards apart, interspersed with pumphouses, machine shops, workers’ barracks, pipelines, 
and pools of oil. When one enterprise hit an uncontrollable oil fountain, it was likely to 
inundate neighboring plots and force work stoppages for days or weeks. Destructive fires 
were inevitable—in addition to the inherent flammability of oil and gas, risk factors 
included the distinctive wooden cladding added to derricks in Baku to keep sand out of 
the works, the high winds common in the area, limited rainfall, a culture of cigarette- 
smoking, round-the-clock operations that required lighting by kerosene lantern, and 
poorly-enforced safety procedures. However, production always resumed after oilfield 
fires, and observers were left with an exciting story to tell the folks back home. Countless 
postcards, carrying words of cheerful greeting and mundane business, depicted derricks 
 
 
 
 
153 Irina Rote, “Sezd bakinskikh neftepromyshlennost i Sovet sezda neftepromyshlennikov,” Nash Baku: 
Istoriia Baku i bakintsev, https://www.ourbaku.com/index.php/ 
Съезд_бакинских_нефтепромышленников_и_Совет_съезда_нефтепромышленников 
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and oil fountains engulfed in flames, black smoke rising hundreds of feet in the air.154 In 
1896, the Lumière brothers traveled to Baku to make a film on the subject, which they 
entitled Oil Wells of Baku: Close View. Much of the film’s thirty seconds is devoted to 
shots of a large, uncontrolled oilfield fire.155 Russians also found these images 
compelling. In 1901, French-born Russian citizen A.M. Mishon shot three films in Baku, 
two of which focused on oil fountains and fires.156 
Such accounts of the fires and gushers in the oilfields indicate observers’ fixation 
on the effect of the oil industry on the surrounding environment, another of the dirty 
features of the oil industry that added to its dreadful allure. This is by no means evidence 
of early ecological concerns; rather, European writers’ lingering descriptions of the 
industry’s exceptionally pollutive effects were an extension of their fascinated horror at 
the unnaturalness of the whole enterprise. The smoke of the Black City and the well fires, 
the standing lakes of oil, the thorough saturation of the ground with oil for miles around 
the city, the litter of exhausted plots—unless these conditions interfered with production 
or otherwise affected revenues, they were dramatic and unappealing side effects of 
business as usual, another facet of life in Baku to be endured for the sake of money- 
 
 
 
154 “Chernyi gorod – fotoalbom,”; “Bibi Eibat – fotoalbom,” Nash Baku: Istoriia Baku i bakintsev, 
https://www.ourbaku.com/index.php/ Биби_Эйбат_-_фотоальбом; multiple photo essays in Nicolas Iljine, 
ed., Memories of Baku (Seattle: Marquand Books, 2013). 
 
155 Robin L. Murray and Joseph K. Heumann, “Ecology and Spectacle in Oil Wells of Baku: Close View: 
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making.157 For their part, the cleanliness of Nobel refineries in the White City said 
nothing about the company’s practices out in the oilfields; complaints about the smoke of 
the Black City were usually semi-racist commentaries on the district’s unsightliness and 
odor. Contamination of the environment simply was not a concern for early oil 
industrialists, nor was it for industry authorities for many following decades. Suffice it to 
say that due to common industry practices from the mid-nineteenth century until at least 
the mid-twentieth century, the Baku region—its land, sea, and air—became one of the 
most polluted locations on earth. 
It is worth noting that, in every era, perceptions of pollution in the Baku region 
had some gray areas, as it were. Travelogues from the early nineteenth century, well 
before Baku had any notable industrial activity, lingered on descriptions of oil naturally 
oozing from the ground and floating on the surface of the Caspian Sea. Rowing out into 
the bay to set fire to an oil slick or bubbles of natural gas was a favorite diversion for 
visitors.158 Certainly this was quite different in the eyes of nineteenth-century observers 
from smoke that blackened the sky and oil particles that floated on the wind from 
fountains to stain one’s clothing once the oil industry reached its prime.159 However, 
between processes of nature that had always forced oil and gas to the surface, on the one 
hand, and the damaging effects of human industry, on the other, it was not always clear 
 
 
157 Thompson, 223; Marvin, 174; Marsh, 53; Murray and Heumann, 21. 
 
158 Landor, 22-23; O’Donovan, 37; Osmaston, 249. 
 
159 Abraham V.W. Jackson described one oilfield fire as a “titan torch” threatening to destroy “everything 
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what constituted pollution. Those concerned with the health of workers and other urban 
inhabitants were most frequently concerned with crowded barracks, improper waste 
disposal, and other conditions that might lead to the spread of diseases such as typhoid 
and cholera.160 
The physical changes that overcame Baku in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century were a display of European aesthetic standards and the unsightly operations that 
worked to support them. The businessmen who directly and indirectly funded the growth 
of Baku wanted the city to comfort them even as they gathered wealth from an industrial 
enterprise that spawned urban-industrial landscapes repulsive to their sensibilities. This 
was certainly not the last era in which the rewards of industrial development were 
unevenly distributed across Baku’s physical environment. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, every acre of the major Baku oilfields had 
been accounted for. In spite of the risks, or perhaps in some cases because of them, Baku 
became attractive for European businessmen and investors who hoped for a relatively 
quick and exciting rise to affluence. Western and European Russian oilmen felt confident 
in the future of Baku as a moneymaking venture, and had indelibly transformed the 
region, layering industrial infrastructure and pretty European flourishes onto the city’s 
existing Persian and Russian administrative elements. 
Emerging in this era, too, were the seeds of future long-term troubles that became 
as characteristic of Baku’s development as its pipelines and refineries. Despite repeated 
 
160 Baberowski, Vrag est vezde, 63-64. 
69  
attempts at urban planning, the city has never been able fully to accommodate the 
residents drawn in by the work opportunities it offers. Environmental damage 
accumulated, unaddressed, eventually interfering with residents’ wellbeing. As addressed 
in chapter three, the city and industry soon felt the ramifications of rapid migration and 
population, which resulted in interethnic and labor disputes that laid low the industry in 
the early decades of the twentieth century. Conflicts between Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis in Baku contributed to a longstanding feud that has continued to the present. 
Over time, the city drifted into a space between Europe and Asia, embedded in the 
Transcaucasian context that made it alien to the West, but integrated also in a system of 
international commerce that separated it from its surroundings. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
LABOR, ETHNICITY, AND CRISIS IN THE BAKU OIL INDUSTRY, 1901-1920 
 
 
The bloody and sad events of the past few days in the city of Baku upset the entire 
population in the Caucasus. Hearts bleed from horror, reading the incomplete, 
short reports about these events in the local newspapers and telegrams. In the 
peaceful, trade-filled and industrial city Baku, a savage scene of murder, theft, 
violence, and arson took place. Two parts of the city’s population, closely linked 
by common interests, and very often by the ties of friendship, warmed their hands 
in blood. 
—Yerevan Chief of Administration to Yerevan City Council (1905)161 
 
On February 14, 1905, the Yerevan Chief of Administration requested that the 
city council send funds to help victims of recent clashes in Baku. The murder of an 
Armenian man by an Azerbaijani oilfield proprietor in Baku had set off spates of fighting 
between Azerbaijani and Armenian inhabitants of the city; the violence spread from Baku 
to the surrounding countryside and other major population centers of Transcaucasia, 
subsiding and resurfacing repeatedly until the middle of 1906. This conflict, usually 
referred to as the Armeno-Tatar War, was largely concurrent with the 1905 Russian 
Revolution, an outbreak of political and social turmoil that spread from St. Petersburg to 
all parts of the empire. As an established industrial center, Baku was eclipsed by the sort 
of political protest and labor unrest that was taking place in other large cities, such as 
Moscow and St. Petersburg; disruptive striking had plagued the city for years but became 
uncontrollable beginning in early 1905. These two conflicts, Baku’s Revolution of 1905 
 
 
161 Quoted in Leslie Sargent, “The ‘Armeno-Tatar War’ in the South Caucasus: Multiple Causes, 
Interpreted Meanings,” Ab Imperio 4 (2010), 154. I would like to acknowledge, as does Sargent in her 
article, that the ethnoreligious violence of 1905 and similar incidents later continue to be contentious 
matters in the national narratives especially of Armenia and Azerbaijan today, and that retrospective 
assessments such as my own might bear some implications beyond their specific historical focus. It is my 
express intention to avoid “taking sides” in regard to any of these events. 
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and the Armeno-Tatar War, were to some degree of separate origins and to some degree 
took different courses, but nevertheless built upon and fed into one another in 1905, 
making that year in Baku’s history one of its most violent. 
As it transpired, the events of 1905 were only the beginning of a deeply unsettled 
period in Baku’s history, setting the tone for the remainder of the pre-Bolshevik era in 
Baku, just as the Russian Empire never quite settled after the country-wide Revolution of 
1905. Frontier lawlessness had been common in Baku in the late nineteenth century, but 
in the early twentieth century this disorder was sharpened and escalated by specific 
grievances. Under the combined influences of tsarist political opposition, leftist labor 
activism, and a natural decline in the oil industry, the labor movement of Baku emerged 
as a wide-scale, sometimes-organized, and extremely disruptive force in its oil industry. 
Major strikes occurred in 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1908, 1913, and 1914, followed by 
general disorder between the February Revolution and the Bolshevik takeover. The 
political breakdowns and military interventions associated with the 1905 Revolution, 
World War I, and the 1917 revolutions created their own waves of violence and unrest. 
These failures of political control became openings for interethnic massacres in 
Baku during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The distinctiveness of this era 
of conflict lies in the inseparability of governance, labor, and ethnicity in this industry 
and region, a theme raised in passing by Audrey Altstadt and Ronald Grigor Suny in their 
mentions of this period, and more extensively in Jörg Baberowski’s Der Feind ist 
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überall.162 In particular, Baberowski has detailed the deep ethnic divisions apparent in 
Baku’s organized labor activity of the time. The nature of the oil industry in this region 
caused rapid, unregulated, concentrated urban-industrial growth to a largely 
unprecedented degree, and was greatly complicated by extreme ethnoreligious diversity 
in the workforce that was made possible only due to Baku’s particular history and 
geographical location, which facilitated large-scale migration from Armenia, Russia, and 
Iran. The history of the unsettled oil industry in the early twentieth century is a clear 
demonstration of Baku workers’ complex and overlapping ethnic and labor identities. 
 
 
Baku, 1905 
 
In early 1905, labor strikes and political protest began to spread across the 
Russian Empire in response to numerous perceived governmental deficiencies. The 
severe strikes that took place in Baku in the same year represented the culmination of 
several years of increasing labor unrest. Labor and political discontent had been relatively 
common in Baku since 1901 due to fluctuations in the oil industry, so the strikes and 
demonstrations of 1905 were in large part a continuation of a trend, albeit more violent 
 
 
 
 
 
162 Suny’s Baku Commune, 1917-1918 was one of the first to address directly the clear ethnic stratification 
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and uncontrolled. Waning oil production and the fluctuation of global oil prices 
combined to put workers in a relatively disadvantageous position after 1901. 
After Baku hit its peak of production in 1901, making up more than half of oil 
extracted globally that year, output began to decline (Table 4). The reasons for this 
decline are various. Suny points to a general economic downturn in Russia around this 
time, falling oil prices and less demand for oil globally, and steep competition from the 
American oil industry, which benefited from more advanced technology and less 
taxation.163 It also seems likely that the known oil reservoirs beneath the Absheron 
Peninsula were starting to show fatigue; in the absence of large new discoveries, the same 
oilfields had been under continuous exploitation for decades by oilmen who frequently 
used extractive methods detrimental to the future productivity of the reservoirs. In 1902, 
oil production was reduced about 700,000 metric tons, or about 6 percent from the 
previous year, and in 1903 a similar decrease occurred.164 
An excess of labor relative to the number of positions available, in combination 
with less power in bargaining for fair working conditions, pushed workers to seek 
alternative means to pressure employers: that is, striking and other work stoppages. The 
overwhelming majority of strikes and other labor unrest that occurred in Baku in the first 
two decades of the twentieth century appear to have originated, expectedly, in the various 
enterprises associated with the oil industry. Oil workers made up one-quarter of the 
region’s population; therefore, although most strikes were confined to individual 
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Table 4. World, US, and Russian Crude Oil Production, 1900-1910 (selected years) 
(thousand tons)165 
Year World (thousand tons) US (thousand tons) Russia (thousand tons) 
1900 20525 8596 10429 
1901 23044 9376 11721 
1902 25022 11994 11085 
1903 26821 13574 10403 
1904 29996 15820 10509 
1905 29602 18203 7564 
1906 29351 17091 8106 
1907 36328 22442 8512 
1908 39263 24122 8559 
1909 41111 24749 9079 
1910 45109 28315 9680 
 
 
enterprises, the industry-wide or general strikes that occasionally arose often resulted in 
utter paralysis of the region’s operations.166 In 1901, workers in the Baku oil fields for the 
first time observed International Workers’ Day (May Day).167 In July 1903, what began 
as individual strikes mounted into a general strike, incorporating transportation and 
utilities workers, and therefore crippling the city’s operations.168 By the summer of 1903, 
labor unrest was a near-constant part of the Baku working atmosphere, and would remain 
so for nearly the next two decades. 
Discontent among workers created fertile ground for labor activists, who had been 
at work in the area for several years. The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party 
(RSDLP), the predecessor of the Bolshevik and Menshevik parties, appears to have been 
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the first present in the Caucasus, organizing mostly Russian workers beginning in the last 
years of the nineteenth century. For many years after the 1903 split between the 
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, the latter held far more sway among Baku workers, and in 
the Caucasus more broadly.169 Because of their explicit association with Russia, however, 
the RSDLP did not initially have much success reaching non-Russian workers. 
More appealing to Baku’s diverse workforce were non-Russian labor 
organizations. In 1904, the RSDLP spawned the Hummet (“endeavor”) party, a branch 
organized for Muslims only, and led by Azerbaijani community elites. Many Iranian 
workers were taken in by a party called Adalet (“justice”), which later became the basis 
for the Iranian Communist Party.170 However, the most influential party of this period 
was that led by brothers Lev and Ilya Shendrikov, who had arrived from Tashkent in the 
summer of 1904 to found a socialist organization that at first incorporated workers from 
the Balakhani and Bibi-Eibat districts of Baku, but soon grew to encompass a far larger 
contingent of workers. From the time of their arrival until 1907, the Shendrikovs headed 
likely the most popular labor organization in Baku, first named the Organization of the 
Balakhani and Bibi-Eibat Workers, and renamed the Baku Workers’ Union.171 
Contemporaries recalled the charisma particularly of Ilya Shendrikov, who was regarded 
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as either a dangerous demagogue or a champion of the people, depending on how closely 
one identified with the Bolshevik party, the Shendrikovs’ declared antagonist.172 
It was the Shendrikovs who organized a general strike that in December 1904 
utterly paralyzed Baku industries. For two weeks, workers throughout Baku, especially in 
the oil and transportation industries, refused to show up for work and picketed. 
Ultimately, 50,000 workers went on strike, and for the first time many Muslims were 
among them.173 There was some property destruction, including the burning of over two 
hundred oil derricks, and the labor stoppage caused a temporary downturn in oil 
production and transportation, as the strike spread quickly to the Black Sea port of 
Batumi. Compared to the 1905 strikes, however, the labor problems of December 1904 
were swiftly and neatly concluded. Oil producers and workers sat down to negotiations 
by mid-December, and by the new year had agreed to the “December agreement” or 
“Fuel Constitution,” the first industry-wide labor contract settled in the Russian Empire, 
and a major success for organized labor.174 This agreement set labor standards that, even 
if further strikes were necessary to compel enforcement, were ultimately binding for 
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employers for the remainder of the imperial period.175 Peace reigned briefly, but in 
January 1905 word spread to Baku of the shootings in St. Petersburg, and both labor and 
political activists took the opportunity to stage their biggest protest to date. 
The labor unrest that immobilized the oil and other industries of Baku was 
initially not dramatically different from that taking place in other major urban-industrial 
centers of the Russian Empire in 1905.176 That is, the process of worker radicalization 
tended not to be spontaneous or strictly self-generated, but rather prompted by the 
agitation of professionals or intelligentsia; grievances were both economic and political; 
and the unrest quickly embraced factions from a variety of industrial enterprises and 
backgrounds. The labor unrest that immobilized the oil and other industries of Baku was 
not itself exceptional in the context of the 1905 Russian Revolution—broadly speaking, 
similar trends of striking and property damage were occurring throughout the empire. 
What distinguished Baku’s 1905 was its concurrence and interaction with the first 
severe spate of ethnoreligious violence between the Armenian and Azerbaijani 
populations living in the region. Baku was increasingly ethnically diverse, but it was not 
a “melting pot”; that is, ethnic communities tended to remain fairly insulated from one 
another in the city. In the oil industry there was clear ethnic stratification along 
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occupational and union lines, and separation between ethnic groups of individual 
enterprises. For much of the oil industry’s history, Russians and Armenians filled white- 
collar and skilled positions, while Azerbaijanis, Persians, Daghestanis, and others 
occupied blue-collar and unskilled positions. Social hierarchy according to ethnicity or 
nationality was not unique to Azerbaijan in any time period under consideration, but the 
diversity, insularity, and friction of groups in Baku meant that labor relations were 
especially volatile. Ethnic conflict in Baku and the Caucasus region more generally has 
been enduring and conspicuous for centuries, perhaps millennia, but ethnic or national 
consciousness was particularly heightened in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The industries in Baku brought together workers, students, and state officials of 
a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds in unprecedented numbers. Only in the 
rarest of cases did “class” solidarity overcome ethnic divisions, and in fact was more 
often obstructed by it. As Baberowski has pointed out, multiethnicity and social solidarity 
need not be mutually exclusive; in this situation, however, longstanding governmental 
and workplace discrimination based on ethnicity was largely effective in intensifying the 
seriousness of perceived ethnic differences.177 
For reasons that are complex and partly guesswork, antagonism had been growing 
particularly between the Azerbaijani and Armenian populations of Baku since at least the 
mid-nineteenth century. I argue that, as with the labor and political grievances that fed 
into Baku’s Revolution of 1905, the tension that grew into outright violence primarily 
between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in Baku can be largely traced back to the rapid 
growth of the region’s oil industry. Industrial growth demanded more workers and other 
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personnel, which provoked rapid growth in the region’s population. Men and women 
traveled from Russia proper, Central Asia, what is today Iran, and from elsewhere in the 
Caucasus, turning Baku from a city of several thousand in the mid-nineteenth century to 
over 150,000 in 1903.178 Notably, many of the permanent arrivals (as opposed to seasonal 
laborers) were Armenians, who often received preferential treatment from tsarist 
authorities, and as a result occupied more gainful positions in the oil industry. In 
combination with various other ethnoreligious differences, not least that Armenians were 
Christian and Azerbaijanis Muslim, resentment grew between the two populations, most 
clearly in overcrowded Baku. 
Relatively recent western scholarship has contended that tsarist authorities in the 
Caucasus deliberately fomented hostility between the two groups in a decades-long 
“divide and rule” strategy.179 I do not dispute that the nature of Russian governance in the 
Caucasus was significant in generating these clashes; with some significant exceptions, 
Russian policy did appear to favor Armenians more often than Azerbaijanis. It should be 
noted nonetheless that evidence of a deliberate, long-term strategy to create antipathy 
between the two groups is weak; contemporary and scholarly accounts that emphasize 
this interpretation (excepting Altstadt) are frequently motivated by some other platform, 
such as Marxism or anti-Russian sentiment. Certainly, Russian authorities and private oil 
company owners did routinely practice ethnicity-based labor and economic 
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Figure 4. Destruction in the Baku oilfields, 1905. Source: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian%E2%80%93Tatar_massacres_of_1905%E 
2%80%9307#/media/File:Neft.jpg 
discrimination, but instances of casual racism versus strategic attempts to deter 
widespread labor organization are not clear cut. 
In February 1905, less than a month after the escalating labor, political, and social 
tensions in the empire had given way to labor revolution in Baku after “Bloody Sunday,” 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis throughout Transcaucasia began attacking one another in 
recurring, often small-scale, bloody and destructive confrontations. The first attacks took 
place on February 6 following the public murder of an Azerbaijani by one or more 
Armenians; the reason for the murder is unclear, but could very well have been the 
outcome of a personal dispute. The conflict increased in scale on each of the three 
following days, growing to include large numbers from each ethnoreligious group and 
setting entire neighborhoods of the city against one another.180 This particular wave of 
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violence, which included murder, beatings, theft, and arson, ended only when imperial 
troops were called in to clear the streets. Between 3,000 and 10,000 people were dead by 
the end.181 
On February 9, community leaders called for peace, offered to pay for any 
damage, and held a diplomatic parade to unite the community.182 Prince Nakashidze, the 
governor of Baku, walked through the city with the Armenian bishop, the head of the 
local mejlis (the Azerbaijani community council, essentially), and other Armenian and 
Azerbaijani elites. In his report to Minister of the Interior Bulygin, Nakashidze reported 
bystanders’ “shouts of joy” during the procession, followed by an evening of calm. 
Nevertheless, he expressed uneasiness about the future.183 His fear was ultimately 
justified; the atmosphere of conciliation did not last long. 
Sporadic outbreaks of demonstrations and intermixed violence took place 
throughout the remainder of year. In March of 1905, the Transcaucasian Railway strike 
reached Baku, spreading from railway workers to other industries. Tens of thousands of 
workers participated in striking and other demonstrations on May Day of that year. After 
Nakashidze was assassinated by Armenian nationalists in May, nearly the entire 
Caucasian region was placed under martial law.184 Throughout the spring and summer of 
1905, numerous smaller strikes in industries of all kinds took place, settled either by 
employer concessions or by force, but always another arose elsewhere. This state of 
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affairs continued not simply because workers felt empowered by the general disarray that 
weakened employers, but also because the labor activism was itself quite disorganized. 
The general strike of December 1904 had been uniquely successful because the 
Shendrikovs acted as a strong, single advocate for workers of all participating enterprises. 
In contrast, striking workers in the first half of 1905 lacked a unified labor movement, 
and so no general settlement between labor and employers could be made. Each small- 
scale strike had to be settled individually and was in no sense binding for the workers or 
employers of other trades or enterprises. 
After February, the largest-scale and most violent incident of 1905 was the 
August general strike, organized by the Baku Committee, which had managed to 
coordinate a large number of workers. The strike began in Baku on August 16; on the 
same day in the city of Shusha, far to the east, yet another outbreak of violence between 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis took place. As word of this incident spread to Baku, 
ethnoreligious violence also pervaded the general strike, turning the organized 
demonstration into bedlam. Between August 20 and August 26, ethnoreligious and other 
violence killed hundreds and wounded thousands more; arson far worse and more 
widespread than that earlier in the year destroyed workers’ homes and industrial 
infrastructure and set wells ablaze.185 
In this period, labor and ethnoreligious identities blurred in myriad ways. Russian 
workers were typically considered to be the most proactive and enlightened because they 
went on strike for, in the view of labor organizers, the most progressive reasons—that is, 
they desired more expansive social and political concessions. It was noted in the records 
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of oil companies such as Nobel and Krasilnikov that “Muslim workers” were the first to 
begin striking in 1905, bringing work to a halt. Furthermore, the industrial sabotage that 
took place in 1905 and 1906 was not simply a matter of workers taking political and 
economic grievances too far, but was in some cases motivated by the ethnicity of the 
owners or personnel of a particular enterprise.186 In other cases, it was likely collateral 
damage, as the ongoing violence between Azerbaijanis and Armenians contributed to 
general lawlessness in the region that easily turned to property damage, quite often arson. 
Likewise, the Armeno-Tatar War should not be considered separate from the 
Revolution of 1905. The acute breakdown of authority that followed Bloody Sunday 
created an anarchic atmosphere in Baku that at the very least fostered the continuation of 
outbreaks of ethnoreligious violence in February 1905. Various other mass political 
demonstrations during the following year and a half, most notably in October 1905, 
generated unrest that at times turned to ethnoreligious violence.187 In most cases, it is 
difficult to determine whether a particular outbreak of violence or arson was motivated 
by political, economic, or ethnic grievances, and whether the grievances were personal or 
based on broader motives. 
The violence of this period ultimately died down due to the settlement of the 
October Manifesto, which temporarily calmed labor and political upset. Stronger law 
enforcement presence and a constant state of either emergency or martial law helped to 
dampen unrest as well.188 In mid-1905, before the August riots, city administrators began 
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to implement police reforms, which included bringing district police forces more directly 
under the control of the central Baku police department. D. Odinstov, one of Baku’s 
former governors, advised on this restructuring. A larger police force was justified, he 
argued, because the city was large and growing, the workforce was unruly and saw 
constant turnover, the population was unusually ethnically heterogeneous and 
“excitable,” and the urban layout was worrying from a security point of view, 
characterized by narrow, twisting streets that were easily barricaded and provided cover 
for ambushers. Oil industrialists lobbied relentlessly for a stronger police force in Baku, 
offering to dedicate some of their own funds to that goal. After the August events, oil 
industrialists demanded to have armed guards at every oil field and enterprise and the 
right to influence the election of the police chief. Some imperial officials balked at the 
proposition to involve foreign money in policing, which they feared would result in oil 
companies running their own militias, but ultimately foreign money was accepted in 
limited amounts. By October 1906, the Baku police force had been fortified and 
restructured to owners’ satisfaction.189 
This assessment of the violence in Baku in 1905 is intended to make at least two 
points. First, I wish to emphasize the centrality of the region’s oil industry to these 
developments, as it generated a great potential for labor unrest and drew together masses 
of workers from various regions of the continent. Second, I argue that in the history of the 
Caucasus, labor and ethnicity must be considered together; the Revolution of 1905 and 
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the Armeno-Tatar War were to some degree driven by different grievances, but blended 
and fed into one another. I would like to avoid leaning too far into the notion that the 
strikes of this year “degenerated” into “uncontrollable” ethnoreligious riots, as it carries 
some misleading assumptions.190 Ethnoreligious conflict did in a number of cases seem to 
vitiate worker solidarity; for instance, the August 1905 strike might well have had the 
potential to accomplish a broad agreement akin to that obtained from the December 1904 
strike, had its participants not been diverted by ethnoreligious hostility. However, it is not 
strictly correct to imply that labor activity in this period was significantly less violent, 
more organized, and more legitimate in some sense than the conflict between Armenians 
and Azerbaijanis. 
A central interpretive issue regarding the factors contributing to and the events of 
1905 is the absence of definitive evidence, with information coming largely from rumors, 
the accounts of often confused or biased witnesses and participants, one-sided press, 
official reports, and, rarely, archival documents, which when brought together provide 
little clarity, leaving room for a variety of interpretations, in particular regarding who is 
to blame for starting it. One contemporary British military report vaguely blamed 
“political agitators,” possibly referring to labor activists.191 Maxim Gorky, who was 
traveling in the area at the time, promoted in a pamphlet his belief that the Russians 
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instigated the 1905 interethnic violence.192 Both contemporary accounts and more recent 
scholarship from a number of recent Armenian and Azerbaijani writers have quite 
consistently placed blame on the other side: Armenian writers have tended to paint the 
Azerbaijanis of 1905 as resentful bullies; Azerbaijani writers have tended to argue that 
radicalized, expansionist Armenians began the conflict.193 Soviet historians generally 
claimed that tsarist authorities and the forces of bourgeois capitalism fomented ethnic 
hostility in order to suppress revolutionary movements and labor radicalism.194 
It is this last line of interpretation that is most commonly carried forward in more 
recent western scholarship on 1905 in Baku. That is, after decades of deliberately 
manipulating the two ethnic groups, in February of 1905 local tsarist authorities in one 
way or another directly instigated the violence between them in order to distract from the 
intensification of labor-based disruptions that had troubled the Baku oil industry all 
winter.195 One scholar states that after Bloody Sunday, local officials had begun to spread 
rumors that violence between the two groups was imminent, and that the governor- 
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general had begun to allow more Azerbaijanis to purchase arms.196 This line of reasoning 
is not well supported by existing evidence, and may not be entirely plausible. Under 
Russian rule, the two groups gradually grew in their resentment of one another, but it 
never deterred respective community leaders from deriding and attacking their tsarist 
oppressors, or laborers from striking against their employers. Did tsarist officials believe 
that introducing an ethnic dispute would result in less destruction and remain more 
controllable than the political and labor unrest they faced, knowing that the they were 
short on law enforcement due to the Russo-Japanese War and the recent diversion of 
Baku’s forces to the town of Shusha, and, one scholar insists, having issued weapons 
permits to Azerbaijanis?197 Stirring up ethnoreligious antagonisms intentionally and 
arming one side of the conflict in order to quell other unrest would have been at 
minimum a reckless and shortsighted strategy, especially for a region so economically 
valuable to Russia and Europe alike. 
 
 
Aftermath of the 1905 Events 
 
The events of 1905 had long-lasting consequences largely along two different 
lines: the status of the oil industry, and relations between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in 
the region. Given the high level of foreign investment in the Baku oil industry, the 
destruction associated with 1905 represented an international economic disaster.198 
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Although the oilfields lay in Azerbaijani territory, and lawfully belonged to the Imperial 
Russian government, the development of Baku had been truly an international effort. The 
extent of the entanglement and the associated possessiveness that European interests had 
come to feel for the Baku region is apparent from the ire they expressed when the labor 
and ethnic unrest in the Caucasus resulted in extensive loss of life and destruction of 
property around Baku and its oil industry. The affected European industrialists felt that 
they had reached for a blossom and encountered its thorns, namely, “savage” locals and 
the utter incompetence of Russian administration.199 This episode demonstrates that by 
the early 20th century, the southern Caucasus, and therefore the Russian Empire, were 
sufficiently integrated into European business that domestic disorder could wipe out 
foreign companies and draw the attention of the world. That is, there was a distinct 
international element to the revolutions of 1905. 
During the first few days of the conflicts, the grand corporations that nearly 
monopolized the oil industry had remained fairly unconcerned with the unrest taking 
place in Baku, likely believing that it would soon be resolved as strikes of the previous 
few years had been. Only when the bloody fighting turned to widespread destruction of 
property later in the year did owners and investors become truly agitated.200 The 
chairmen of the Council of the Congress of Oil Industrialists and the Baku Exchange 
Committee reported to Minister of Finance V. N. Kokovtsov around February 14 that the 
non-combatant population of Baku had effectively lost its nerve: “the impression of the 
hard days was so strong that order could not be restored. Under the influence of 
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understandable panic, masses leave the cities, abandoning property and affairs, 
industrialists, artisans, workers. Fishing and trade risk being left without workers. Only a 
complete conviction that the life and property of the population will receive protection 
from the government can reassure the population and establish a peaceful, normal 
order.”201 In addition to extensive arson, which claimed not just derricks and pipelines 
but also company housing and offices, the conflict became threatening enough to drive 
away company personnel.202 Several companies, in their claims to the British 
government, estimated their immediate losses at over one million pounds, and future loss 
of revenue due to stoppage only slightly less.203 “It is at present impossible to estimate 
even approximately the amount of loss which this Company has sustained,” wrote a 
representative of the London-based Schibaieff Petroleum Company, “but it must amount 
to a very large sum.”204 The Nobels lost thirty-six oil derricks, the company office was 
looted, and its managers’ apartments were damaged. The company was not able to 
recover its production levels until just before World War I.205 
In the weeks and months following the onset of the most destructive conflicts, 
rumors and accusations surfaced that regional authorities had, at the very least, known 
beforehand that violence was going to break out, and had perhaps encouraged or 
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instigated it. Some oil company owners accused local authorities not of deliberate 
instigation but of irresponsible passivity.206 In October 1905, Sir Charles Hardinge, the 
English ambassador to Russia, wrote an outraged letter to the English Foreign Secretary 
regarding the outbreaks of fighting earlier in the year, asserting that the Russian 
government had a responsibility to compensate oil owners whose property and workforce 
had suffered because, he asserted, authorities knew of an “imminent massacre” and had 
done nothing. 
Two days before the massacre occurred a deputation from the Russian and foreign 
petroleum Companies waited on General Fedaieff, the Governor of the town, 
pointed out to him the impending danger, and asked that additional troops might 
be brought into the town, there being at the moment only 1800 troops in Baku. 
The Governor declared that there was no cause for alarm and treated lightly the 
warnings of the deputation. Two days later 1000 of the 1800 troops in Baku were 
sent by the Governor to Shusha, where disturbances had occurred, thus leaving 
only 800 troops in the town, and in the afternoon of the same day the massacre 
commenced which lasted some days. The Governor himself declared to those who 
asked for protection that he could only protect the foreign Consulates. From these 
facts it is evident that the Governor was absolutely wanting in all sense of 
responsibility and was, owing to his action in sending away more than half his 
troops, answerable for the disorders and the losses which they entailed.207 
 
Hardinge pointed out the “enormous revenue” that the Russian government received from 
oil companies in the form of taxes and rent, arguing that the companies were therefore 
deserving of protection from the government.208 Other companies made similar demands, 
claiming that local authorities had allowed fighting between Azerbaijanis and Armenians 
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to continue unchecked for days.209 However, the Russian government responded that it 
could not be held responsible for the losses, and refused to compensate foreign 
subjects.210 
In addition to immediate compensation, foreign companies and governments were 
interested in ensuring that no further disturbances occurred. Oil journalist J. D. Henry 
offered his outlook on the situation: “Obviously, practically the chief thing wanted to 
ensure the return of prosperity in Baku is a lasting peace—not a patched-up arrangement 
amongst the fanatical races of the Caucasus, but a real, permanent peace guaranteed by a 
military force which the country must keep in the Caucasus before it can expect to enlist 
the assistance of foreign capital in the development of its mineral and industrial 
resources.”211 Foreign companies continued to invest in the region, but remained wary of 
its potential for instability. 
The destruction caused contemporaries to reflect on the importance that 
Caucasian oil and the industry in Baku had for the British Empire itself. Sir Boverton 
Redwood, a contemporary British expert on petroleum and a member of the Baku 
division of the Imperial Russian Technical Society, observed, “The progress of the 
Caucasian oil business has been temporarily arrested by the recent disorders and 
destruction of property, but the first effect has been to bring into greater prominence the 
extent to which the industrial life of the Empire depends upon the supply of petroleum in 
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the form of liquid fuel.”212 Significance was invested into the region by industrializing 
capitalist powers who came to value the resource. The Russian government and local 
entrepreneurs left the oil industry open to foreign powers, who, because of their 
investments in the region, came to feel possessive of it. The unrest in Baku in 1905 would 
otherwise have meant little to foreign imperial powers. 
For Russia and the other powers of Europe, the 1905 upheavals were more than 
just another incident of peripheral ethnic conflict, demonstrating the great geopolitical 
significance that had been imbued in the peninsula as an established “oil-producing 
region” in just a few decades. Poor labor relations, ethnoreligious strife, and inadequate 
governance and policing caused oil companies to see Baku as a risky investment, which, 
in addition to the destruction of industrial property and the Russian government’s refusal 
to compensate owners for the damage, severely hampered industrial reconstruction in the 
following years.213 Archival records show a flurry of plot sales and purchases around 
1905 as owners reconsidered the wisdom of remaining involved in the Baku oil 
business.214 Baku fell behind the world’s other great oil-producing regions, and to the 
present it has not regained its status as a serious competitor on a global stage. 
In addition to this major industrial setback was the enduring damage done to 
relations between Azerbaijanis and Armenians. Before 1905, there had been no open, 
large-scale violence between the two populations. Open conflict further reinforced a 
sense of national rather than merely religious difference between the two groups. Since 
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1905, there have been several major clashes, notably between 1918 and 1920 (discussed 
later in this chapter), in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and occasionally in more recent 
years. This conflict represents the initiation of a longstanding cyclical interethnic dispute: 
the violence of 1905-1906 in Transcaucasia involved injustices that Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis could use as justification for continued hostility toward one another, and in 
moments of turmoil might fuel reoccurrences of ethnoreligious violence, which were 
themselves folded into the narrative that justified continued hostility. 
 
 
Between Crises: 1905-1914 
 
Between the settlement of October 1905 and the onset of World War I in July 
1914, Baku experienced a somewhat more peaceful period. Organized labor was 
temporarily undermined by the October Manifesto and concessions granted by oil 
companies. Suny finds that, until about 1908, “Baku workers enjoyed a degree of 
freedom and activity unknown in the rest of the empire.”215 The devastating 
consequences of worker dissatisfaction demonstrated in the death and destruction of 
1905, in addition to better oil prices and higher domestic demand for oil, compelled 
employers and municipal authorities to concede more liberties to workers and unions. 
Whether due to the passivity or contentment of workers, or exceptional repression by 
authorities, this period was in fact quiescent only relative to the scale of violence that 
arose in 1905. In comparison with the decades before 1900 and after 1920, this era in 
Baku’s history remained deeply unsettled. Rather than seeing an “absence of further 
clashes” between 1905 and 1918, Baku remained ripe to burst whenever the balance of 
 
215 Suny, “Journeyman,” 375-376. 
94  
labor power again tipped, resulting in a number of strikes, both individual and general, 
albeit largely devoid of ethnoreligious violence.216 
Certainly, despite frequent arrests, labor organizers had little trouble continuing 
their propagandizing among workers or their political maneuvering against one 
another.217 The period between 1905 and 1914 saw considerable shifts in the balance of 
power among the labor organizations of the region. The Shendrikovs, who had been such 
a formidable presence in years previous, quickly fell from grace after 1905, the victim 
apparently of competitors’ successful rumormongering, and fled to Saint Petersburg.218 In 
the footnotes of Stalin’s Works, the editors craft a story of enmity between the 
Shendrikovs and the Baku Bolsheviks, elaborating on rumors that the Shendrikovs were 
controlled by the police (“Zubatovites”) and in the pay of oil company owners and tsarist 
authorities. The Bolsheviks, who may well have been the originators of this attack, 
continued to press it for years afterward, lumping together the Shendrikovs and the 
Mensheviks as unacceptably rightist. In a 1908 article, Stalin derided the Shendrikovs’ 
attempt to reenter the Baku scene via their publication Pravoie Delo, in which they 
promoted more conciliatory tactics than the Bolsheviks proposed; Stalin framed their 
approach at once as meek and insultingly patronizing to workers, and as a danger to the 
proletariat.219 
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This was also the period in which the Bolsheviks made their move against the 
Mensheviks, who were still the most influential organization in the region. Stalin was 
only one of several leading Bolsheviks active in Baku in the years before World War I. 
After playing a leading role in the infamous 1907 Tiflis bank robbery, Stalin traveled to 
Baku. Mensheviks then dominated the Baku Committee, so Stalin and other Baku 
Bolsheviks—including Transcaucasians Stepan Shaumian, Aliosha Japaridze, Suren 
Spandarian, and Sergo Ordzhonikidze—formed their own organization. Stalin wrote 
prolifically for the relevant local press, and was active in organizing labor strikes, for 
which he was repeatedly arrested; he was detained in Baku’s Bailov prison for most of 
1908.220 After a period of exile and flight, Stalin returned to Baku in June or July of 1909, 
remaining there until he was again imprisoned in Bailov and subsequently expelled from 
the region in September 1910.221 
Much of Stalin’s writing from this period related to a series of strikes that took 
place in the first months of 1908, likely the worst labor disruption that Baku experienced 
between 1905 and 1913, in which the Bolsheviks played a large part. The strike of the 
Mirzoiev firm was the most severe, beginning on February 14 and lasting 73 days, and 
including 1500 workers at its peak. However, the workers of several other large firms 
also went on strike in late 1907 and early 1908, notably Nobel, Motovilikha, Molot, and 
Adamov. Economic terrorism had apparently been rather common in the preceding years, 
including assassination, theft, arson, and other sabotage. During the Mirzoiev strike, the 
manager of the Surakhani oil fields was assassinated, and a fire occurred in a boiler room. 
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Stalin wrote that any “dark elements” who committed acts like these were not associated 
with the Bolsheviks or honest laborers.222 However, if any workers were guilty of 
economic terrorism, it was only because of the malicious activities of the oil owners, 
“which incense and embitter the workers.” Unless oil owners corrected course by 
ameliorating working and living conditions and offering educational opportunities, the 
assassinations would continue.223 
There was a distinctly racialized note to Stalin’s descriptions of the Bolshevik 
effort to “enlighten” Muslim workers, now an increasingly larger portion of their 
organization. A March 1908 article by Stalin in the Baku-based Gudok (The Siren) 
reflects some of the Bolshevik narrative describing the evolution of Baku’s Muslim 
workers from ignorant small-mindedness to a more “evolved” state. Prevailing 
stereotypes about Muslim workers of this period painted them as largely passive laborers, 
motivated by material desires, and easily mollified by minor concessions. Now, Stalin 
wrote, “from petty-bourgeois demands (for bonuses), the workers are passing to 
proletarian demands: dismissal of the more arrogant managers…, reinstatement of 
discharged comrades…, extension of the rights of the oil field and works commission.” 
Stalin repeatedly called attention to the workers of Nobel and Mirzoiev for their 
exemplary approach. “One must see these workers, one must know with what pride they 
say: ‘We are not fighting for bonuses, or for towels and soap, but for the rights and the 
honour of the workers’ commission’—one must know all this, I say, to realise what a 
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change has taken place in the minds of the workers.” Stalin accused company owners of 
dividing and setting back workers by indoctrinating them to accept baksheesh (or 
beshkesh), in this context meaning irregular payments or “bonuses” rather than consistent 
reasonable wages and benefits. As a result of workers becoming more open to the active 
intervention of unions, strikes were more organized and effective. Workers made a “few 
important demands capable of uniting the masses” rather than long lists of petty demands, 
and pursued them with greater perseverance.224 This account of course presents an 
excessively rosy view typical of Bolshevik propaganda; more important is what this 
communicates about the assumptions held by Bolsheviks about the nature and 
motivations of Muslim workers, which shaped the ways in which Bolsheviks then 
interacted with their increasingly non-Russian membership and others they wished to 
recruit, as well as their treatment of the Baku oil industry and its workers following the 
Bolshevik takeover in May 1920. 
Following the strikes of 1908, the atmosphere in Baku remained, on the surface, 
relatively quiet until 1913, when widespread striking again returned to the oil industry. 
The rights that workers had gained due to previous strikes had gradually been weakened 
over some years as employers took advantage of small opportunities to withdraw or 
circumvent concessions. In addition, with oil prices again on the rise, workers saw a new 
opportunity to make demands. In July of 1913, a strike at the Rothschild oilfields in 
Balakhani grew to include dozens of other firms and tens of thousands of workers.225 
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Strikers made both economic demands (such as better wages and working hours) and 
demands related to cultural and social improvement (such as education in native 
languages, better educational opportunities, and days off during Muslim holidays). This 
strike ended in August of 1913, when individual company owners agreed to most of the 
workers’ demands, but the sense of discontent apparently continued.226 Individual strikes 
still regularly appeared, and in late June 1914, on the eve of war, some 30,000 workers 
were on strike.227 When the war began at the end of July, troops forced workers to resume 
work, but the workers’ grievances remained. 
Both the accounts of contemporary industrialists and later scholars interpret the 
demands that workers were making in 1913-1914 as again reflecting an upward trajectory 
toward “enlightenment.”228 In her analysis of the rhetoric of Azerbaijani elites at the time, 
Altstadt finds that, after 1905, their cultural agenda came to include much more political 
language, adding matters of civil rights, social justice, legal equality, and political 
representation to their agenda.229 Owners’ records show that by 1914 the workers had “a 
new-found solidarity….Only the beginning of the war and mobilization, however, put an 
end to the crisis.”230 However, it is not clear how important these issues were to 
Azerbaijani workers, many of whom still did not self-identify according to ethnicity or 
nationality, or whether Azerbaijani oil company owners belonging to the national elite 
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welcomed any but the most tightly controlled dissemination of these ideas. Altstadt notes 
that industrial owners of different ethnicities, nationalities, or religious affiliation for the 
most part did not respond to worker demands in noticeably different ways; the major 
exception, she notes, is that Azerbaijani owners who had made significant philanthropic 
contributions to the community, such as mosques or night schools, might have resented 
workers’ “ungratefulness” in striking when they had already received so much.231 This 
implies that Azerbaijani cultural and political elites were not always primarily moved by 
ethnoreligious affiliation, but in a number of ways identified more according to 
socioeconomic class. 
 
 
War to Revolution: 1914-1920 
 
Following the Russian Empire’s entry into World War I in the summer of 1914, 
war, politics, and interethnic disputes overtook the Baku oil industry, at first threatening 
normal operations, then undermining all production, and finally causing severe 
destruction. Although the arena of war did not reach Baku until 1917, the initial war 
years were quite demanding, as oil products were newly significant in World War I. The 
Baku oil industry was considered war-critical by the Russian state, meaning that most oil 
workers were permitted draft deferments, and that oil companies were required to serve 
state orders for fuel before their own priorities. The latter policy was poorly received. 
Although by 1914 the overwhelming majority of European nationals involved in the 
Baku oil industry were associated with the Allied countries, oilmen continually fought 
the demands of the Russian state, in the end acting mostly according to their own 
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priorities. This included shutting down production and fleeing Baku as national and local 
circumstances deteriorated.232 
Even as fighting elsewhere in the Caucasus resulted in hundreds of thousands of 
military and civilian casualties, Baku remained relatively untouched by violence until 
1917. The Viceroyalty of the Caucasus and all other imperial offices ceased to exist along 
with the monarchy as a result of the February Revolution, creating a vacuum of power in 
Baku that several groups fought to occupy. As in Moscow, Petrograd, and many other 
large cities throughout the former Russian Empire, the two main centers of power that 
arose in Baku were representatives of the Provisional Government and the local soviet. In 
Baku, the Provisional Government was embodied in the Special Transcaucasian 
Committee (Osobyi Zakavkazskii Komitet, or Ozakom), comprised of moderate Russians 
and Transcaucasians. Although it was in theory a replacement for the Viceroyalty, 
Ozakom held little effective authority. The Baku soviet was dominated by Bolsheviks, 
who had gradually edged Mensheviks out of the city’s leftist political scene in the years 
since the 1905 Revolution. For much of 1917, the Baku soviet held much of the decision- 
making power in the city.233 
The political landscape contained more factions than Ozakom moderates and the 
Baku soviet Bolsheviks, however, which accounts for the convolutions of the following 
few years. As Anastas Mikoyan recognized during his time there in 1917, “in Baku, as in 
the Caucasus as a whole, the situation is now very worrying. Baku is a node where all 
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national and class contradictions unite and fight with each other and seek solutions.”234 
He sensed that the Bolsheviks had an uphill battle before them. Actions by both Ozakom 
and the Baku soviet to muffle Azerbaijani political expression gradually drove more 
locals to Musavat, an Azerbaijani nationalist political party founded in Baku in 1911. 
While the Baku Bolshevik Party had a number of prominent Transcaucasian members, 
including Shaumian, Mikoyan, and Japaridze, Armenians and Georgians were far better 
represented than Azerbaijanis, stirring local resentment against the party. In the soviet 
elections of November 1917, Musavat won the most seats, and the Dashnaktsutyun, an 
Armenian nationalist party, came in third. The uezd, guberniia, and Transcaucasia 
regional elections were also dominated by Musavat, the Dashnaktsutyun, and Ittihad, a 
radical anti-imperial, Islamist political party founded in Baku in September 1917. The 
Bolsheviks nullified the city elections, declaring them rigged, and continued to fill the 
soviet with their own supporters, but they were clearly in a tenuous position, 
outnumbered and geographically isolated.235 
The Baku soviet remained in power until the summer of 1918, but their tenure 
was challenging and violent. In March 1918, ten thousand Bolshevik-ambivalent 
Transcaucasian troops, the “Savage Division” left over from the imperial era, arrived in 
Baku. After brief negotiations, they fell to fighting with the Baku soviet’s six thousand 
men and its several thousand Dashnak allies. The Baku soviet won the contest, forcing 
the Savage Division to retreat, a result that caused tensions between Azerbaijani and 
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Armenian civilians in Baku to boil over. The subsequent conflict, known as the March 
Days, gave rise to the second series of interethnic massacres in the city. Much as in 1905, 
thousands of Azerbaijanis and Armenians died over the course of just a few days (March 
30 to April 3), and the precise death tolls and origins of the violence are still debated. The 
most widely reported accounts stated that Dashnak fighters, unhappy that the Savage 
Division had been permitted simply to leave and burning for a fight, embarked on a 
rampage through the city’s Muslim sections. Panicked by the violence and political 
hostility, thousands of Azerbaijanis, including many community and political leaders, left 
Baku for the countryside, further undermining local opposition to the Bolsheviks for the 
time being.236 Leftists in the city, dominated still by the Bolsheviks, formed a new city 
government: the short-lived Baku Commune, with Shaumian at its head.237 
Azerbaijani nationalists forged ahead, ultimately linking up with the Ottoman 
effort to exert control in Transcaucasia. On May 28, 1918, encouraged by Ottoman 
backing, Azerbaijani representatives declared the creation of the independent Azerbaijan 
Democratic Republic (ADR). Together, Azerbaijani, Turkish, and Daghestani volunteers 
formed the Army of Islam, between 16,000 and 18,000 men commanded by Nuri Pasha, 
the brother of Ottoman leader Enver Pasha. The force began making its way east across 
Transcaucasia to Baku in early summer 1918.238 
The British, interested in seizing Baku oil and controlling Transcaucasia for 
geostrategic reasons, had meanwhile been mustering forces to make their own advance 
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on Baku. In January 1918, the British military pulled together a group of Commonwealth 
officers to make a move on Baku from Baghdad under the command of General Lionel 
Dunsterville. The goals of the “Dunsterforce” were to take or destroy the Baku oilfields 
to keep them from the Central Powers, to gather intelligence on the Bolsheviks in 
Transcaucasia, to accumulate a fighting force as they traveled, and to lead the remaining 
tsarist forces in the region against the Ottomans.239 
As the Army of Islam and the Dunsterforce were advancing on Baku, power was 
again changing hands in the city. The Baku Commune had proved incapable of feeding 
and supplying the city, and support for the Bolsheviks was at an all-time low. Faced with 
an imminent takeover by either the Ottomans or the British, non-Bolsheviks asserted 
themselves in city government, offering an invitation to the Dunsterforce to fend off the 
Ottomans, arresting twenty-six of the Commune’s most Bolshevik-leaning leaders, and 
forcing the dissolution of the Baku Commune.240 
The Dunsterforce arrived in Baku in mid-August with some equipment, but its 
men were utterly depleted by the long journey across Persia, and the city had little to 
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offer them.241 Soon after, the fresher and better-equipped Army of Islam approached 
Baku and began limited attacks. On September 15 and 16, the Army of Islam launched its 
final assault on Baku, causing the Dunsterforce to evacuate back to Baghdad almost 
immediately. Local Azerbaijanis took this opportunity to exact retribution for the 
Armenian attacks during the March Days.242 During the September Days, yet another 
interethnic massacre in Baku, Azerbaijanis killed perhaps ten thousand Armenians.243 
With Ottoman support, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic became the region’s 
official new government, headed in Baku, and remained so until the Bolshevik takeover 
in May 1920. When the Ottoman Empire was forced into an armistice in October 1918, 
British forces under Lieutenant General W.M. Thomson arrived to occupy and administer 
Baku. Although Baku was yet again under foreign power, Thomson’s conviction that the 
ADR was the new rightful government of Azerbaijan provided strong backing.244 The 
end of British occupation in August 1919 denoted the start of true independence for the 
ADR, but the country was vulnerable without such a powerful ally. True multiparty 
politics in late 1919 gave the Bolsheviks another opportunity in Baku. By the end of 
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1919, Bolshevik activists had gained control over all socialist-leaning parties in 
Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan Communist Party, or AzCP(b), was founded in February 
1920. In its Central Committee were several ethnic Azerbaijanis, but the party itself was 
dominated by ethnic Russians and Armenians.245 When Bolshevik pressure came from 
the outside as well, Baku had little hope of avoiding another takeover. In late 1919, the 
White forces led by Denikin finally collapsed, removing the last anti-Bolshevik holdout 
standing between Russia and Azerbaijan. The Red Army made its way to Baku during the 
following spring, arriving in May 1920 to provide military support for the political 
takeover by the AzCP(b).246 
Throughout the political upheaval of 1917-1920, the oilfields continually 
deteriorated. Baku in this period was not a welcoming environment for the oil business, at 
first because authority and chains of command were unclear, later due to material 
destruction and social disruption in the city. The Baku oil industry was effectively cut off 
from European markets in February 1917, and most of the European oil company owners 
who had remained in the city even after the war had begun to turn against Russia now 
took the opportunity to flee.247 For the greater part of the Civil War years, 1918 to 1920, 
Baku remained cut off from markets in Russia, the other great consumer of its oil. In 
early 1918, the Bolsheviks had attempted to nationalize the oil industry, but their time in 
power that year was too brief to make much headway on such a massive reorganization 
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project.248 In June 1918, the government of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, then 
still attempting to assert real control, decreed the nationalization of the oil industry for its 
part, looking ahead to the revenue it would need to sustain itself as an independent 
country.249 The ADR also made little progress on the nationalization issue, however: the 
industry still required significant foreign private investment, and British administration of 
Baku between October 1918 and August 1919 was hostile to the possibility of 
nationalized industry. After the departure of the British, the ADR was never quite able to 
get the industry back on its feet.250 
Meanwhile, the intense social disruption that resulted from years of political 
upheaval created an unreliable workforce. The oil industry’s downturn had resulted in 
mass unemployment; groups of angry out-of-work laborers crowded the streets and 
harassed political leaders. Industrial leaders, whose enterprises were hemorrhaging 
money, added to the upset by failing to pay their workers.251 Thousands of Bakuvians 
fled the city between 1917 and 1920 due to material deprivation and violence. The 
clashes between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, who made up the largest part of the 
industry’s laborers, disrupted the industry’s operations to an unprecedented degree. Not 
only were many oil workers suffering death, injury, and other personal tragedies due to 
interethnic violence and repeated military invasions of the city, the fighting itself 
frequently resulted in damage to infrastructure vital to the oil industry. Setups that 
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required regular human intervention and maintenance, such as wells and distillation 
equipment, were abandoned to decay without the personnel needed to attend to them. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Baku had reached its prime, producing half of 
the world’s oil, but the productivity of the industry rested on an unstable network of 
social and political systems that repeatedly cascaded into crisis. Some of the relevant 
factors originated outside of the oil industry’s reach, including the Russo-Japanese War, 
World War I, and the 1917 revolutions; others had been built into the oil industry’s 
makeup from the start. Unequal labor relations and deep ethnic divides spiraled and 
intersected as Russian imperial authorities lost their control. 
The social instability of this period stemmed from a variety of factors, but 
underpinning it were rising demographic and labor tensions instigated by the rapid and 
largely ad hoc growth of the oil industry and the careless nature of Imperial Russian 
governance in the Caucasus, as well as the influence of political unrest plaguing the 
entire empire. Moments of labor and interethnic violence in this period had specific 
triggers, but each represented the culmination of longer-term economic and demographic 
trends. The oil industry had grown rapidly and with few regulations, leading to abuses by 
employers and poor living and working conditions that disposed workers to strike when, 
after decades of consistent growth, the oil industry took a turn for the worse after 1901. 
Worker grievances were therefore to a significant degree similar to those that spurred 
workers and activists elsewhere in the Russian Empire to resort to protest and violence in 
the early twentieth century; the striking that took place in Baku in 1905 was a particularly 
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severe instance of a trend that troubled the industry from 1901 until 1920. However, the 
unrest of those decades took on different forms in each locality; in Baku, the protests of 
1905 were shaped by the nature of the industry and the makeup of the industrial 
workforce and surrounding population, in conjunction with concentrated and pervasive 
ethnoreligious hostility. 
Baku’s initial boom of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had 
prompted extraordinary population growth in the region, chiefly due to labor migration, 
bringing large numbers of Muslim Azerbaijanis and Christian Armenians into contact 
with one another in a situation that fostered antagonism. Although the formation of these 
two now-national groups should not be “naturalized,” it can be seen that in the decades 
leading up to 1905, the combination of, on the one hand, unequal and divisive treatment 
by the tsarist Russian administration, and, on the other hand, urban-industrial growth that 
brought these groups together to make the inequality obvious, was a decisive incubator of 
“group-ness” that led to national development. Similar but less severe clashes took place 
in other major cities of Transcaucasia, including Shusha, Ganja, Tiflis, and Batumi. 
Although violence between Azerbaijanis and Armenians subsided for a time after 1906, 
the clashes of 1905-1906 inaugurated overt hostilities that reappeared in 1918 in a 
massacre that took tens of thousands of lives, and acted as a pretext for further violence 
in the late 1980s and in more recent years. These local disruptions, concurrent with 
negative developments in the international oil industry, contributed greatly to a crisis in 
the Baku oil industry that was not fully corrected until the late 1920s. 
By 1919, the oil industry of Baku had been severely hobbled. An article at the end 
of the year in Neftianoie delo (Oil Business), the official organ of Baku oil industrialists, 
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despaired over the industry’s future. “What is currently being experienced by the oil 
industry can only be called a severe test. This is not a crisis with logic and laws and 
therefore proceeds normally, like a disease in nature, but something out of the ordinary, 
some kind of paralysis, which does not allow for a prognosis, a kind of deadening 
wave.”252 No oil center had ever experienced such a rapid downturn. Given that oil 
production was the reason for Baku’s existence as a noteworthy urban-industrial site in 
the modern era, its future was unclear. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESTORATION OF THE BAKU OIL INDUSTRY, 1920-1928 
 
 
After many victims, after long years of bloody battle, we won. Neither the 
governor, nor the police, nor the Nobels or Mantashevs [remain]. They do not 
exist and will never again. But the battle is not over, and will not end until we 
achieve world communism. Baku workers continue their work, carrying the 
banner forward. We stand as the source of oil. 
—“Under the Old Banner,” Bakinskii Rabochii (1921)253 
 
When Bolshevik forces arrived in the Baku region in May 1920, they discovered 
its oil industry in a “state of ruin.”254 Across the Absheron Peninsula, formerly prolific oil 
wells sat inactive, gradually filling with groundwater, surrounded by deteriorating or 
damaged pumps, rotting wooden derricks, rusting pipelines, and other decaying industrial 
paraphernalia.255 In the city itself, empty were the local headquarters of grand oil 
companies such as those owned by the Nobels and the Rothschilds, who had been driven 
from Baku along with most other industrial leaders in the time since the 1917 Bolshevik 
Revolution. As supplies and work opportunities dwindled, many industrial personnel and 
other residents of Baku escaped to the Transcaucasian countryside or more distant places 
of origin. Oil production fell to the level of 1889, before the industry’s turn-of-the- 
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255 Ia.D. Gurevich, “Rozhdennaia revoliutsiei (1917-1922),” in Neft SSSR (1917-1987 gg.), ed. V.A. 
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century “boom.”256 Multiple crises of authority, the ejection of capitalist industrial 
leaders, and extensive local interethnic violence between February 1917 and May 1920 
had brought the Baku oil industry to its nadir.257 
The Bolsheviks set themselves the task of restoring the Baku oil industry to its 
former productivity—no small commitment for the young and still-embattled 
government. The expense and effort that rebuilding posed were extreme, but the 
perceived economic and strategic value of Baku’s oil resources was high enough to merit 
dedicated attention from Bolshevik authorities. Because possession of the industry 
appeared to be a zero-sum game, the new regime would have been eager to protect Baku 
from falling into the hands of its Civil War enemies and other belligerents in any case. 
However, the importance of Baku’s oil went well beyond depriving capitalist opponents 
of a source of further enrichment; it promised the renewal of industry throughout what 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
256 Between 1917 and the early 1920s, Baku’s oil production fell to its lowest point in the 20th century, 
roughly equal to production in the late 1880s and early 1890s. Heinrich Hassmann, Oil in the Soviet Union, 
trans. Alfred M. Leeston (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 147-148. 
 
257 Soviet sources were eager to lay blame on foreign capitalists for any destruction; one later Soviet oil 
official asserted that, having failed to recover their oil concessions in the Caucasus, departing British and 
French forces deliberately inflicted “serious damage” on industrial structures. I have not encountered 
evidence to support this assertion. E. Gurov, “The Export of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products,” (1967) in 
Communist Trade in Oil and Gas: An Evaluation of the Future Export Capacity of the Soviet Bloc, by 
Robert Ebel (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 206. In a piece included in the November 5, 1921 issue 
of The Toiler, Karl Radek similarly claimed that it was “English troops” who had devastated the Baku oil 
industry during the Civil War, while other belligerents destroyed important industrial centers such as the 
Donets coal basin and the ironworks in the Urals. Karl Radek, “The Russian Famine and the Capitalist 
World,” in The Toiler No. 195, Vol. IV (November 5, 1921), 13. 
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would become the Soviet Union, a strong trade position, and acceptance of its legitimacy 
by other world powers.258 
For the city of Baku itself, the 1920s were a period of remarkable transition and 
turbulence. The focus of this chapter is the nationalization and beginning processes of 
reconstruction of the Baku oil industry under the Bolsheviks from their takeover in May 
1920 until the onset of the First Five-Year Plan in 1928. Very soon after the Bolsheviks 
took control, Aleksandr Pavlovich Serebrovskii, a close colleague of Lenin, was installed 
as the local authority in charge of restoring the oil industry. His work, and that of 
Bolshevik municipal officials, over the course of the decade brought around the industry 
and the urban community associated with it. Authorities in Moscow and Baku dealt out 
directives to effect a transition from physical devastation and (in the view of the new 
authorities) abusive capitalism to a socialist industrialism characterized by 
progressiveness, rationality, and mindfulness of workers’ wellbeing. The early evolution 
of Soviet industrial administration in Baku manifested in efforts to reconstruct and 
reorganize the industry, improve working and living conditions, and renovate the spatial 
environment of the Baku region. 
However, like many of the Bolsheviks’ early efforts, in this period the reshaping 
of administration and implementation of policy in Baku was often partial and 
experimental, a distinct contrast from the forthright approach of the later Five-Year Plans. 
Occupied with reestablishing some measure of order and control, local and central 
 
258 In 1920, Baku remained one of very few locations outside of the United States with major known oil 
reserves, making it attractive to oilmen, to say nothing of the Bolsheviks’ enemies in war, despite wartime 
disorder. Even after the Red Army had marched into Baku and nationalized its oil industry, some investors 
continued to pursue oil interests there, convinced that the Bolsheviks would soon lose their hold on the 
Caucasus. Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (New 
York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 51. 
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authorities had little opportunity to implement grand socialist infrastructural projects fully 
in these early years. Real-world obstacles hashed revolutionary expectations—industrial 
reconstruction suffered from internal administrative conflicts and shortages necessitated 
cooperation with foreign capitalists. Utopian urban planning clashed with the 
infrastructural needs of industrial development and the new regime’s inability to cope 
with Baku’s demographic growth, resulting in an urban environment characterized by 
elements of innovative design, grim industrialism, and the leftovers of previous eras. 
Decision-making regarding the Baku oil industry was fairly decentralized for a time, 
open to the influence of competing visions and interests, especially between local and 
central leaders.259 Given the divisions and mutations of early Bolshevik visions, the 
policies that guided urban and industrial development in Baku changed repeatedly during 
the 1920s. In retrospect, this period in Baku’s history was a time of transition between the 
incoherent capitalism of the old regime and the single-minded drive of the early Five- 
Year Plan era. 
State interest in reconstruction extended beyond the industry proper to the 
community that surrounded it. A study of the physical development of Baku, examining 
the interrelationship of community and environment, will round out this chapter. The 
architecture of industry itself is key to a discussion of labor experience, as demonstrated 
by Stephen Kotkin in his study of Magnitogorsk.260 In the case of Baku, it demonstrates 
well the varied impacts of the Soviet administration. Adding to the city’s ancient golden- 
 
 
259 See William G. Rosenberg, ed., Bolshevik Visions: First Phase of the Cultural Revolution in Soviet 
Russia (Ann Arbor: Ardis Publishers, 1984) for discussion of this concept in other applications. 
 
260 Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
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hued, Persian- and Turkish-influenced Old City and its gray, straight-backed Russian 
administrative and military establishments, the Soviets inserted their own inventive 
modernist styles. Even as the most visible parts of the city acted as a site to experiment 
and to display power and ideology, residences for the lower and working classes 
remained much as they had for decades, with a few exceptions: in this period, the Soviet 
authorities did occasionally attempt to alleviate some obstacles for workers by improving 
transportation and housing. 
This chapter contributes to the history of the early years of Bolshevik power in the 
non-Russian regions of the Soviet Union, adding to current understandings of peripheral 
urban-industrial adjustment to the new regime. My focus on a significant peripheral 
capital, once suffused by colonial administration and Russian influences, then undergoing 
rapid and disruptive renovation under Bolshevik hands, finds some parallels in Jeff 
Sahadeo’s Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865-1923.261 In addition to the creation 
of new institutions and enterprises, the demands of the early Bolshevik state required 
adaptation by far-flung urban-industrial centers that had an established character and 
purpose (often colonial in nature) in the Russian Empire. The situation in cotton-growing 
Tashkent clearly mirrored the exploitative colonial relationship between industrialized 
center and resource-rich periphery that had existed in tsarist-era Turkestan. In 
comparison, oil fostered relations between Baku and the center of a somewhat different 
 
261 Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865-1923 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2007), 209, 226. In both cases, the overriding objective was economic: oil from Baku, and cotton from 
Turkestan. The different natures of these two resources was vital, however, shaping the nature of relations 
between the center and the peripheral capital in distinct ways. See also Matthew J. Payne, Stalin’s 
Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Socialism (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001); Paul 
Stronski, Tashkent: Forging a Soviet City, 1930-1966 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010); 
Beatrice Pénati, “Le commité du coton et les autres: Secteur cotonnier et pouvoir économique en 
Ouzbékistan, 1922-1927,” Cahiers du Monde Russe 52, No. 4 (2011). 
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nature. The Baku region could not choose between producing oil or another product, and 
no party had any incentive to halt production. For reasons of geology the industry was 
spatially concentrated, and for reasons of geography and transportation oil had to be 
refined locally, so the city was necessarily heavily built up and industrialized. Finally, 
whereas Tashkent was comparatively expendable in the early 1920s, Baku and its oil 
were, the Bolsheviks believed, critical to the survival of the new regime; as I will 
describe in this chapter, the center agonized over the food shortage in Baku, fearing that 
it would somehow lead the region to break away or fall into enemy hands. 
In focusing on this center-periphery relationship (Moscow and Baku) defined by 
oil, my work adds to the growing body of scholarship related to Azerbaijan’s oil history 
in the early Soviet years. The relevant administrative history of the Baku oil industry 
under the Bolsheviks, as well as crucial international context, has been explored in part 
by Sara Brinegar, in her 2014 dissertation “Baku at All Costs: The Politics of Oil in the 
New Soviet State.”262 More recently, Jonathan H. Sicotte delved into Sovietization as 
related to the pacification of Baku in the 1920s and 1930s in his dissertation “Baku: 
Violence, Identity, and Oil, 1905-1927.”263 Examining the messy process of center- 
peripheral reorientation that consumed early Soviet Baku specifically as related to its oil 
industry adds to the perception of early Soviet outreach as experimental and vulnerable, 
shaped by both local and international circumstances, plainly not a clean break from the 
previous era. 
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The Bolsheviks encountered significant obstacles in their attempts to bring the 
Baku oil industry back to its pre-revolutionary production levels. The tensions of this era 
may be conceptualized in subtly different ways: the dramatic changes that the Bolsheviks 
wished to implement were blunted by the presence of foreigners and practical shortages; 
a grand transformation was effected despite the foreigners and shortages; or the urgent 
need for oil prevented the Bolsheviks from moving beyond foreign assistance but they 
were able to initiate a “spatial revolution” in any case. The difference, in essence, is 
whether the results by 1928 were for the Bolsheviks cause more for optimism or 
disappointment. I conclude that, in spite of the Bolsheviks’ ideologically-compromising 
agreements with foreign oil experts, issues of administrative conflict, and widespread 
shortages, by the end of the 1920s Soviet officials had succeeded in reorienting the Baku 
oil industry to serve its own practical and ideological imperatives. The immense pressure 
on the Baku oil industry that came with the onset of the First Five-Year Plan in 1928 
reflected not the Soviet authorities’ frustration with the state of the Baku oil industry 
itself, but rather the stepped-up need for oil associated with broader crash 
industrialization. The first decade of Soviet control in Baku was in many respects 
awkward, but ultimately the city and its industry emerged as one of the early Soviet 
state’s most promising projects. 
 
 
Bolshevik Takeover and Nationalization of the Industry 
 
Upon their entry into Baku in May of 1920, the Bolsheviks promptly nationalized 
the oil industry, completely altering the organizational structure of the industry’s 
administration and irreversibly erasing former boundaries of private and state ownership. 
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Disregarding the forceful protests of previous owners, the Bolsheviks took control of oil 
fields, production facilities, and means of transportation, erasing all former divisions to 
bring every aspect of the industry under state control. The new administration 
reorganized the different elements of the Soviet oil industry geographically, putting the 
oil industry of the Baku region under the administration of the Azneft group 
(ob’iedinieniie). The sector controlled by Azneft was further divided into ten trusts 
(tresty), associated with certain fields and industrial facilities.264 Geographically, the oil 
regions (and the settlements within them) were divided into six departments that roughly 
accorded with the main oil districts of the previous era: Balakhani, Sabunchi, Ramani, 
Bibi-Eibat, Surakhani, and Binagadi.265 The intention behind this reorganization was to 
make the operation of the industry more rational and efficient, thereby improving 
production and the wellbeing of those working for it. 
Bolshevik leaders believed that the Baku oil industry had a uniquely important 
role to play in sustaining the new regime. As historian Sara Brinegar has put it, the 
industry represented for the Bolsheviks not only a means “to develop its industrial 
capacity but also, and even primarily,…a political tool which they could leverage 
strategically to gain diplomatic recognition, attract foreign investment, obtain hard 
currency on the international market, and conclude trade agreements.”266 That is, in the 
view of Bolshevik leaders, Baku oil would not only contribute fuel and capital to the war 
effort and the rebuilding and growth of domestic industry, but would also significantly 
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boost the Bolsheviks’ bid to gain international recognition as a legitimate state and 
trading partner. However, in a more immediate sense, Lenin and many of his compatriots 
were convinced that without Baku oil, the Civil War could not be won, and the new state 
could not survive. In the immediate post-revolutionary years, the domestic demand for oil 
products was quite low in comparison to that during the crash industrialization of the 
early Five-Year Plan era a decade later, but demand existed nonetheless.267 Without a 
proper supply of coal and oil, many trains had been converted to burn timber, causing 
them to creep along at an intolerably slow rate, which disrupted the war effort and basic 
operations.268 Lenin acknowledged in 1920 that, without the capital obtained from the 
sale of Caspian oil, the new state could collapse; in that same year, the oil industry of 
Baku was at its lowest state in decades and remained very vulnerable geographically, 
surrounded by war in progress, which prevented most transportation and left it open to 
invasion from several sides.269 In spite of these significant drawbacks, the prize of oil 
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encouraged Bolshevik authorities to invest not only in rebuilding the infrastructure of 
industry, but its urban community as well.270 
However, for reasons both political and practical, recovery proceeded relatively 
slowly until 1928. The improvement that the Baku oil industry saw in this period was 
perfectly respectable, given the difficult circumstances of the early 1920s, but the rate of 
increase in oil production does appear fairly modest when compared to the exceptional 
booms of the turn of the century and the early Five-Year Plans. The rate at which oil was 
extracted and processed was related directly to the health of the industry itself—unclear 
administration and damaged infrastructure significantly and sometimes entirely impeded 
extraction, refining, and transportation. Between 1921 and 1928, the annual oil 
production of Azerbaijan increased by a few hundred thousand metric tons per year 
(Table 5). In large part, the gradualness of this progress was due to the difficulties of 
repairing the industrial infrastructure, adjusting to a drastically different style of 
administration, and reconstituting a sufficient and stable workforce. The development of 
Baku and its oil districts in the 1920s involved not just the restoration of damaged and 
neglected existing infrastructure, but also the introduction of new technology, in order to 
“catch up” to the progress of the global oil industry, and new standards of labor imposed 
by the Soviet state. 
The oil industry required more than administrative reworking to survive, of 
course. The actual reconstruction of Baku’s oil industry was put almost entirely in the 
 
270 Despite their explicit denunciations of tsarist imperialism, the Bolsheviks deftly rationalized their 
conquest of the resource-rich areas of the former Russian Empire as a necessary step in the successful 
transition to socialism. This “re-colonization” relied on the assumption of Bolshevik authorities, 
particularly those at Gosplan (the State Planning Committee) and its predecessors, that the new regime had 
a given right to develop and exploit the territory’s natural resources. Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: 
Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 78. 
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hands of Serebrovskii, a long-time revolutionary who had gained Lenin’s personal trust 
by 1920, having taken part in revolutionary activity in Petrograd in 1917 and having 
occupied multiple leadership positions within the Red Army. In April 1920, Serebrovskii 
met in person with Lenin, who requested that he take charge of affairs in Baku, given his 
leadership experience and background in both industry and engineering. 
Table 5. Azneft Share of Soviet Oil Production, 1920-1930271 
Year Azneft Share of 
USSR Oil 
Production (%) 
USSR Oil 
Production 
(metric tons) 
Azneft Oil 
Production 
(metric tons) 
Azneft Change 
from Preceding 
Year (%) 
1920 65 3,851,000 2,500,000  
1921 65 3,781,000 2,450,000 -2 
1922 67 4,658,000 3,120,000 +20 
1923 69 5,277,000 3,640,000 +14 
1924 67 6,064,000 4,060,000 +10 
1925 67 7,061,000 4,730,000 +14 
1926 67 8,318,000 5,570,000 +15 
1927 66 10,285,000 6,790,000 +18 
1928 66 11,625,000 7,670,000 +11 
1929 63 13,684,000 8,620,000 +11 
1930 57 18,451,000 10,520,000 +18 
 
 
Serebrovskii was credited by both contemporaries and later observers as personally 
responsible for the reconstruction of the Baku oil industry. Anna Louise Strong, an 
American journalist who traveled through Baku in the early 1920s, described 
Serebrovskii as “the oil king of the district.” Through assiduous labor and personal 
sacrifice, “It is he who has brought order out of chaos,” she wrote. His wife’s failing 
health, either tuberculosis or malnutrition, was “only one little part of the price of 
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rebuilding Baku” for Serebrovskii.272 His responsibilities were great, and his command 
very broad. “Ilyich’s mandate,” as Serebrovskii’s later opponents referred to it, included 
increasing the productivity of Baku’s oil industry as much as possible and arranging for 
the transportation of its products, all with the region’s military and civil forces at his 
disposal.273 
Indeed, Serebrovskii required all of these means to cope with the widespread and 
varied calamities befalling Baku. The damage done to the industry in the years between 
1917 and 1920 continued to have a negative impact on oil production in the first years of 
Bolshevik administration, and crises continued to arise. Over the course of 1920, oil 
production dropped significantly. Authorities fretted constantly about the threat of 
flooding in Baku fields.274 Abandoned oil wells were gradually filling with water, which 
took great effort to remove, but the industry lacked the personnel and organization to bail 
them out and restore them to working order. The longer the wells were left alone, the 
more difficult it became to restore them. According to the Bolsheviks’ own statements, 
imparted in a 1921 report from the United States Department of Commerce, the number 
of viable wells and overall oil production continued to drop precipitously after the 
Bolsheviks took control of the industry. In 1917, there had been over 3,000 producing 
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wells in the Baku region; by January 1921, there were just 828 operational wells. Fifteen 
percent of these, according to the report, had been rendered unusable by flooding.275 
In addition, the workforce itself was in poor shape. A general and ongoing food 
shortage, likely caused by supply disruptions, depleted the workforce and generated 
unrest among the local population. Many Azerbaijani workers had retreated to the 
relative stability of the countryside, while Persian workers attempted to return to their 
homeland. In the first few years under the Bolsheviks, the proportion of Russians 
working in Baku’s oil industry grew to a solid majority, while the number of Persian and 
Armenian workers dropped considerably.276 As Persians had traditionally made up the 
majority of the industry’s bailers, one of the more lowly jobs, their departure required 
reshuffling of personnel. This loss of workers was noted by local authorities as a chief 
cause of the continued decline in production in the early 1920s; in sharp contrast to the 
overabundance of workers that existed in the Baku oil industry in the pre-war era, there 
were now not enough laborers to do the work required to rebuild the industry. The 
Bolsheviks’ reports noted worsening shortages of workers: in August 1920 there were 
roughly 22,000 “employees” in the oil fields; this had dropped to about 16,000 by 
January 1921.277 Those who stayed were constantly malnourished due to food shortages 
and unable to perform their jobs competently. They did not receive proper compensation 
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because the new regime did not have the resources to pay them.278 Finally, working and 
housing conditions were exceptionally poor, leading to yet another mass labor strike in 
April 1921. Unlike previous strikes, which usually consisted of Russian and Azerbaijani 
workers, this strike encompassed a broader swathe of the community, including Persian 
bailers, who traditionally had stayed away.279 
The Bolshevik leadership seemed to fear that, if they were not able to put Baku to 
rights it might be lost to them, falling to an outside power or attempting to detach itself 
independently. On June 1, 1920, a month after the Bolshevik takeover of Baku, Lenin 
received a telegram from Serebrovksii and Z. N. Dosser, the Chairman of the Chief Oil 
Committee, reporting on the food shortage in Baku. The Special Food Commissar, A. Y. 
Belenky, had failed to send food from the North Caucasus to Baku, but also refused to 
allow workers to obtain food from the North Caucasus themselves. The following day, 
Lenin made a note to himself to telephone Nikolai Bryukhanov, the Chairman of the 
Special Supplies Commission of the Eastern Front and the head of the Main Supplies 
Directorate of the Red Army. “If Belenky does not absolutely guarantee the delivery, and 
quickly, then it is obligatory at once to permit independent procurements. It is criminal to 
lose Baku because of the idiocy or obstinacy of officials of the Food Commissariat,” 
Lenin wrote.280 
Food shortages continued well into the following year. On April 9, 1921, Lenin 
sent a reply to a telegram from Ordzhonikidze regarding “the desperate food situation in 
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Transcaucasia.” He noted that Moscow had attempted some solutions, including giving 
gold to Armenia (presumably in exchange for food and other basic supplies) and 
transmitting special instructions to the Commissariat of Food. However, he noted that 
Moscow was also “in great need,” and could offer only limited help. The suggestions that 
he subsequently offered all required independent action from local authorities in 
Transcaucasia: improve relations among the three Transcaucasian states, advance 
irrigations efforts in Azerbaijan “with the help of the resources in Baku,” and to buy more 
supplies “even if it be from abroad.” In closing, Lenin instructed Ordzhonikidze to pass 
this information on to Serebrovskii in Baku.281 
The widespread troubles that the Bolsheviks encountered in the first few years of 
the project to nationalize the Baku oil industry give some indication of the reasons that, 
earlier, the Baku Commune and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic had been unable to 
make progress on similar endeavors. Over the course of at least five decades, the industry 
had developed conventions that were difficult to overcome. In any case, shortages of 
basic goods and the constant threat of invasion were major obstacles in themselves. In 
these circumstances, the Bolsheviks required outside help. 
 
 
The NEP Era and Foreign Assistance in Reconstruction 
 
It is appropriate here to address the War Communism and New Economic Policy 
(NEP) eras as related to the Baku oil industry, given that the issue of supplying the 
population’s basic needs was a major factor in the transition from the former to the latter. 
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The Bolsheviks’ late arrival in Baku (relative to the RSFSR) meant that the traditional 
periodization of War Communism followed by NEP does not fully apply in this case. 
While it is likely that many other locales also differed from the “norms” of War 
Communism in European Russia, and that therefore Baku may not represent an exception 
to a rule so much as part of a trend that presents a larger challenge to the usual 
periodization of the early Soviet period, it is worth pointing out that the period just 
preceding the introduction of NEP in Azerbaijan did not see the sort of ruthless 
confiscations that so alienated rural inhabitants elsewhere. Brinegar suggests the 
alternative term “Revolutionary Communism” for Baku between May 1920 and 
September 1921, during which time Azerbaijan experienced the “same ideological 
militancy and harsh punishments as War Communism but allowed trade and did not 
requisition foodstuffs from the peasantry.”282 In some ways, then, this era in Baku 
resembled the situation of the NEP era in other locations of the future USSR. 
The Bolsheviks’ openness to outside help in the reconstruction of the oil industry 
truly signaled the region’s advancement toward NEP-era economic policies. As part of 
the “commanding heights” of the Soviet economy, the oil industry remained firmly under 
state control during the NEP period, but administration of individual trusts became 
relatively decentralized. Each trust was intended to be run productively in order to cover 
the costs of recovery.283 However, throughout the 1920s, Baku, a former hub of 
international interactions, remained dependent on “bourgeois specialists” from capitalist 
countries and oil companies. Bolsheviks both central and local eagerly accepted 
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equipment and professional advice from foreign oil firms and other specialists throughout 
the 1920s. Progress toward industrial recovery was apparent by the middle of the decade 
in no small part due to this foreign aid. Without the technological and other guidance of 
foreign experts in the early to mid-1920s, the Soviet oil industry simply could not have 
recovered at the pace that it managed. 
Until the late 1920s, when the Soviets began to innovate oil industry technology 
of their own, and Stalin began to lead the country down an increasingly isolationist path, 
authorities in the oil industry unreservedly sought out the most advanced methods of oil 
production and personnel training from American, European, and Japanese firms.284 
These “technical-assistance agreements” involved no permanent foreign investment, but 
were instead limited to technical and managerial guidance and short-term contracts for a 
fixed fee. Rather than jeopardize their ideological superiority by inviting real concessions 
from foreign parties, Bolshevik authorities “rented” foreign enterprises’ expertise 
regarding industrial technology, transactions for equipment, and labor discipline.285 One 
example is the Barnsdall Corporation, an American company that aided in the oil 
industry’s recovery from 1921 to 1924. Barnsdall did little more than advise and drill 
wells for Azneft, an arrangement comfortable to the NEP-era Bolshevik conscience, and 
nothing like the far-reaching concessions made under the tsarist regime.286 With the use 
of Barnsdall’s advanced equipment for drilling and pumping, the Baku oil industry 
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gradually recovered some of its former productivity, and by 1924 intensive drilling had 
resumed.287 
In addition to inviting foreign expertise, authorities in Baku also traded 
extensively with American and European powers, exchanging primarily Azneft’s own oil 
for basic supplies and industrial equipment, as most of the oil equipment that had been 
left in Baku in 1917 had been damaged or become obsolete. Serebrovskii traveled in the 
early 1920s to the United States to learn from its oil experts and purchase equipment. 
During his trip, Serebrovskii had arranged for the purchase of 52 million francs’ worth of 
American equipment for Azneft.288 Another trade, an exchange in Constantinople in 
April 1921 with the French association “Socifross” (Société Commerciale, Industrielle et 
Finiancière pour la Russie et les Pays Limitrophes [Commercial, Industrial, and Financial 
Association for Russia and Neighboring Countries]), highlights the intersection of the 
struggle to obtain equipment for rebuilding the industry and supplies for the community 
and the decentralization of decision-making in the first few years of Bolshevik power in 
Azerbaijan. Serebrovskii had apparently arranged the Socifross agreement with little or 
no consultation from the center. In a letter written in June 1921 to A. M. Lezhava, then 
the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the RSFSR, Lenin expressed 
anxiety over Serebrovskii’s agreement with Socifross, which had previously done some 
business with the Whites.289 Serebrovskii had already concluded a number of trades with 
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Constantinople in exchange for supplies, which Lenin noted he did “not at all object to,” 
but he then insisted on getting the details of purchases from Constantinople and 
Socifross. The tone of the letter suggests Lenin’s frustration at feeling disconnected from 
the situation in Baku. Serebrovskii apparently became offended by Lenin’s inquiry and 
glumly offered to resign, but in a subsequent telegram to Ordzhonikidze Lenin took care 
to note that he found Serebrovskii to be “a most valuable worker” and was simply 
“worried over the future of Baku.” He then proceeded, in the same telegram, to demand 
to be “supplied with exact information about the results of improving the oil industry in 
Baku, and also about the results of foreign trade operations.”290 
Particularly salient here is Brinegar’s discussion of relations among three clusters 
of Baku-oriented authorities: the central Bolshevik leadership, represented primarily by 
Lenin; local nonnative Bolsheviks, especially Serebrovskii, Kavburo chairman Sergo 
Ordzhonikidze, and Ordzhonikidze’s deputy, Sergei Kirov; and native Azerbaijani 
Bolsheviks, chiefly Nariman Narimanov. The changing balance of power among these 
groups describes the transition from relatively decentralized to centralized decision- 
making, and a generational shift in Bolshevik tactics, from militancy and (in Narimanov’s 
case) international revolution to a more composed focus on effecting socialism in one 
country.291 The center seemed to accept the need for Baku authorities to exercise 
considerable autonomy in these early years, but was concerned still that local authorities 
do their utmost to stick to the Party line. 
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Notwithstanding spats within the leadership and legions of practical hurdles, the 
oil industry of Baku did in fact recover the productivity experienced under tsarist 
administration (Table 6). The oil industry’s new authorities oversaw the reconstruction of 
factories, derricks, and pipelines; repurposed office space that had once been the 
headquarters of capitalist oil industrialists; and set out on new ventures. In 1923, they 
completed a land reclamation project in the Bibi-Eibat Bay, just south of Baku, that had 
been started in 1909 and had stalled in 1914 due to lack of funding.292 In a time when 
offshore oil extraction was still unviable, the only way to capture the oil that was known 
to lie beneath the seabed was to extend the land to provide a base for derricks. Bibi-Eibat 
was one of the most prolific fields in the region for decades.293 Following this success, 
engineers created a number of artificial islands for the same purpose in the shallow 
waters just off the coast of the Absheron Peninsula.294 
Table 6. Approximate Crude Oil Production, Azneft, 
1901-1926 (selected years) (metric tons)295 
1901 11,000,000 
1913 7,664,000 
1920 2,500,000 
1926 7,670,000 
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Retaining control of the region and improving oil production were not the 
Bolsheviks’ only goals for Baku, as I will discuss below, but they were paramount. 
Bolsheviks proudly broadcast this recovery, incremental as it was, depicting their 
leadership as its driver. A contemporary American journalist, Louis Fischer, took a more 
nuanced view of the industry’s progress, but still credited the Bolsheviks. During his trip 
to the region in the mid-1920s, Fischer observed that, despite various deficiencies, the oil 
industry of the Soviet Caucasus was showing signs of progress. “To be sure,” he wrote, 
“the Russian refining industry is backward. The varieties of oil manufactured by the Baku 
plants are very few; the processes used in the Caucasus for ‘cracking’ and extracting 
benzine are not up-to-date; much goes to waste and many by-products are not utilised. 
Nevertheless there has been improvement all along the line.” In the fields, “more 
primitive methods” of drilling for oil were being replaced with advanced rotary methods 
pioneered by Americans (likely a reference to the activity of companies such as 
Barnsdall).296 “Inevitably,” Fischer noted, “Russia will lag behind…for a number of 
years, but the realisation is general that modernisation is imperative, and every effort is 
being made to increase efficiency, productivity, quality and variety.”297 Certainly the 
Soviet Union did lag in oil production during the 1920s, “catching up” to other major oil 
centers only with the early Five-Year Plans, but its recovery remains impressive 
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nonetheless, due largely to the Bolsheviks’ openness to foreign expertise and trade, 
leniency in food distribution policies, and prioritization of heavy industry.298 
 
Refashioning Baku 
 
The recovery of industrial output was gradual, but the transformation of labor and 
urban life effected by the Bolshevik takeover and nationalization of the industry was 
remarkable. In part, this change represented intentional, if piecemeal, alterations made by 
Bolshevik leaders seeking to revive the industry according to revolutionary ideals. The 
appearance of Baku, the outlying oilfield settlements, and industry itself underwent 
reconditioning at varied paces, according to varied needs. Accompanying spatial change 
was a transformation of the feel and pace of the lives and work rhythms of those who 
inhabited this region. In this era, the industrial community of Baku saw the onset of what 
eventually fully evolved into the Soviet industrial management regime, characterized by 
efforts to plan oil production, refining, and transportation according to detailed quotas set 
by the central state; rationalized work practices in the field and on the factory floor; 
rational distribution of workers; mixed attempts (by the mid-1920s) to promote 
Azerbaijanis and Azerbaijani language and culture within the industrial community; and 
an effort to develop the industrial community physically via rational urban planning. As 
the nature of the industry changed, so too did the lives of those tied to it. 
By about 1922, the conclusion of open warfare in Transcaucasia, relatively stable 
administration in Baku, and clear attempts to reconstruct the city, industry, and supply 
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lines had begun to attract workers who had abandoned Baku after the 1917 revolutions. 
Most Baku oil industrial personnel had either remained near the city or in nearby villages; 
as work opportunities became available, they began treading familiar tracks back to their 
former places of work. The usual migration routes continued to bring in workers from the 
Transcaucasian hinterlands, central Russia, and, for a time, northern Persia. Work 
availability was advertised in northern Persian newspapers through the mid-1920s, 
indicating that labor demand kept borders open for the time being.299 Because the 
employee records of imperial-era oil companies had largely been removed or destroyed, 
the reintegration of workers required some special vetting by new employers. Managers 
held over from the previous era provided personal testimonies to vouch for the 
experience and diligence of returning workers.300 
This was not the unprecedented wave of migration of the late 1920s and early 
1930s (discussed in chapter five), but the arrival of new and veteran workers nevertheless 
required accommodation. The Bolshevik takeover involved far more than a singular focus 
on increasing industrial production; it was the new regime’s stated goal to remake the 
country into a proletarian paradise. In Baku, planning extended to the overhaul of living 
and working conditions, from the oil fields and factories to worker settlements and 
central Baku itself. In 1925, Azneft director Serebrovskii predicted that “in two years, 
those who saw Baku before the war, or immediately after it, will not recognize it 
anymore, because the physiognomy of the region will have changed so much.”301 This 
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drive was in part a grassroots movement, coming from workers’ committees themselves, 
but also represents to some degree the leadership’s pursuit of the revolution’s promises. 
Improvements were selective and partial, but striking to inhabitants in any case. 
To begin with, the new regime attempted to create a sense of community 
conceptually, bonding Baku together while tying the industrial community to the 
revolutionary project itself. External stressors, both war and the impression that the 
country was encircled by belligerents, contributed greatly, reinforcing the notion that the 
industry had a mission. Oil was not yet a primary fuel for the prosecution of war, but the 
oil industry of Baku had a financially important role to play in any case, keeping the 
emerging Bolshevik state afloat, and was still an attractive target for other belligerents 
and private oil firms.302 In particular, media and the establishment of social gathering 
places were used by authorities to promote a sense of urgency and unity in the Baku oil 
community. Recognizing the need to placate restless workers during the early grim years, 
in October 1922 Lenin penned a message in Bakinskii Rabochii addressed to the workers 
of the Baku oil industry. 
Dear Comrades, 
 
I have just heard Comrade Serebrovsky’s brief report on the situation in the 
Azerbaijan oilfields. The difficulties of the situation are by no means small. I send 
you my cordial greetings and urge you to do all you can to hold on for the 
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immediate future. Things are always particularly difficult at first. Later on it will 
be easier. We must win, and we shall do so at all costs. 
 
Once more, my most cordial communist greetings. 
 
V. Ulyanov (Lenin)303 
 
Bakinskii Rabochii represented the chief means of communication with the 
working community of Baku. It had been founded in 1906 as an organ of the RSDLP and 
was now refashioned as the Azerbaijan Communist Party’s conduit to communicate with 
the Baku proletariat. Although the newspaper’s name does not specify oil workers, 
because the oil industry was primary in the area, its articles and other features were 
largely geared toward such a reading audience. Notably, the newspaper was published 
exclusively in the Russian language from its first issue, but its content was clearly meant 
not only to appeal to all workers, but to create a sense of community among its readers.304 
The 1921 New Year’s issue of Bakinskii Rabochii sought to emphasize continuity 
in the history of the newspaper in the community, reinforcing its own legitimacy and that 
of the new order by creating a sense of unbroken comradeship with the reader since the 
first issue, in 1906, despite the political and administrative upheavals of the recent past. 
In an article entitled “Under the Old Banner,” it was proclaimed, “Workers of all kinds 
know that it has been fifteen years [since the founding of Bakinskii Rabochii]. Many 
‘veterans’ in Baku industries well remember our first issue….After many victims, after 
long years of bloody battle—we won.”305 Later in the same issue, another article 
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discussed how workers had celebrated the new year. It described workers gathering 
together near their factories to celebrate, while other “comrades” rushed around, washed 
up, cleaned house, and prepared food for the occasion. “Let this be the first New Year 
that Baku workers will meet and pledge friendship and the happiness of world workers,” 
the article continued.306 Not uncommon to such Party media, Bakinskii Rabochii 
formulated its content to make readers feel as though they were members of a shared 
effort, and surrounded by comrades who acted and believed in common. 
The party and state, often via Bakinskii Rabochii and other media, further 
encouraged a sense of comradeship and common goals with recurrent references to the 
ongoing foreign and domestic struggles that Baku oil production could ameliorate. In the 
period between the Bolshevik takeover of Baku and the resolution of the Civil War in 
1922, Bakinskii Rabochii consistently encouraged workers to raise oil production and 
improve oil transportation in order to strengthen the revolution and protect it from 
enemies large and small. As long as the Civil War continued, Bakinskii Rabochii 
constantly reiterated to workers the importance of the Baku oil industry to the war effort 
and by extension the fate of communism. “A Pood of Oil Is a Step Toward 
Communism,” one headline read. “Now a pood of oil counts as an enemy of the Whites! 
A barrel of oil greases the wheels of Soviet locomotives!”307 Oil production could also 
solve the Soviet Union’s domestic shortage problems. In the July 1923 issue of Soviet 
Russia Pictorial, an extreme leftist “graphic monthly review of Russian affairs,” reporter 
I. Amter wrote on Soviet Russia’s desperate need for manufactured products and credits. 
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If granted international credits, Amter wrote, Soviet Russia would be able to unleash its 
true industrial potential and therefore feed its “hungry millions.” “Perhaps Baku oil, after 
which the world is scrambling and of which the United States is in such great need, will 
bring Soviet Russia credits. A sage prophet would even forecast that oil will bring about 
the recognition of the Soviet Government,” Amter wrote. Amter was quick to note that 
the hunger did not stem from a true famine, which the Soviets had corrected, but rather 
from blockade and civil war. The country needed agricultural and mining machinery, a 
“forest of tractors,” in order to correct its hunger problems. He entreated “capitalism” to 
“compromise for the sake of Baku oil, and give the Russian workers and peasants 
machinery and credits.”308 
According to Anna Louise Strong, in the early 1920s a sense of conspiracy also 
pervaded the oil industry. Strong reported rumors that, when the February revolution 
occurred, Gustave Nobel ordered some of his employees to remain in Russia to act as 
“economic spies.” Taking advantage of the new regime’s reliance on specialists, they 
were to pursue upper-level positions in the government, using them to send secret reports 
abroad, including to Wrangel’s office in Paris, and otherwise sabotage the oil industry, 
the story went. “They held themselves ready, when the time came, to paralyse the oil 
industry, and thus destroy Russia, burning up oil fields and oil reserves if necessary.” 
According to Strong, these “spies” were eventually located by the Cheka and would have 
been shot had they not been foreigners.309 Whether or not there is any truth to this 
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account, the impression remained into the early 1920s that enemy elements remained 
active, requiring constant vigilance and internal unity.310 
More obvious were the physical renovations begun in the early 1920s. This 
section enters into some existing scholarship on the changes to the built environment in 
Baku in the early Soviet era. In noting that the cyclical nature of Baku’s booms and busts 
is laid visible in its architecture, making oil the primary driver of its urban development 
since the nineteenth century, I am linking to work by Eve Blau, who has developed a 
useful argument regarding oil and the physical evidence of transformation.311 Recent 
work by architectural historian Christina E. Crawford on early socialist urbanism also 
bears well on the development of Baku in this period. Applicable is her argument that 
“early Soviet planners were motivated not by form but by process—and specifically 
praxis, that is, the critical engagement with existing conditions in order to [effect] 
systemic change.”312 Baku was one of several urban-industrial sites on the periphery of 
the country that in the early 1920s acted as “living laboratories for urban experiment.” 
However, the deliberateness of “choosing” Baku as a site of experimentation, and the 
potential motivations for this choice, is still a matter of debate.313 I argue that Baku 
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became a site of experimental development because it was already undergoing drastic 
industrial renovations, which created greater opportunity for experimentation, but that the 
depth and systematic nature of this overhaul should not be overstated. Emphasized here is 
planners’ and inhabitants’ engagement with preexisting urban-industrial forms. 
Urban planning was spearheaded by Aleksandr Platonovich Ivanitskii, a Russian 
civil engineer. In 1925, the Baku City Council tasked Ivanitskii with drafting a general 
plan for the new Baku. In collaboration with brothers Viktor and Alekandr Vesnin and 
A.V. Samoilov, all architects, Ivanitskii produced the 1927 General Plan of Baku, which 
included a layout scheme for the Baku region’s development over the following thirty 
years, as well as specific development projects for at least five of the city’s worker 
suburbs and various elements of its transportation network. Ivanitskii’s plan was truly 
holistic, taking into account transportation, communications, sanitation, education, 
healthcare services, and sports and other recreational activities. The underlying 
assumption was that Baku would experience major population growth in the subsequent 
years and decades, “driven by such an exceptionally powerful economic force as 
Azneft.”314 
Several of the plan’s major elements had been implemented by 1930, but despite 
the ambitions of the Baku City Council, urban development throughout the 1920s 
remained irregular. The center of Baku remained the highest priority. The millennia-old 
Inner City and the Russian colonial settlement had been built with an eye toward both 
form and practicality, as they represented the administrative hubs of the region and its 
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industry but were not mired in industry itself. In the early Soviet era, the same priorities 
remained. Two of the projects implemented earliest were the renovation of the waterfront 
structures, including both its restful promenade and the business-related wharves, and the 
repaving of streets in the city center.315 
Beyond practicality, however, municipal authorities still showed a particular 
concern for appearance, but now according to quite different tastes. As in other rapidly- 
expanding peripheral cities of the time, Baku became ground on which Moscow 
architects and planners tested models of urban planning, housing design, modernist 
architectural styles, and social infrastructure.316 In the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
experimental housing blocks that many other Soviet cities later adopted were first 
installed in Baku, making the city “at the forefront of Soviet architecture.” Now layered 
upon the pre-colonial architecture of the Inner City and the Western and Victorian-style 
additions of the Russian colonial era were the sporadic avant-garde experiments of the 
modern Constructivist school. Constructivist architectural renovations and additions in 
central Baku were far from systematic; rather, the city offered an opportunity for early 
Russian Constructivist architects, including Ivanitskii, the Vesnin brothers, and architect 
Semen Pen, to try new styles.317 Several workers’ clubs designed by the Vesnin brothers, 
including those in Staenka Razin, Black City, Surakhani, and Bailov, combined 
Constructivist experimentations with adaptations to local conditions; the buildings’ 
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facades were blocky, awkward, and patently modern, but the buildings included 
traditional shady, green courtyards to provide some relief from Baku’s exhausting sun 
and wind. The construction of new, elaborate workers’ clubs in each of Baku’s districts 
was a statement of the new regime’s priorities.318 Palaces of culture and other spaces of 
education and socialization, such as these workers’ clubs, spread into each neighborhood 
of Baku, offering the opportunity for a rearrangement of community social life. When 
workers managed to drag themselves to a palace of culture after work or on days off, they 
rarely came for conferences or educational purposes, but rather for simpler entertainment. 
Per driller Said Kuli’s estimation of the Surakhani workers’ club, “It is a good club— 
even when there’s no movie, all come to the buffet.”319 
In other respects, worker settlements, whether part of established industrial 
suburbs such as the Black City and Akhmadly, or barracks constructed by imperial-era oil 
companies on the oil fields themselves, saw only piecemeal improvement efforts. Though 
quite flawed in terms of actual implementation, the Bolshevik regime did selectively 
attempt to improve the living and working conditions of industrial personnel according to 
a rational ideal.320 The new municipal authorities initially aimed to have a separate 
dwelling for every oil worker by October 1923, and made some progress in that respect 
by refurbishing abandoned barracks and appropriating lavish colonial-era residences for 
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worker accommodations.321 In an April 1925 interview with the French journal Revue 
Petrolifère, Serebrovskii touted his “Americanization” not only of the oil exploitation 
methods used in the Caucasus, but also a sort of “Americanization” of its personnel and 
housing. He mentioned the development of Staenka Razin (now Bakikhanov, a settlement 
in the northeastern part of Baku). The village, he said, was “constructed on the model of 
Long Beach, [California],” with 2,700 American-style houses. In this effort, Serebrovskii 
and locals had been aided by two American engineers, one of whom settled semi- 
permanently in the area with his family. In addition to advising on matters of industrial 
development, the engineers directed the construction of the community’s housing “per 
American plans. Only the styles of the façades correspond to local color. Even the 
furniture is of the American type.”322 The adoption of American-style community 
development did not remain a common practice in Baku, but rather corresponded with the 
general openness of leaders to foreign expertise during the 1920s. 
Staenka Razin was not the only oil village that benefited from rebuilding in this 
period. Renovation of several other worker suburbs had been specifically included in 
Ivanitskii’s plans, including Surakhani, Balakhani, Romanov, Montin, Binagadi, and the 
White City.323 It appears that some degree of improvement had been implemented by 
1928, when Maxim Gorky visited the area. Gorky was effusive: 
Almost every house has its own architectural physiognomy, and this variety of 
types makes villages surprisingly fun….Wide concrete streets, water supply, 
sewage, playgrounds for children’s games—everything was done to put workers 
in the proper cultural conditions. Everything is very skillful and very clever. Two 
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or three old barracks were preserved in the fields so that children could see in 
what dirty caves the capitalist masters kept their fathers….In each village, a 
family of Turks lives side by side with Russian families, children are brought up 
together, and this inspires hope that in two decades there will be no Turks or 
Russians, but only people firmly united by the idea of a worldwide brotherhood of 
workers.324 
 
Gorky’s words must be taken with some skepticism, as he was no impartial observer, and 
quite keen to embellish the truth, but in fact municipal authorities were directing 
resources to improve conditions in worker settlements as they could, partial and gradual 
as it was. Between 1925 and 1932, the state constructed a large housing estate, which 
they named for Stepan Shaumian, specifically to house oil workers near Baku, a 
manifestation, one Soviet author noted, of “the paternal concern of the state” for oil 
workers.325 The focus on accommodating every person or family in an individual house 
became less feasible by the late 1920s, however, as the city was inundated with more new 
arrivals than it could comfortably house. Communal housing, including dormitories, large 
apartment buildings for families, and oilfield barracks for single workers, became the 
norm during the 1930s.326 
Developments of transportation also demonstrate this sort of limited 
improvement. Resources were directed toward the most visible problem areas. The Baku- 
Sabunchi-Surakhani line, which had originally opened in 1880, by 1924 had 12 trains 
sluggishly rolling along the ten miles between the Baku city center and two of its satellite 
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oil field settlements. In 1926, the line and its wagons were electrified, making this the 
first electrified railway in the Soviet Union. Electrification doubled the speed of travel to 
nearly 20 miles per hour, thus accommodating the travel of the city’s growing worker 
population, and was touted as an example of the Soviet regime’s great innovation and 
modernization.327 However, this sort of improvement was not widely implemented, and 
little was done about improving transportation within oilfield settlements, which were 
often quite expansive. Oil workers frequently complained about the difficulty of getting 
to work on time or to workers’ clubs in the evening or on weekends. Most seem to have 
been forced to walk long distances without the aid of public transportation. This attests to 
the sprawling nature of Baku’s raiony. To excuse poor attendance of events at the 
Surakhani palace of culture, for instance, workers complained that they felt too tired after 
work to make the long trek by foot.328 
Despite grand intentions to effect a wholesale reconstruction of Baku according to 
rational socialist urban ideals, including ample housing and social services, large open 
spaces, and a regular grid, urban planning had to contend with the oil industry’s 
imperative to extract, process, and transport as much of the region’s oil as possible.329 
Industrial construction expanded in every direction, on land and into the Caspian Sea, as 
refineries, derricks, pumps, pipelines, and all the other trappings of the oil industry 
proliferated, becoming part of the city’s landscape. In addition, planned urban housing 
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simply could not keep up with in-migration, so migrants found or built housing as they 
could. Public health remained abysmal until the 1930s, as Baku municipal authorities 
struggled to organize basic services such as sewage systems, garbage disposal, and water. 
The death rate in Baku remained disproportionately high in comparison to the rest of 
Azerbaijan through the end of the 1920s. Baku workers did not remain quiet as they 
endured such living conditions. Worker representatives on the Baku municipal committee 
repeatedly urged those in power to provide regular utilities and to continue further 
housing construction. The Baku committee estimated that in 1925 and 1926, some ten 
thousand Bakuvians were living on the street or in shantytowns, even as industry 
authorities demanded more laborers than the city could house.330 Despite the Bolsheviks’ 
promises to create a workers’ paradise, maximum production of oil remained the highest 
priority.331 
The steps that both Azneft and the Baku city government took to remake the 
industrial community were incomplete and often ad hoc, but it was nevertheless a project 
that was key both to the industry’s productivity and to the principles of the revolution. 
The two sides of this community—the strictly industrial and the urban—were distinct but 
closely connected entities; the recovery of the one was not possible without the other. 
Together, these programs set in motion the larger project of adapting Baku and its oil 
industry to the new regime’s practical and ideological imperatives. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Baku oil industry of the 1920s was in transition between, on the one hand, the 
inefficient tsarist government, abusive capitalist ownership, and largely underdeveloped 
proletariat of the ancien régime and, on the other, the progressive enlightenment of the 
new era, in the Bolshevik view. Anastas Mikoyan, who first arrived in Baku in March 
1917 to work with the local RSDLP, much later described the striking difference between 
what he saw then, “a seedy city buried in dust and rubbish,” and the “majestic and well- 
maintained” industry and city that he observed growing under Soviet power in the 
decades after they took the region.332 For the new Soviet regime, remaking Baku was an 
indication of socialism’s power to overcome the wastes of colonial capitalism. 
In her vivid description of Baku in the early 1920s, Anna Louise Strong depicts in 
bald terms the contrast between old and new, traditional and modern, “backward” and 
progressive. “It is desolate, and as fascinating, as hell,” she wrote of the industry and 
surrounding region. 
Up the narrow streets in the Tartar City the Mussulman women toil, drawing their 
veils across their faces with one hand and balancing heavy water-buckets with the 
other. At their feet lies a city brilliant with electric lights, full of giant refineries 
where a hundred streams of machine-oils pour constantly, day and night, winter 
and summer. Here is a modern power plant larger than any in Europe, sending 
current out to operate the distant fields. Here is modern industrialism on a 
foundation of primitive Asia; workers whose dialects have hardly been reduced to 
writing, operating rotary oil-drills fresh from America….An industrial oil city, 
modern, mechanical, ruthless. In it live children orphaned by famine, and veiled 
women of the East, and men, Russians and Tartars and Persians and Armenians 
and the tribes of Central Asia who have not yet learned to read and write but who 
can produce oil for rebuilding a nation.333 
 
 
 
 
332 Mikoyan. 
 
333 Strong, 99-100. 
146  
Throughout her account, Strong, a far left-leaning journalist, wavers between frank 
narrative and open approbation of the new approach ushered in by the Bolshevik 
experiment. Strong’s account by and large glosses over the less-heroic struggles of 
Baku’s industry and society, instead focusing on the new regime’s confrontation with 
“primitiveness,” but nevertheless highlights the sense that Baku was in between. 
The changes to life, work, and production in 1920s Baku seem hesitant and half- 
hearted when compared to the measures taken during the Soviet “Great Break”—that is, 
the intense industrialization that was foundational to the early Five-Year Plans (discussed 
in the next chapter). However, it is worth isolating the 1920-1928 period from that 
chronological context for a moment to recognize the gains that the new state achieved in 
abysmal circumstances. On the whole, Soviet authorities succeeded in making its 
industry work for the country in a time of dire need. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE BAKU OIL INDUSTRY AND THE EARLY FIVE-YEAR PLANS, 1928-1939 
 
Newspapers shout in all the cities of Europe: “Holy war against the Bolsheviks!” 
“Europe must destroy the robbers!” “All of Europe against the power of the 
Soviets!” 
These cries reach the Soviet workers. “It's not so easy to catch up with us,” they 
answer the capitalists. “We will be able to protect ourselves. We will build our 
own socialist economy. In five years, we will catch up and overtake you.” 
“Not in five years, not in four, not in three—in two and a half years!” 
—Evgenii Khazin, Neft (1931)334 
 
 
The onset of the First Five-Year Plan in 1928 prompted several years of rapid 
growth in the Baku oil industry, fueling the industry’s second major boom in its longer 
trajectory of surges and lulls. During most of the 1920s, restoration of the oil industry 
progressed rather gradually; in contrast, the 1930s were a time of revolutionary 
transformation for the Baku industrial community. Technological and infrastructural 
investments by the central Soviet state pushed the oil industry to new production levels. 
As in the past, growth in the industry required masses of additional workers, most of 
them rural-to-urban migrants, as well as new attempts to accommodate them. The city 
and industry that these workers entered was, however, very unlike the circumstances that 
the initial wave of labor migrants had encountered in the late decades of the nineteenth 
century. It was in the early Five-Year Plan era, roughly the late 1920s to the late 1930s, 
that Soviet authorities attempted to apply urban and industrial policies that were both 
strictly in line with their socialist ideology and stood the best chance of speeding the 
USSR into modernity, security, and prosperity. State-driven policy provoked changes in 
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patterns of urbanization and rural-urban migration that brought many workers into 
contact with the demands, rhythms, and constraints of the Soviet industrial setting for the 
first time. 
In discussing the rapid industrialization and urbanization of Baku during the years 
of the Great Break, this chapter aligns with some of the aims of Stephen Kotkin’s 
Magnetic Mountain. Kotkin’s arguments regarding Magnitogorsk and Magnitostroi apply 
well to the situation in Baku during the early Stalinist years. In both urban-industrial 
sites, the Soviet regime attempted to destroy elements of the old and to create a new 
socialist civilization, involving a complete transformation of “property relations, social 
structure, the organization of the economy, political practice, and language,” as well as 
human nature; in both urban-industrial sites, Soviet citizens adapted to and avoided the 
demands of the new system as they could.335 However, in Baku, unlike in Magnitogorsk, 
the Soviet regime was building on an already highly developed urban-industrial site, 
rather than working from scratch; there were therefore somewhat greater limits to the 
physical transformation of Baku. Furthermore, the complex ethnoreligious landscape of 
Transcaucasia deeply affected Baku’s development and the experiences of its residents to 
a degree not evident in Kotkin’s study of Magnitogorsk. Examination of the Soviet 
nationalities policy—another element of socialist civilization—as implemented in a “hard 
line” industrial setting such as Baku speaks to another dimension of the revolution’s 
possibilities and limits.336 
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This chapter discusses the development of Baku’s oil industry during the first 
three Five-Year Plans, with a particular focus on the period of the First Five-Year Plan, 
as it prompted the most radical shift in the running of the oil industry and the lives of 
those associated with it. The principal focuses of this chapter are demography and Baku 
society. This period in Baku’s history offers a telling illustration of the demographic 
effects prompted by the central Soviet regime’s intense industrialization drive, most 
significantly in terms of migration trends. I will elucidate the connections, often 
successive, between the Soviet state’s drive for modernization; the resulting movement 
and conglomeration of laborers; and the effect of both forces on the industrial community 
in Baku and individuals’ experiences of it. Inquiries here address the effect of labor 
migration on the character of the city and industry, factors that caused the Russian 
population in the area to increase rapidly, Russians’ influence on the city’s development, 
whether migration was in accordance with the state’s interests, and the experiences of 
both Russians and non-Russians in the early Five-Year Plan era. The development of the 
Baku oil industry illustrates the ways in which Soviet industrial progress metamorphized 
communities with a specific value to the union—that is, in this case, how Baku was 
changed to meet the needs of an external power. 
 
 
The First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932) 
 
In 1929, the “Year of the Great Break,” Stalin declared that the industrializing 
Soviet Union was “becoming a country of metal, an automobilized country, a tractorized 
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country.”337 This future relied on the extraction of vast amounts of crude oil. The Five- 
Year Plan system that Soviet leaders initiated in 1928 was designed to spur rapid 
economic growth by setting production quotas for nearly all economic sectors throughout 
the Soviet Union, with an emphasis on the promotion of heavy industry, one of the 
regime’s most conspicuous sources of insecurity. The drive to “catch up” to the 
developed nations of Europe and North America must involve the spread of machinery 
and other advanced technology, as well as the development of natural resources as fuel 
and for trade. The country’s sophisticated agricultural sector would be made efficient not 
only by collectivization, but also by mechanization—the widespread use of tractors 
demanded more oil by-products of all kinds, but especially lighter petroleum fractions 
such as gasoline, which previously had largely been exported.338 Few Soviet citizens had 
personal automobiles, but did benefit from oil-driven mass transit. Many still used 
kerosene lamps and/or other forms of lighting that used oil by-products. Other heavy 
industries relied on machinery that operated on internal combustion engines, which have 
historically run on petroleum products almost exclusively. All branches of the military 
relied directly or indirectly on oil-byproducts, as fuel for military vehicles and other 
machinery with internal combustion engines, as lubrication, and for the fabrication of 
plastics and other products. Finally, as noted by former Azneft planner Andrei Naidenov, 
improvement of oil production, in addition to boosting the country’s industrial 
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transformation, was meant to make the Soviet Union more independent in anticipation of 
war.339 
The relatively gradual reconstruction of the Baku oil industry during the early and 
mid-1920s had yielded encouraging results: by 1928, Baku had reached pre-World War I 
levels of production.340 The plans for the oil industry changed repeatedly in the years 
leading up to 1928. Gosplan and VSNKh (Supreme Soviet of the National Economy) 
each put out several competing plans; the final version, composed by Gosplan, was 
approved only in March 1929. Under this plan, Soviet oil production was to increase by 
85.1% each year, until it reached 21.7 million tons per year.341 And indeed, with the onset 
of the First Five-Year Plan, oil production improved dramatically in Baku, primarily due 
to greater attention from the central state, which assumed responsibility for centrally 
planning all aspects of industrial oil production, from geological prospecting and 
extraction to transportation and final consumption. Azneft received about 55% of the 
state’s capital investment in the oil industry as a whole in 1928 and remained the single 
largest recipient of state investment in the oil industry until after World War II.342 
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Figures released by Soviet sources show that, after increases of just one to two 
million tons of crude oil per year throughout most of the 1920s, between 1929 and 1930 
production rose by about five million tons (Table 7).343 This increase in the Baku oil 
industry’s productivity was the result of new policies and pressures, primarily from the 
central leadership, that effected similar results in many other enterprises across the Soviet 
Union in this period. Bolshevik authorities had implemented full vertical integration of 
the oil industry in 1920, believing it to be the arrangement best suited to rapid recovery, 
maximum productivity, and worker wellbeing.344 During the First Five-Year Plan, state 
agencies renewed their attention to all components of the oil industry “chain,” from 
exploration to marketing, in an endeavor to drive the industry to its fullest potential. For 
oil and other heavy industries that had remained in the grip of the central state during the 
NEP era, the Five-Year Plan system meant a significant expansion of the degree of state 
control over their operations, but few dramatic changes in direction. In the Baku oil 
industry, the implementation of the First Five-Year Plan policies entailed higher quotas 
set by Gosplan, more intense scrutiny of output per person and per promysl, more 
extensive coordination regarding local and extra-local transportation of goods and people, 
a labor recruitment campaign coordinated at the local and state levels, formal and 
informal pressure on laborers to work harder and better (Stakhanovism), and greater 
financial investment from the central state. 
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Table 7. Production of Crude Oil in the Soviet Union, 
1927-1933 (millions of metric tons)345 
Year Quantity 
1927 10.2 
1928 11.6 
1929 13.6 
1930 18.4 
1931 22.3 
1932 21.4 
1933 21.4 
 
 
A newly-intensified industrial work culture, dominated by the Stakhanovite and 
udarnik ethos, played a large part in pushing forward Azneft’s ambitious projects to 
improve every element of the vertical integration chain. Increased oil production relied 
on rapid expansion of urban and interregional transportation, processing facilities, and 
equipment manufacturing. The local industry newspaper, Bakinskii Rabochii, daily 
applauded workers’ productivity, attempting to reset standards of work and to generate an 
environment of good-natured competition. On January 1, 1930, for instance, the paper 
detailed the accomplishments of a team of well-drillers of the Leninskii outfit, who had 
completely “spontaneously” exceeded their quota by 70%, apparently driven by patriotic 
zeal.346 Workers laying pipelines, operating distillation plants, and discovering new oil 
hotspots were similarly featured for going above and beyond the call of duty. This sort of 
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recognition was frequently balanced by prompts to engage in self-criticism in order to 
recognize and eradicate shortcomings in oneself and others.347 
One result of the state’s greater investment (literal and figurative) in the Baku oil 
industry was the advancement of Soviet oil science and its practical application in the 
field. Petroleum geologists began to employ more advanced instruments and methods in 
geological explorations, mapping the subsurface structures of the region using 
exploratory drilling, seismological, and electrical methods. The studies completed in the 
1930s remained among the most thorough, definitive records of the Baku region’s 
geology until the 1990s; well into the post-Soviet era, Azerbaijan’s leaders relied on the 
mapping projects of the early Soviet era in enticing foreign investors. As a result of these 
studies, Soviet geologists began to discover enormous, highly productive oil fields on par 
with those exploited in the late tsarist era. The small discoveries of the 1920s were trivial 
in comparison to massive fields such as the Karachukhur-Zykh and Neftechala fields, 
discovered in 1928 and 1931, respectively.348 Technological innovations extended 
beyond exploration to extraction and processing. Using normal distillation processes, the 
crude obtained in the Caucasus yielded relatively little gasoline, a product that was 
increasingly sought after in a country of automobiles and tractors. Thermal cracking, a 
still-developing method of separating crude oil into its constituent fractions, was 
therefore very promising. In the late 1920s and 1930s, the Soviets reported, Baku-based 
scientists Vladimir Shukhov and Matvei Kapeliushnikov developed a new method of 
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catalytic cracking and oversaw the construction of a new cracking plant in Baku, which 
later provided high-octane fuel for military aircraft.349 
The rapid increase in production after 1928 prompted authorities to revise 
projections for 1932 from 22 million tons to a wildly optimistic 40-55 million tons. In 
fact, oil production for 1932 turned out to be roughly that of the previous years, and oil 
production numbers for the following years indicate that the industry plateaued for a 
time.350 Despite this leveling-off in production, Azneft generated roughly 58% of Soviet 
oil in 1932, the last year of the plan, remaining the country’s primary oil producer.351 
In March 1931, G.I. Lomov, then the deputy chairman of Gosplan, announced 
that Azneft had achieved a “shining victory!”; just two and a half years into the First 
Five-Year Plan, the Baku oil industry had already fulfilled its plan quotas, according to 
official estimates.352 In a statement published in Pravda on April 1, 1931, Stalin offered 
his congratulations to the administrative and technical personnel of Azneft and Grozneft 
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on their accomplishment.353 Masses of workers in all sectors of the oil industry received 
commendations and prizes for having helped achieve the First Five-Year Plan in half the 
time, and, although it impossible to judge their sincerity, many workers and 
administrators spoke about this achievement as though it were a personal point of 
pride.354 Much was made of this achievement in the Soviet press as proof that the Five- 
Year Plan system more broadly was not only worth the hardship, but would indeed bring 
Soviet industry to the level of more “advanced” Western countries. It seemed that the 
expedited top-down industrialization of the plan system had had its intended effect. 
 
 
Migration and Ethnicity 
 
Integral to industrial buildup anywhere is the migration of labor, be it rural-urban 
or urban-urban, temporary or permanent, internal or international. Associated with the 
late-1920s crash development of the Baku oil industry was an unprecedented movement 
of people and a great reorganization of life in the region. Between the late 1920s and the 
early 1940s, the communities associated with the oil industry of Baku transformed as the 
city’s population swelled exponentially with laborers and other migrants journeying from 
all parts of the vast Soviet Union. Not unlike other centers of industry, Baku’s labor force 
inflated with a greater proportion of workers of agrarian backgrounds, whose difficulty in 
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adjusting to city life and the industry’s increasingly demanding workplace culture led to 
rapid turnover and disillusionment. 
In their survey of Russian and Soviet migration, Lewis Siegelbaum and Leslie 
Page Moch declare cities “the great victors of the twentieth century.”355 In the period 
between the censuses of 1926 and 1939, the urban population of the Soviet Union grew 
from 18% to 33% of the total population, nearly doubling. Some of this can be attributed 
to natural growth and the redrawing of urban boundaries, but in this period the most 
significant growth resulted from in-migration, usually prompted by the prospect of labor 
in industrializing urban centers.356 Urbanization, as defined by Richard H. Rowland, 
differs from simple urban growth in that it represents a “battle” between urban and rural 
change in a given region.357 Given the drastic growth in the percentage of Azerbaijan’s 
total population living in urban centers in comparison to rural population, it can be said 
that Azerbaijan was definitively urbanizing in this period, primarily due to net rural- 
urban migration. In addition to the usual surplus of rural labor that drove typical seasonal 
 
355 Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Leslie Page Moch, Broad Is My Native Land: Repertoires and Regimes of 
Migration in Russia’s Twentieth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 13. 
 
356 Ibid., 98-99. 
357 Richard H. Rowland, “Urbanization and Migration Data in Russian and Soviet Censuses,” in Research 
Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses, ed. Ralph S. Clem (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 113, 
114. The Russian and Soviet censuses give a better idea of overall urbanization (according to this 
definition), as population movement and natural growth are not represented well. It must be noted that 
census and other official data from the Soviet state are not without significant flaws, such as inaccuracies 
both accidental and deliberate, and inconsistent or imprecise categories (for instance, the nationality 
designation for Azerbaijani Turks changed more than once). However, the numbers appear to be reliable 
enough to indicate broad trends that are supported by other sources. For figures and calculations related to 
population growth and national composition in Transcaucasia, the Azerbaijan SSR, and Baku, other than 
those given in census data from 1926 and 1939, I rely primarily on those reported by Richard Pipes in 
“Demographic and Ethnographic Changes in Transcaucasia, 1897-1956.” This article, although produced in 
1959, appears to remain dependable in terms of data, which come from information released by the Soviet 
government at various points. Richard Pipes, “Demographic and Ethnographic Changes in Transcaucasia, 
1897-1956,” Middle East Journal 13, No. 1 (Winter 1959): 41-63. 
158  
migration, the pressures of agricultural collectivization prompted a mass migration from 
the countryside to the city. Regions with a high degree of collectivization tended to see 
the largest rate of rural-urban migration; this was the case in Azerbaijan, where 
collectivization was a fraught process.358 Census figures from 1926 and 1939 indicate 
that the urban population growth rate of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic 
(AzSSR) easily outstripped rural growth in the inter-census period, growing by 78%, 
most rapidly in the first half of the inter-census period, 1926-1932; in comparison, the 
overall population increase of the Azerbaijan SSR was roughly 38%, and the rural 
population grew by just 23%. Nearly all of Azerbaijan’s urban growth took place in 
Baku, as labor migrants came seeking work generated by the oil industry. In 1926, the 
population of Baku stood at 453,333; by 1939, it had grown to 809,347, an increase of 
79%.359 
Some of this migration was planned or expected by state and industrial leaders. 
The success of industrial endeavors of the Stalin era, especially those that exploited a 
 
 
 
 
358 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “The Great Departure: Rural-Urban Migration in the Soviet Union, 1929-33,” in 
Social Dimensions of Soviet Industrialization, ed. William G. Rosenberg and Lewis H. Siegelbaum 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 22. 
 
359 Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1926 g. SSSR, Respubliki i ikh osnovnye region, 
http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_26.php?reg=30; Vseosoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1926 g., 
Belorusskaia, Ukrainskaia, Zakavkazskaia, Uzbekistanskaia, Turkmenskaia respubliki i ikh osnovnye 
region, http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_26_b.php?reg=63; Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1939 g., 
Chislennost gorodskogo naseleniia SSSR po gorodskim poseleniiam i vnutrigorodskim raionam, 
http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_pop_39_3.php; Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1939 g., Chislennost 
nalichnogo naseleniia SSSR po soiuznym respublikam, kraiam, oblasti i avtonomnym respublikam, 
http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_pop_39_1.php; Svetlana Soboleva, Migration and Settlement: 8. Soviet 
Union (Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1980), 5; Pipes, 53-54, 
55, 57. The overall population increase in Georgia and Armenia was roughly the same as in Azerbaijan. 
The rate of urban growth in these two republics was somewhat stronger, as they had begun the Soviet 
period less urbanized, and therefore had more ground to make up. See Pipes and Lorimer for more detailed 
comparisons. 
159  
localized natural resource, relied on moving people where they were needed.360 Wherever 
there existed a “noncorrespondence between demographic density and natural resources,” 
resettlement was likely, voluntary or not.361 As Stalin continued to consolidate his hold 
on power, control over the population and its movements became stricter, and more 
ambitious attempts were made to distribute the population rationally according to the 
location of natural resources and associated industries, as in Baku.362 Unskilled laborers, 
who came primarily from the surrounding countryside, were in greater demand in the 
Baku oil industry in this period than in previous years. In most places, industry had 
sufficiently developed or recovered by the end of the NEP era to offer new jobs, and the 
prejudice against those who were not “real proletarians” waned for a time.363 In June 
1931, the Central Committee decided that, in the interest of industrial progress, peasants 
were free to leave the kolkhoz for temporary industrial work, with no penalty if they then 
decided to remain there permanently. On the eve of the great famine, there was yet no 
pressing reason to curtail the peasant exodus from the countryside.364 
The agenda of the Soviet state was only one major influence among several that 
influenced migration to Baku. The city’s growth and change during the early Five-Year 
Plans were induced by an industrializing drive that originated in Moscow, but the 
industrial community of Baku was in addition shaped by influences beyond the control of 
 
360 Siegelbaum and Moch, 392; Fitzpatrick, 15. 
361 Siegelbaum and Moch, 388. 
362 Ibid., 3-4. 
363 Fitzpatrick, 16-17. 
364 Fitzpatrick, 18-19. 
160  
the state. Individual migrants made the decision to move based on the expectation of a 
better existence for themselves and their kin, heedless of either the city’s capacity to 
accommodate them or the state’s ambition to move labor where it was needed in a 
controlled manner. Furthermore, many new rural-urban migrants found that they could 
not cope with Soviet urban-industrial life and soon departed, a trend of unsettledness that 
aggravated state planners. Far from a passive community helplessly manipulated by an 
omnipotent totalitarian state, migrants utilized methods old and new—migrant networks 
of communication and urban support, artels, buying or forging documents—in order to 
move to areas of greater economic opportunity.365 
Migration to Baku in the era of the early Five-Year Plans differed from that of the 
pre-revolutionary era in terms of rapidity and volume, and in that far more migrants were 
Azerbaijanis of rural origin. Pushed by collectivization and pulled by the new jobs 
offered in industrial centers, tens of millions of peasants throughout the USSR made the 
decision to leave once relatively stable agricultural livelihoods for the uncertain promises 
of urban-industrial wage labor. The Sovietization of life in Baku offered an additional 
challenge to rural-urban migrants, demanding adaptation to a Tayloristic work tempo, the 
ideological scrutiny of peers and officials, and the imposition of alien politics and culture. 
The Five-Year Plans demanded more of the oil industry’s entire workforce, but most 
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especially of peasants who were encountering for the first time the industrial aspirations 
of the revolution. 
In addition to this increase in migration from the rural regions of Azerbaijan was 
continued labor migration from Russia. Migration from Russia to the Baku oil industry 
was a long-established pattern that continued well into the Soviet era. Nearly all Russian 
migrants to Transcaucasia after 1897 settled in urban centers, a large number traveling 
specifically to Baku in order to work in its oil industry. The influx of Russians spiked at 
the end of the nineteenth century and during the years of the First Five-Year Plan, with 
outflows from the onset of World War I until the early 1920s, indicating that Russian 
nationals migrated to Baku when the industry was expanding and more work was 
available, and tended to depart in large numbers otherwise.366 The 1926 and 1939 
censuses show a distinct increase in the Russian population in Baku. In 1926, 
Azerbaijanis, who made up 62% of the total population of the Azerbaijan SSR, accounted 
for just 37% of the urban population. Russians, who made up 9.5% of the AzSSR 
population, constituted 25-27% of its urban population, and 35-37% of the population of 
Baku.367 By 1939, the Russian population of the republic had grown to 16.5% of the 
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overall population, and around 30% of the urban population.368 In total, between 1926 
and 1939, the Russian population of Azerbaijan grew by 307,000, 78% of whom were 
migrants.369 
The vastness and diversity of the Soviet Union made internal migration often a 
very different experience than that in most other modern states; a Belorussian migrating 
to Kazakhstan arrived in an utterly foreign environment without ever having crossed 
international borders. Siegelbaum and Moch term this “transnationalism in one 
country.”370 However, the extremity of the transition for Russians migrating to Baku 
should not be overstated. A large number of Russians coming to Baku were already 
experienced industrial wage laborers, not peasants, entering another Russianized 
industrial community, often to ply the same trade, or one similar, that had employed them 
previously.371 It is apparent that Russians traveling to Baku in this period were far less 
likely than Azerbaijani migrants to be entering unskilled positions. Census data indicate 
that migrants to Transcaucasia came primarily from central Russia, especially the Central 
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Industrial, Central Chernozem, and Volga regions, and the North Caucasus.372 It is likely 
that many did come from peasant backgrounds, but attracting Russian workers of any 
kind to Baku was made less challenging because a large Russian community already 
existed there; a constant feature of migration in any era is reliance on preexisting 
networks and community ties.373 
Migration from Russia had the effect of perpetuating the Russification of Baku in 
spite of Moscow’s program to promote non-Russian national minorities within the Soviet 
Union. This effort, known as korenizatsiia (indigenization, lit. “putting down roots”), was 
a reaction to the “Great Russian chauvinism” of the country’s imperial past, and was 
meant to advance, in the case of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani culture, leaders, institutions, 
language, and so on. The Baku industrial community clearly demonstrates a major 
limitation of this program, in which, per Terry Martin’s terminology, the Soviet state’s 
“soft-line” policy of korenizatsiia ran up against its “hard line” of industrialization. The 
requirements of the latter were invariably privileged.374 Although clearly some effort was 
made to promote Azerbaijani culture and officials in Baku and the AzSSR, within the oil 
industry itself korenizatsiia was irregularly implemented. 
Baku of the 1930s represents a particularly striking case of the challenges facing 
the Soviet nationalities policy. As one of the oldest industrial centers in the Soviet Union, 
there existed in Baku long-established Russian districts, Russia-centric modes of 
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industrial and urban administration, and paths of migration from Russia. Until the 
institution of the nationalities policy, Russian dominance had not represented an 
ideological dilemma. In the late 1920s, at a time when Soviet authorities were most 
loudly asserting their commitment to a fair nationalities policy, Russian migrants poured 
into Baku in their greatest numbers, disproportionately occupying positions as skilled 
laborers, managers, city and state officials, and students. Authorities made meager efforts 
to promote Azerbaijani culture and language, but Russian remained the language of 
industry. Ultimately, non-Azerbaijani people continued to rise to the top of the Baku oil 
industry, one of the Soviet Union’s most precious industrial regions. Because the oil 
industry appeared vital to the success of the Soviet industrial project, Soviet leaders were 
unwilling to leave it in the hands of indigenous workers and administrators seen as less 
competent than Russians. Although Soviet authorities did organize attempts at de- 
Russification in the Baku region and Azerbaijan more broadly, only the more superficial 
programs were implemented to any meaningful degree. 
The oil industry, crucially important to the Soviet state, was the realm in Baku 
that remained most dominated by Russians in the era of the First Five-Year Plan, even as 
the workforce swelled with new recruits of all backgrounds. Despite the increased rate of 
rural-urban migration, native Azerbaijanis remained a minority in the unskilled and 
especially the skilled labor forces of the Baku oil industry. In October of 1924, native 
Azerbaijanis made up just 10.5% of workers. Russians comprised 40%, Iranian 
Azerbaijanis 21.5%, and Armenians 17%.375 Seven years later the balance had somewhat 
improved; at the first Transcaucasian Meeting of Workers of the Oil Industry of the 
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USSR, held in Baku in April 1931, Azerbaijanis made up 39% of the delegates in 
attendance.376 This change in the balance of the workforce may have been due in part to 
increased promotion of Azerbaijanis under the nationalities policy, but the larger part 
likely resulted from the flood of local rural-urban migration during the First Five-Year 
Plan. A combination of prejudice and a genuine lack of skilled and experienced native 
workers and officials led to the marginalization of non-Russians.377 According to the 
Party line, Azerbaijan, having suffered exploitation and poor economic development 
prior to the Bolshevik takeover, required the aid of the more experienced Russian 
proletariat.378 
Accordingly, positions of leadership in the city and industry were also largely 
filled by Russians. Essential to the progress of this particular industrial community was 
increasing the number of state officials, managers, technicians, and other authority 
figures (“career migrants”), many of whom had benefited from better opportunities for 
social mobility under Stalin.379 State planning extended to the assignment of officials and 
specialists where they were needed. As in the tsarist era, the leadership of the oil industry 
remained distinctly, although not exclusively, Russian.380 Serebrovskii, who headed 
Azneft from 1920 to 1926, and his immediate successor were both Russian. The latter, 
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according to one Harvard Project interviewee, was known anecdotally to discriminate 
against Azerbaijanis in hiring, for which he was fired in 1933 or 1934.381 The same 
respondent also felt that Russians tended to take most of the administrative posts at 
factories, in part because they were more likely to be experienced specialists.382 In 
addition to the specialist cadres needed for industrial development, Baku received many 
more state officials as it grew into a major administrative center of the region. Another 
Harvard Project respondent observed that, although many “executive” and rural posts had 
been given to native Azerbaijanis by the 1930s, the Baku soviet was still made up largely 
of Russians and “other foreigners” (likely referring to Armenians), and positions such as 
the chairmen of education, culture, and the city council, as well as many deputies to the 
Baku soviet from important factories, were held by Russians.383 
The number of non-Russians trained as specialists was simply not sufficient, it 
seemed, and training new personnel could not keep up with the demands of developing 
industry.384 This situation resulted from both the over-promotion of Russians and the lack 
of educational opportunities for Azerbaijanis that remained in this period. The imperative 
to educate new cadres of technical specialists that accompanied the industrialization and 
modernization drive tended to favor Russians, even at institutions in Baku. According to 
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the Commissariat of Enlightenment, from 1927 to 1932 the number of students in 
Azerbaijan more than doubled, with factory schools showing among the largest 
increases.385 Students at lower-level schools were likely to be locals, but those at 
institutions of higher education were often migrants who had traveled to Baku 
specifically in order to attend the growing number of technical institutions recently 
founded there, or members of recently-migrated families. In November 1920, the Baku 
Polytechnic Institute opened, the first institute in Eurasia specifically intended to train 
engineers in fields related to the oil industry.386 At some point in the 1920s, it was seized 
by Azneft’s Union of Miners, becoming the Red Banner Oil Institute in 1929-30. It 
continued to emphasize disciplines related to oil production and refining.387 The 
Azerbaijan Scientific Research Institute on Oil Processing opened in October 1929, and 
in 1931, the Azerbaijan Scientific Research and Project Institute of Oil Machine Building 
was established.388 
Nevertheless, technical education among native Azerbaijanis was rather slow to 
develop, as the system seemed to privilege Russian students. Quotas for incoming 
students according to social category proved disadvantageous for native Azerbaijanis—at 
most institutions in the late 1920s and early 1930s, about half of incoming students were 
supposed to be of worker background (at the Oil Institute it was 75%). Native 
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Azerbaijanis had long been a minority in their own industrial workforce, so many did not 
qualify.389 Although many educational institutions held classes in the Azerbaijani 
language, and efforts were made to admit more Azerbaijani students into institutions of 
higher education, by the late 1920s fields associated with science and technology, 
especially those related to the oil industry, remained heavily Russified. A Harvard Project 
interviewee who attended school in Azerbaijan in the early 1930s opined that Russians 
took more of the positions in technical (what we today term “STEM”) fields in 
educational institutions, and occupied a disproportionate number of university jobs of any 
kind.390 According to mixed reports from various other Harvard Project interviewees, the 
number of Azerbaijani and Russian instructors at schools of various levels seems to have 
differed quite a lot from institution to institution.391 Yet another respondent, who entered 
the Azerbaijan Oil Institute in 1933 after finishing tekhnikum, felt that Azerbaijanis had 
the same opportunity as Russians to secure decent positions in their chosen fields, with 
some exceptions, namely the oil industry.392 For many students in this era, their schooling 
represented an introduction to the priorities and values of the Soviet regime. In 1928, one 
Harvard Project respondent reported, “the Soviets began to introduce new Proletarian 
culture.”393 
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Thus, although the First Five-Year Plan demanded more of the oil industry’s 
entire workforce, it was most challenging to peasants who were encountering for the first 
time the industrial and other aspirations of the Russian Revolution. For instance, there 
were some endeavors to introduce more of the Azerbaijani language into Baku daily life, 
but Russian could not be uprooted. While residents saw more billboards and public 
signage in Azerbaijani, telephone, postal, and medical services continued to operate 
largely in Russian.394 The Russian language, which remained the lingua franca for the 
entire Soviet era, and certain Russian traditions continued to provide a “cementing bond” 
for social life and industrial progress, and served to lure more Russians into the oil 
industry’s workforce.395 Notably, stenographic reports of a number of oil workers’ 
meetings at this time included full accounts only of the speeches given in Russian, 
inserting merely “in Turkish” (viz., Azerbaijani) when an Azerbaijani attendee spoke.396 
Attempting to translate constantly between the two languages created time lags, 
misunderstandings, and other inefficiencies that were viewed as unacceptable.397 The 
transition from the countryside to the industrial community of Baku was made only more 
difficult by migrants’ poor knowledge of the Russian language, which was often 
necessary to move beyond basic, unskilled work and to integrate fully into urban life. 
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Azerbaijanis who wished to advance, especially in technical fields, were virtually 
obligated to learn Russian. At every level those who better adapted to the Russified 
environment were more likely to succeed. 
Although the industrial infrastructure was better developed in the Baku region 
than in some other industrializing areas of the USSR, this rapid influx of peasant workers 
overwhelmed the industrial community. Despite an excess of laborers, industries 
everywhere experienced labor shortages, in part due to the inability of labor-allotment 
authorities to adjust to the new conditions. 398 The workers entering the industrial 
workforce during the early Five-Year Plans tended to be inexperienced and less able to 
make the transition to permanent wage-labor successfully. The promotion of shock- 
workers (udarniki) created a culture of work discipline that encouraged workers to push 
themselves to their limits in order to meet plan goals. There was a high rate of turnover, 
which Stalin blamed on the lack of work incentive that the “‘Leftist’ practice of wage 
equalization” created.399 Peasant laborers’ lingering ties to the countryside may also have 
provided an escape route from urban industrial life. In fact, in part due to rapid turnover, 
the overall number of workers employed by Azneft remained fairly stable even during the 
plan years. According to figures reported in Soviet sources, the Soviet oil industry in any 
given year between 1928 and 1932 employed 50-55,000 workers, about half of whom 
worked for Azneft.400 Igolkin notes that the number of workers and other employees in 
the oil industry grew more slowly than in other industries of the USSR during this time 
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also due to the technological advances that the regime had eagerly begun to apply, which 
required increasingly less manual labor, but more training.401 
The oil industry in particular tended to favor stable, trained workers. Most oil 
workers who received awards or special recognition for their labor had been working in 
the oil industry for a number of years before the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan; in 
lists of distinguished workers, recently-hired former peasants are rare. The most common 
reason given for accolades was contribution toward fulfilling the First Five-Year Plan in 
two and a half years.402 Tikhon Aleksandrovich Mikhelev, a long-time mechanic at the 
Ordzhonikidze plant in Baku, received the Order of Lenin for his enthusiastic work 
toward early fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan, an honor that many other laborers of 
Azneft received in 1932.403 Semen Vasilievich Parfenov, another worker in the 
mechanics’ section at the Ordzhonikidze plant, received between 100 and 300 rubles for 
each of his useful “labor rationalizing suggestions.”404 Georgii Aleksandrovich 
Liubimov, an engineer of peasant origin who had been employed in the oil industry since 
1923, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor for his innovation of several 
drilling-related devices.405 
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As in many other heavy industries growing during the First Five-Year Plan, the 
Baku oil industry experienced persistent issues with labor discipline.406 At a March 1931 
meeting of oil workers, after sitting through an exhaustive rundown of the status of the 
Baku-Batumi crude oil pipeline and description of the cracking plants and other 
installations pioneered in recent years, attendees voiced their grievances about the masses 
of underqualified and poorly educated workers in their ranks, which interfered with 
productivity and sapped morale.407 Similar complaints were heard at the Baku General 
Cultural Conference of the Union of Oil Workers in January of 1932; speakers claimed 
that 80% of union workers were “politically illiterate,” blaming a lack of “Turkic”- 
language literature in local libraries and qualified cadres, and the inactivity of cultural 
workers. Questionnaires answered by an apparently random selection of the Surakhani 
club visitors indicate that most did not use the club’s resources because they simply had 
to work too much, were occupied with looking after their children, or lived too far away. 
Many made time for it only when movies or theater performances were put on. One 
Comrade Kikava stated that the recent series of “breaches of work discipline, disruptions 
of productive work, and various abnormalities and insufficiencies” ought to be corrected 
through education, that is, attending more courses, seminars, and discussion circles.408 
The effects of Soviet antireligious policies in Baku workplaces are still somewhat 
unclear from my research. Like any number of other ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, 
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Azerbaijani identity by the early twentieth century was tied closely to religion. The 
Soviet regime would hardly have tolerated Muslim practices such as prayer breaks and 
the practice of fasting during Ramadan, which not only represented unacceptable public 
expressions of religious belief, but also had potential to interfere with Soviet work 
schedules. Local authorities were actively implementing the regime’s antireligious 
campaign in the 1920s and 1930s, including regular antireligious seminars in community 
programming.409 Extrapolating from the results of the antireligious campaign elsewhere 
in the Soviet Union, it seems likely that older Azerbaijani workers resented the policy 
and continued religious practices in secret, remaining Muslims at heart. There were limits 
to the enforcement of antireligious policies in the home. However, decades of 
secularization had their effect on successive generations—Azerbaijan is currently among 
the least religious countries in the Muslim world.410 
The ethnic dimensions of work discipline and complaints regarding a lack of it are 
complex. Some Soviet adherents seemed to have taken the nationalities policy quite 
seriously, and one Harvard Project respondent noted that as a factory worker he had 
never experienced conflict with other workers “on national grounds.”411 In contrast, other 
reports seem to indicate tension especially in educational institutions related to the oil 
industry. Overall, however, no overt interethnic violence took place between Baku 
Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Russians until the end of the Soviet era. 
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Baku’s Post-First Five-Year Plan Decline 
 
The population trends that the First Five-Year Plan initiated continued to some 
degree during the Second and Third Five-Year plans, but with a few key differences. 
Crucially, in December 1932, the state introduced an internal passport system that 
restricted migration throughout the Soviet Union. As it related to industrial expansion, 
mass rural-urban migration again caused housing problems, a high rate of labor turnover, 
and poor discipline. In addition, in 1932-33 many parts of the western Soviet Union 
experienced a terrible famine, causing peasants to flee the countryside, which authorities 
wished stop. Passports were issued by the Commissariat of Internal Affairs primarily to 
urban residents; without a passport, a person was not permitted to reside in a city, and 
peasants were rarely issued passports. Workers at the leading industrial enterprises 
received passports first, and in February 1933 the passport system extended to Baku.412 
Throughout 1933, peasants and other undesirables were forced from the city and arrested. 
Peasant migration to Baku stalled for a few years; eventually, peasants again found their 
way to the city, legally and not, but never in the numbers seen during the First Five-Year 
Plan. 
For reasons likely unconnected to the passport system, oil output began to level 
off in the mid- to late 1930s, despite greater capital investment from the state. The period 
of the First Five-Year Plan was in many ways the biggest peak for the Baku oil industry 
between the turn-of-the-century “boom” and the industry’s revival in the 1990s. In terms 
of population growth, urban development, oil and gas production, and technological 
innovation, the years 1928-1932 were unparalleled in the Soviet era. However, oil 
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production had begun to level off even before the end of the plan. Indeed, output for 1932 
and 1933 fell behind that for 1931 by about a million tons each year, only recovering in 
1934, under the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937).413 The results of the Second Five- 
Year Plan were rather disappointing—the Soviet oil industry on the whole received an 
investment of 2.5 billion rubles in the years of the second plan, more than doubling 
investment during the first plan, but by 1937 it was producing just 27.1 million tons of oil 
per year, falling far short of the expected 68.1 million tons. The Third Five-Year Plan 
(1938-1942), cut short by the onset of World War II, saw slightly better results.414 
It is most likely that this leveling off was the cost of the rapid industrial expansion 
of the previous years. In order to meet and exceed the quotas stipulated by the First Five- 
Year Plan, hasty and sometimes inexpert methods of extraction were employed, which 
appears to have had a negative effect on the long-term potential output of known oil 
reservoirs.415 As Peter Maass notes in Crude World, extracting oil too quickly from an oil 
reservoir or using incorrect recovery methods can permanently limit the quantity of oil 
that the reservoir can produce.416 
Intertwined with declining production was a wave of purges in the oil industry 
leadership, concomitant with upper-level purges across the country. During the turn 
against the political left, authorities targeted planners who had set inflated quotas for the 
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oil industry in previous years, notably L. K. Ramzin, an Armenian engineer who 
ultimately carried the responsibility for the extremely inflated production goal for 1932 
(an increase from 22 million tons in 1931 to 40-55 million tons in 1932). For this 
“maximalist planning,” Ramzin was made chief defendant in a show trial of industrial 
leaders, convicted, and sentenced to death (commuted to 10 years imprisonment).417 
The state’s increasing devotion to oil fields elsewhere in the Soviet Union 
gradually diverted its attention from improvement of Baku oil production. One reason for 
the development of oil fields elsewhere was the geographical vulnerability of the 
Caucasus to military action.418 Although the Caucasus did continue to provide the vast 
majority of crude oil until after World War II, in the postwar years the “Second Baku,” in 
the Volga-Urals region, and the “Third Baku,” in the West Siberian basin, were 
prioritized for development.419 Azerbaijan’s share of state investment in the oil industry 
fell from about 55% in the 1928/29 fiscal year to 33% in 1938, and continued to decrease 
thereafter.420 The region remained an important oil center, and continued to provide much 
of the oil equipment and many of the specialists for the development of the oil industry 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union (as discussed in chapter seven), but the Baku oil industry 
itself never regained the significance it had had during the First Five-Year Plan and 
before. 
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Conclusion 
 
During the early Five-Year Plan era, the metamorphosis of the Baku industrial 
community (or series of communities) was shaped by a confluence of the Soviet state’s 
modernizing agenda, the habits and preferences of labor migrants, and the practical 
limitations of crash industrialization. Due to state prompting and their own ambitions, 
large numbers of workers from across the Soviet Union made their way to Baku, further 
upsetting and remaking the city. Idealistic Soviet planning clashed with the realities of 
the oil industry and its personnel, resulting in a muddle of innovation and decrepitude, 
calculation and improvisation, order and chaos. Regardless of the plateau and moderate 
decline of oil production and state investment, the Baku oil industry continued as the 
Soviet Union’s primary oil center for the remainder of the 1930s. As described in chapter 
six, Baku’s material contributions to the Soviet effort during World War II were 
immense, including eighty to ninety percent of all fuels used by Soviet forces. The rapid 
buildup of industry during the early Five-Year Plans had had the intended effect: Baku 
was prepared to meet the country’s fuel needs in case of war. The value imbued in Baku 
during the 1930s, however, made it a tempting target for the Soviet Union’s enemies. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
BAKU DURING WORLD WAR II 
 
 
Though perhaps a platitudinous contention it is presumed that if we are at war 
with Russia it is our intention to hit her most vulnerable and vital spots and it 
appears to me that without question the oil supply organization in [the] Caucasus 
is one of the first and most profitable objectives which should receive attention of 
[the] Allies. If it can be attacked from the very first outset of the war with Russia 
even its partial destruction must have [a] far-reaching effect on the ability of the 
Soviet and indirectly the Germans to continue the war. 
—HQ RAF Middle East to Air Ministry (1940)421 
 
During the period between the Soviet takeover of Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1920 and 
the onset of World War II in 1939, the Soviet regime built the Baku oil industry into the 
country’s single largest producer of oil. The industry’s importance to the Soviet Union is 
indicated not only by the resources that the regime directed toward it during World War 
II, but also by the targeting of the Baku oil industry by the Soviet Union’s wartime 
enemies: initially by the Allied Powers, and then by the Axis Powers. The attention given 
to the Baku region during World War II adds to our understanding of wartime strategy 
motivated by the fueling needs of modern militaries. In addition, the unprecedented 
demand for fossil fuels during the war shifted major powers’ approaches to satisfying 
their need for oil; specifically, it was during World War II that Soviet authorities were 
forced to contend with the vulnerability of energy resources concentrated in Baku, 
prompting urgent attention to the diversification of oil production in the country, as 
addressed in the next chapter. Although the enemy never reached Baku, the threats to it 
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and pressures placed upon it speak to oil’s power to shape grander wartime strategy in 
this period. 
The Soviet Union’s enemies during the war were aware that the country’s oil 
industry was concentrated almost entirely in the Caucasus; 70% or more of Soviet crude 
oil came from Baku, 20% from Groznii and Maikop in the North Caucasus, and the rest 
from other sites in the northern Caspian region. Refined oil came almost entirely from the 
same regions.422 The Baku oil industry itself was uniquely compact, with refineries and 
other infrastructure tightly packed into an area of just a few square miles.423 Further, 
transportation of oil and other products from Baku to the central Soviet Union or the 
warfront was limited to just a few rail and sea routes.424 It was a tempting target for those 
who wanted to undermine the Soviet war effort, deny the Soviet allies a major source of 
new oil, or control the source of oil for themselves. 
During the first stage of the war, when the Soviet Union remained allied with 
Germany, Britain and France jointly investigated the possibility of destroying the Baku 
oil industry and its transportation routes via an aerial bombing campaign. The aim was to 
remove the Soviet Union from the war and to prevent it from sending oil to Germany.425 
Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, which caused the 
Soviets to join the Allied Powers, Hitler set his sights on Baku as a source of fuel to carry 
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on his war effort. Axis forces headed toward southern Russia and the Caucasus but were 
ultimately diverted from seizing Baku after stalling at the Battle of Stalingrad. 
During World War II, the convergence of international attention on oil as a 
strategic resource and Baku’s difficult geographical position placed new pressure on the 
industry and city. Caught in the accelerating pace of Soviet war preparation, Baku 
responded by increasing oil production and turning to weapons manufacturing, all while 
preparing for possible aerial bombardment by the British and French. As the war wore 
on, and German invasion seemed imminent, the Baku oil industry deteriorated under the 
new pressures, a disheartening turn for its hardworking residents. Ultimately, Baku 
proved too vulnerable in wartime, setting the stage for the relocation of Soviet oil 
production in the postwar years. 
 
 
British Targeting of the Baku Oil Industry, 1939-1941 
 
In the first years of World War II, the Allies turned their attention to the 
possibility of destroying the Baku oil industry in case of an open war with the Soviet 
Union, and to halt its supplying Germany with oil products. The British War Cabinet had 
named Baku a high-priority bombing target by October of 1939. Of the three major oil 
centers in Transcaucasia, Baku was the most important (the others being Groznii and 
Maikop).426 In addition to producing the vast majority of crude oil, Baku also produced 
about 45% of all refined oil products for the country, as well as being a crucial source of 
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crude for the other primary refining centers of Groznii, Batumi, and Tuapse.427 The 
British Ministry of Supply believed that the annihilation of Russian sources of oil “might 
have an immense deterrent effect,” harming the Soviet war effort and that of its allies.428 
Due to the Allied blockade in the Atlantic, and the difficulty of transporting oil from 
Pacific ports to the Soviet Union’s oil-needy locations, the loss of its primary domestic 
oil-producing centers could not be compensated for by imports.429 It would remove the 
“carburetor” of the Soviet Union’s “whole mechanized scheme,” and “must sooner or 
later to the complete collapse of the war potential of the U.S.S.R.,” an outcome 
“disastrous for Germany as well.”430 
Furthermore, one result of the intensive industrialization and mechanization 
campaign of the first two decades of the Soviet era was the country’s heavy reliance on 
fossil fuels by the eve of World War II. The military certainly needed fuels and lubricants 
for its ever-larger fleet of vehicles, but the country’s agricultural sector was by that point 
similarly dependent on millions of tons of oil and gasoline per year to feed the trucks, 
tractors, and other machinery that most collectivized farms used, the era of horse-drawn 
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Figure 5. British 
military map 
depicting the major 
oil centers and 
pipelines of the 
Soviet Caucasus, 
1939. 
Source: A.L.P. 
Burdett, ed., Oil 
Resources in 
Eastern Europe 
and the Caucasus: 
British Documents, 
1885-1978, Volume 
4, 1939-1945 
(Cambridge: 
Cambridge 
University Press, 
2012), 140-141. 
transport long in the past. If the oil industry were destroyed or at least cut off from the 
rest of the Soviet Union, the country might well suffer another famine.431 
 
Furthermore, one result of the intensive industrialization and mechanization 
campaign of the first two decades of the Soviet era was the country’s heavy reliance on 
 
 
 
431 British military strategists were uncertain of how a famine might affect the USSR’s war potential, 
reckoning that the dictatorial government might not be concerned about the welfare of anyone not involved 
with the war effort, and that perhaps the food shortage would strengthen the regime, “as happened in the 
famine of 1920/21, when the people soon learnt that only the staunchest supporters of the Party were able 
to obtain bread).” “An Air Offensive Against the Russian Oil Industry,” in Oil Resources, Volume 4, 206; 
“Letter from the Ministry of Economic Warfare,” 136; “Air Ministry minute, 28 March 1940, detailing 
Russian oil needs,” in Oil Resources, Volume 4, 192-193. 
183  
fossil fuels by the eve of World War II. The military certainly needed fuels and lubricants 
for its ever-larger fleet of vehicles, but the country’s agricultural sector was by that point 
similarly dependent on millions of tons of oil and gasoline per year to feed the trucks, 
tractors, and other machinery that most collectivized farms used, the era of horse-drawn 
transport long in the past. If the oil industry were destroyed or at least cut off from the 
rest of the Soviet Union, the country might well suffer another famine.432 
The British were also concerned to undermine the German war effort by denying 
them access to Soviet oil, which Stalin supplied to Germany in limited amounts before 
the German invasion of June 1941.433 Before that event, the two sides had worked 
together on the fuel issue. Between August 1939 and June 1941, when the Germans had 
ever-increasing fuel needs, the Soviet Union delivered about 725,000 tons of oil to 
Germany.434 This was a minor amount relative to the overall Soviet production of oil (the 
Soviet Union was then producing roughly 30 million tons of oil per year), but the Allies 
kept in mind that it could increase.435 
The challenges in conducting an aerial bombing campaign against Baku were not 
insignificant, but the plan was ultimately a realistic one. The locations from which a 
bombing campaign would most likely originate were mainly in Iran and Turkey, a 
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situation dependent on shifting allegiances. The distance between Erdebil, in Iran, and 
Baku, for instance, is only about 180 miles, and major bases in Turkey were roughly 
twice that distance from Baku.436 Baku by 1939 was already the best-defended location in 
the Caucasus, protected by several hundred anti-aircraft weapons (other major cities, 
including Groznii and Krasnodar, appeared to have no anti-aircraft defenses) and a 
searchlight regiment.437 Over time, Soviet authorities diverted more weapons of greater 
caliber to Baku.438 Baku also housed the headquarters for the 95th Air Brigade, as well as 
aerodrome installations that could accommodate several hundred aircraft.439  In May 
1940, RAF Wing Commander Bennett reported that anti-aircraft defenses were ramping 
up all over the Caucasus, including the installation of more anti-aircraft batteries and 
machine guns and the deployment of more men to safeguard the Baku-Batumi railway 
and pipelines.440 
However, the British were relatively unintimidated by these defenses, comparing 
the situation to attacks on relatively well-defended oil sites in Spain the decade before. 
This case demonstrated that “active defence measures have rendered many attacks 
abortive but they have failed generally to safeguard oil installations.”441 Zhukov himself 
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recalled feeling that Soviet air defenses would have been incapable of effectively 
protecting Baku from a concerted British or American air attack.442 
The usual priority order of targets for air attack in Baku was the following: 
refineries, oil wells with pumping apparatus, transport installations (storage tanks, 
pumping stations, docks, etc.), key transportation points, and gusher wells.443 The oil 
fields themselves were generally a low priority, given that an oil well was a small target 
and could be destroyed only with a direct hit. Individual derricks and pumps were 
relatively easy to replace.444 However, in November 1939, Ministry of Economic Warfare 
secretary Desmond Morton reported that in Baku “the oil derricks are close together and 
might be destroyed by burning.”445 Other reports used the common “forest” of derricks 
metaphor to emphasize that an attack by incendiary bombs could have a devastating 
effect on certain oilfields.446 The older fields, including Bibi-Eibat, Surakhani, and 
Balakhani-Sabunchi-Ramani, tended to be the most crowded and therefore the most 
vulnerable to bombing and fire. One report described these fields as “chaotic,” noting that 
many derricks were within 50 yards of one another; that in the intervening space lay 
workmen’s housing, the wreckage of old derricks, and other detritus, greatly increasing 
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the risk of fire; and that the ground was saturated with crude oil.447 Bibi-Eibat was in 
danger additionally because much of it was below sea level; if its enclosing wall were 
breached by a bomb, about a third of it could become flooded.448 
The spatial concentration of the Baku oil industry’s refineries was also a key 
factor in British calculations. The compactness of the industry’s high-value installations 
made Baku an appealing target.449 Baku’s dozens of refineries were packed together into 
just three locations around the peninsula, two of them being White Town and Black 
Town; each of these groups was considered by the British air forces to be a single 
bombing target, with one bomb judged necessary to destroy multiple enterprises at 
once.450 Even the threat of an air raid could prove damaging to the refineries, which 
required continuous manning to keep temperatures and pressures in balance, and 
therefore could not safely remain evacuated for more than a few hours at a time without 
risking explosion or fires.451 Per a British report from April 1940, “The Russian refineries 
offer exceptionally vulnerable compact targets; they are not dispersed for protection 
against the spread of fire as are modern refineries in England and Germany. Once a fire 
has got a firm hold in the refinery areas, particularly at Baku and Grosni, it is considered 
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that the Russians could not put it out until it had run its course.”452 It could take up to a 
year to rebuild a destroyed refinery.453 
Other elements of the industry were quite vulnerable as well. Steel tanks with the 
capacity to store up to 10,000 tons each of oil and oil products stood in close proximity to 
the oil refineries, and in some cases could be set on fire with just machine gun fire from 
aircraft.454 Despite the extreme flammability of the products being processed or stored, 
precautions against fire were shoddy.455 Similarly, there were three major power stations, 
one each in White Town, Black Town, and Bibi-Eibat. Not only would the stoppage of 
electrical power cause a damaging shutdown to a refinery, the elimination of any one of 
these power stations would significantly reduce the ability of the city and its industry to 
continue work.456 The relatively small number of long-distance oil pipelines also made 
the Soviet oil supply quite vulnerable. Between Baku and Batumi, the Black Sea port 
devoted to processing Baku crude, ran just two pipelines.457 The primary means of 
transporting oil to the center of the country was by tanker across the Caspian Sea and up 
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the Volga River, a vulnerable route because of the easy visibility of the Baku port, and by 
rail, either west across Transcaucasia or north toward southern Russia.458 The disruption 
of any one of these transportation routes would create gridlock on the others. 
Ultimately, however, the British did not go through with the bombing campaign. 
The French and British both recognized that an attack on the Caucasus would be likely to 
provoke open war with the Soviet Union, an undesirable result when the war with 
Germany was still consuming their attention.459 Furthermore, the British had depended on 
French collaboration for the planned attack, including the use of French air forces; any 
possibility of French support was of course eliminated upon the German occupation of 
most of France in June 1940.460 Plans were tabled until the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union in June 1941, when the advantages of destroying the Baku oil industry again 
became relevant. 
 
 
The German Advance toward Baku, 1941-1943 
 
Hitler’s desire to reach and take the oil resources of the Baku region was captured 
in a sensational moment on his 53rd birthday. On April 20, 1942, Hitler’s staff prepared 
for him a cake that depicted the Caspian Sea and the Absheron Peninsula. In a widely- 
circulated propaganda video, Hitler ladles the chocolate or kirsch of the “Kaspisches 
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Meer” onto the Caucasus Mountains, then dishes up a slice of the cake speared with a 
flag reading “BAKU.”461 
The Germans’ move toward Eastern Europe and then the Soviet Union was 
motivated in no small part by their need for fuel. In September 1940, Dutch oilman Jean 
Baptiste August Kessler noted “the remote possibility of a German attack on Russia with 
the object of securing control of at any rate part of the Russian [oil] output.”462 According 
to the records of several of Hitler’s top officials, including Albert Speer, Minister of 
Armaments and War Production, and Colonel General Franz Halder, the desire to capture 
the Soviet Union’s oil resources in the Caucasus was one of the primary incentives for 
invading the country in 1941.463 In his journal of July 31, 1940, Halder noted among the 
objects of Operation Barbarossa a “drive on Baku oil fields.”464 In June 1942, the 
operation took on the name Case Blue, the object of which was to capture Transcaucasia. 
Shortly after the invasion of the Soviet Union, Halder wrote that Germany hoped 
to reach Baku by early November of 1941.465 As German forces became bogged down at 
Moscow and other sites well north of Baku, the goals of the campaign moved 
accordingly, despite increasingly desperate circumstances. The invasion of Russia only 
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further depleted German fuel resources, as the roads in the Soviet Union were frequently 
in very poor shape, worse at least than in much of the rest of Europe. Fuel consumption 
by military vehicles was double or triple that projected by German planners. In addition, 
the synthetic fuels that the Germans had become increasingly reliant upon did not 
perform well in the extreme cold of the northern Soviet winters.466 In March 1942, Halder 
noted that the Germans still planned to make it to Baku and seize its oil resources.467 In 
April, Hitler was presented with his Baku cake, and the planned date for the seizure of 
Baku moved to September 1942.468 German forces had reached the northern Caucasus by 
July 1942. In August, the Germans took Maikop, one of the larger oil sites of the northern 
Caucasus. In preparation for the attack, locals set fire to stored fuel.469 By October, 
German forces were within 50 miles of another major Caucasian oil site, Groznii, and had 
commenced bombardment of the city and its oil structures. Despite the attack, Groznii 
continued to produce a minor amount of oil for the Soviet war effort.470 By August of that 
year, plans were still in place to reach Baku, but Halder noted increasing resistance to 
Axis forces in the Caucasus region and that additional Soviet forces had set out from 
Baku and were heading north toward Makhachkala.471 
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Shortly after the German invasion of the Soviet Union commenced, the British 
began readapting their planned attack on the Baku oil industry with the intention of 
denying its resources to Germany. The plan remained roughly similar to that developed in 
1939-1940: run a bombing campaign on Baku, concentrating on its oil refineries.472 The 
British ambassador to the USSR, Sir Stafford Cripps, corresponded with Stalin on the 
matter, and reported to Lord Hankey’s War Cabinet Committee on Preventing Oil from 
Reaching Enemy Powers that Stalin was “determined that Caucasian oil should be 
destroyed rather than it should fall into the hands of the Germans.”473 While retaining 
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Figure 6. Luftwaffe aerial photo of central Baku, 1942. 
Source: https://www.ourbaku.com/index.php/ Люфтваффе_-_Разведывательные_ 
аэросъемки_Баку_в_1942г 
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their Caucasian bombing plan, the British for the time being agreed to refrain from action 
until it became absolutely necessary. 
 
 
Buildup and Decline in Baku 
 
It was well-known by the end of 1941 that the Germans had an eye on the 
southern Caucasus. The narrative of the Nazi enemy bearing down on Baku served well 
in Soviet propaganda used to generate support for the war effort. In addition to the usual 
films and leaflets, Soviet officials tailored propaganda methods to the regional tastes of 
Azerbaijan, using traditional Turkic literary figures and conventions, popular local songs 
about pushing out invaders, the worship services of newly-reopened mosques, and 
scholarly historical “revisions” that emphasized strong ties between Azerbaijan and 
Russia and the constant enmity of the Germans.474 
Shortly after the German invasion began, Baku oil workers and organizations 
began performatively proclaiming their renewed commitment to the Soviet war effort, 
pledging to go to even greater lengths than before to increase production. On June 27, 
1941, less than a week after the start of the invasion, a plenary session of the Soviet oil 
workers’ union declared that oil enterprises would subordinate all work to the defeat of 
the “fascist invaders.” They pledged to contribute to the war effort by “strengthening 
labor discipline as never before” and “using every minute productively.”475 During rallies 
in various Baku districts, work teams at enterprises such as Leninneft and Azizbekovneft 
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declared that they would exceed quotas for oil production and drill new wells ahead of 
schedule.476 In any case, those working in this war-critical industry were forced to adapt 
to a wartime schedule of twelve-hour working days with little time off.477 
The initial push yielded positive results in the first month or so after the invasion. 
 
Several Baku oil trusts reported having exceeded planned oil production by many 
thousands of tons.478 Like workers in other industries, oil workers contributed to defense 
funds to support the war effort, in many cases an automatic deduction from earnings (as 
decreed by the oil workers’ plenum).479 Money also went toward construction of named 
tanks, airplanes, and ships for the war effort.480 Oil tankers leaving Baku by rail were 
boldly inscribed “Baku—frontu” (Baku to the front), a statement of the industry’s direct 
link to the war effort.481 Local newspapers daily published stories of workers’ heroics to 
keep spirits lifted.482 Around Baku, a slogan appeared: “People of Baku, remember: oil is 
needed everywhere—on land, in the air, and on the water!”483 
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As in many industries around the world during the period of the war, in the Baku 
oil industry a significant shift in personnel took place as young men were drafted into the 
armed forces. The German invasion created new urgency in this regard. At the start of 
1941, the Baku oil industry had employed roughly 60,000 workers.484 Fully half of the 
workforce entered the armed forces soon after the invasion began, some 30,000 Baku oil 
workers.485 The departure of these workers, many of them skilled, created a labor vacuum 
in the Baku industrial sector. The local Party organizations took on some of the burden of 
bringing new workers in to replace them, including women, students in local oil 
educational institutions, minors, the elderly, and those of undesirable backgrounds.486 In 
addition, the Soviet oil workers’ plenum had its local trade union organizations recruit 
“housewives and students” to contribute to oil production.487 Perhaps 25,000 women and 
minors entered the oil industry during the war as replacements for departed workers, 
many of them called in from surrounding villages by the Komsomol.488 They received 
minimal preparation, and most of their training happened on the job.489 In 1941, these 
nontraditional workers made up one-third of the oil industry’s employees; by 1944, their 
proportion had reached two-thirds.490 The number of Komsomol brigades devoted to oil 
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work in Baku increased from 43 in February 1943 to nearly 900 by the end of the war, 
mostly due to the necessity of recruiting minors to replace drafted workers.491 By late 
1942, Azneftemash, the oil industry’s machine-building sector, estimated that nearly half 
of its workers were women, about 5,000 altogether.492 Although most women workers 
remained in light industries such as food and textiles, in a few high-profile cases they 
entered skilled and/or high-risk positions that had previously been largely closed to them, 
including drillers and welders.493 Toward the end of the war, Axis prisoners of war, 
predominantly Germans, were also pressed into oil industry work, primarily construction 
and equipment manufacture.494 
Wartime administration of the industry also involved a radical shift in priorities. 
Oil and oil products were more imperative than ever (80-90% of the Soviet Union’s oil 
products came from Baku during the war), but some elements of the oil industry, 
especially enterprises devoted to exploration and drilling, could be temporarily reoriented 
without any notable decrease in oil production.495 Several enterprises that had formerly 
been devoted to producing low-octane fuel were refashioned to produce aviation gasoline 
by altering their distillation processes.496 A number of shops in the Azneftemash trust that 
had produced oil machinery turned to the production of weapons and ammunition, 
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including machine guns, pistols, mortars, mines, aerial bombs, and grenades.497 The shift 
toward the manufacture of weapons and new fuels was carried out messily, given that it 
required the quick and fundamental physical and administrative reorganization of several 
large enterprises, and that few in Baku had any experience in the manufacture of weapons 
and ammunition.498 The demand for weapons produced in Baku became greater as the 
Germans advanced farther into the Soviet Union, an advance that prompted the 
dismantling and evacuation of industrial enterprises in now-occupied western regions.499 
As a major urban center initially well behind the front lines, Baku had a further 
role as a medical center for wounded soldiers evacuated from the front. During the war, 
the city hosted 41 military hospitals with a combined capacity of over 30,000 beds. Any 
building with enough available space might serve, including universities and dozens of 
schools (the buildings are now marked with plaques indicating that history).500 Natan 
Gimelfarb, a Red Army soldier wounded in Ukraine, recalled a hospital being set up 
before his eyes in a school the night he arrived in Baku with a group of other injured 
men. Later, he was transferred to an improvised hospital in the main building of 
Azerbaijan State University. In his memoir, he remembers individually every nurse who 
cared for him at the several hospitals he stayed in over his seven months in Baku, their 
“fatal fatigue” as well as their “attention and care.”501 
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Although spirits and production had initially increased after the invasion of June 
1941, the pressures of the remainder of the war undermined both. By the end of 1941, 
Bakuvians’ rations had been severely limited, especially for civilians, with workers in 
key industries and injured soldiers provided for first. Even basic food products, including 
cooking grains, bread, and butter, were distributed “po kartochkam”—by ration cards. 
Meat and fresh produce were increasingly hard to come by.502 The wartime deprivations 
 
quickly undermined Bakuvians’ vitality and enthusiasm. As Azerbaijani actor Tofig 
Mirzoev recalled, “reports from the front were getting worse and worse, and we knew 
that the war would not end in three months or even six months.” As the situation 
deteriorated in Baku, Mirzoev’s family made the decision to move to his mother’s home 
village, where they lived in relative comfort for the remainder of the war.503 
Over the course of 1942, Baku became increasingly cut off from the Soviet center 
as the main lines of transportation were threatened or blocked by enemy action. By the 
autumn of 1942, the Germans had reached the Volga River, eliminating one of Baku’s 
main rail and water connections to the Soviet center.504 Although industry officials 
improvised new transportation routes, redirecting as much oil as possible over the sea to 
Krasnovodsk, millions of tons of oil intended for recipients in the western regions of the 
Soviet Union, most importantly the military, could not leave Baku.505 Oil enterprises 
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therefore had to improvise new storage methods, as in most cases an oil well’s production 
could not be halted without causing long-term damage to the well’s future productivity. 
Excess crude oil was directed toward nearby ravines and waste oil (stripped of gasoline) 
was pumped into derelict wells, to be recovered after the war.506 It is likely that the 
movement of oil and oil products into unorthodox storage locations was also an attempt 
to remove these fuels from the sight of enemy surveillance and bombers. 
As the Germans appeared to close in, a partial evacuation of Baku took place in 
the late summer of 1942. The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan CP had planned for 
such an evacuation in the early days after the invasion, recognizing that any oil experts, 
equipment, and technical documentation would be of immediate use to the enemy in 
restarting oil production upon the industry’s capture. In the final stages, if it were certain 
that the enemy would take Baku, oil wells were to be capped off or destroyed.507 Team 
leaders in the oilfields were given special instructions regarding the disabling and 
preservation of wells and equipment within 48 hours’ notice. In case of greater urgency, 
the instructions were to destroy the wells by lowering into them explosives on strings, 
which would destroy a well’s casing and possibly set fire to its contents.508 Once the 
invasion of the Soviet Union began, elements of the evacuation plan were put into action. 
As part of the State Defense Committee’s program to evacuate Soviet industry to the east, 
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and in a desperate bid to diversify the Soviet Union’s oil supply, Baku authorities were 
directed to begin the partial evacuation of the Baku oil industry.509 Oil industry 
equipment and personnel were shipped piecemeal across the Caspian Sea to Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan between 1941 and 1943. In all, more than 700 wells were shut off, and 
81 drilling teams sent across the Caspian Sea to Central Asia.510 
In charge of the evacuation was Nikolai Baibakov, then the Deputy People’s 
Commissar of the Oil Industry, later the Minister of the Oil Industry and the head of 
Gosplan. In his memoir, The Cause of My Life, Baibakov recalled that the evacuation 
order to dismantle and send away drilling, extraction, and refining equipment was a new 
experience in loss of worker morale.511 
In the course of two months or so all nine Baku drilling organisations, oil 
prospecting and development trusts, pipe yards and some other oil enterprises 
with all their personnel, machinery and equipment were transferred to the east. 
About 10,000 Baku oilmen, most of them accompanied by their families, moved 
to the east in an organised manner. The flower of the Azerbaijan oil industry was 
on the move, including celebrated experts in development and exploratory 
drilling, leading organisers of oil production, experienced engineers, technicians 
and Party organisers, skilled oilmen and repairmen, all of them devoted to their 
chosen field and difficult job.512 
 
Abasov clarifies that it was the offices (kontory) of most drilling enterprises that were 
evacuated, leaving the necessary minimum number of workers to continue operations, 
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rather than masses of personnel from the entire oil industry.513 Regardless, the evacuation 
was a distinct low point for the Baku oil industry. 
By mid-1943, the tide of the war was turning against Germany, and the most 
serious danger to Baku had passed—the city’s fate had effectively been determined by 
the German loss at Stalingrad.514 Signs of the resumption of normal operations began to 
appear late in 1942, as exploration and drilling, activities not strictly essential to wartime 
production, started to resume.515 However, in other respects the later years of the war saw 
a serious decline in oil production in Baku. The departure of experts to new oilfields in 
central Russia, the curtailing of new drilling, and the capping of some wells caused a 
sharp decrease in the number of working wells and average production per well after June 
1941.516 Many of the workers skilled in repair work had been drafted into the army. The 
introduction of women and minors into the workforce could not make up for the removal 
of 30,000 men for military service and another 10,000 to the eastern oil regions.517 Baku 
managed to recover much of its normal oil production in the immediate postwar years, 
but by then Soviet authorities had commenced oil exploration and extraction in other 
regions of the country, as examined in the next chapter. 
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Conclusion 
 
The contributions and sacrifices of the Azerbaijan SSR toward the Soviet effort 
during World War II were considerable and were commended time and again by the 
Soviet regime. The Soviet narratives of course smoothed over suffering and highlighted 
bravery and devotion: an oil worker with four sons serving at the front swearing to 
produce every ounce of tank fuel that they would use; a pensioner offering to “beat the 
fascists” with a handbrake; a woman villager promising to master a machine-operating 
job so that she could replace her drafted brother.518 The eventual loss of roughly 300,000 
Azerbaijanis during the war, or about 10% of the republic’s pre-war population, was 
praised as an invaluable sacrifice for freedom, although it was poorly rewarded in terms 
of military decoration, and constituted an irreparable loss to the republic.519 Memoirs 
such as those by Baibakov and Mirzoev, as well as the recollections of Bakuvians in the 
post-Soviet era, offer more depth to this story, conveying the utterly disheartening 
experience of wartime deprivation and of witnessing the evacuation of large sections of 
the oil industry, as they understood the implication that violent conquest was approaching 
just over the horizon. 
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It was during World War II that the significance of oil to modern warfare became 
truly apparent, shaping strategy and objectives; it was during this period also that the 
location and spatial character of the Baku oil industry became concerning for Soviet 
authorities. It was easily reached by enemy air forces, was connected by just a few lines 
to the center, and was concentrated into a relatively small area on the end of a peninsula 
clearly recognizable from the air. Baku continued to be a major oil producer for the 
Soviet Union into the 1950s, but the threat of destruction by enemy powers during World 
War II prompted Soviet authorities to look elsewhere for its oil and natural gas. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
A NEW VOCATION IN OIL: BAKU AND THE SOVIET OIL INDUSTRY, 1945- 
LATE 1980S 
 
People from all over the Soviet Union…used to visit us [in Baku], to partake from 
our experience, and we went too. To Moscow we went for advanced things, and 
to us they came from Central Asia, from Moldova, from Siberia. 
—“Ali,” oil industry engineer520 
 
The precipitous drop in Baku’s share of Soviet oil production in the postwar era 
prompted and accompanied a shift in the city’s vocation and character as an urban- 
industrial center. Histories of Baku in the postwar era tend either to neglect its oil 
industry or to emphasize elements of decline. Audrey L. Altstadt’s otherwise thorough 
history of Azerbaijan centers on postwar political developments, with little mention of 
the oil industry.521 Those works that do target the Baku oil industry largely take a 
declensionist view. In a 1999 article, historian Nasib Nassibli offers a glum assessment of 
postwar Azerbaijan: despite Azerbaijan’s remarkable achievements in the production of 
oil for the Soviet Union, its “share was poverty, ecological catastrophe, and lack of 
economic and social progress.” Nassibli’s main grievance is the considerable ecological 
damage evident on the Absheron Peninsula, undeniably one of the worst legacies of the 
Soviet era for Azerbaijan. His references to other dimensions of decline is a common 
motif in discussions of postwar Baku and its oil industry.522 However, although Baku did 
lose its status as a major producer of oil in the postwar era, it continued to contribute in 
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important ways to the Soviet oil industry, and the city itself grew demographically and 
spatially. 
The postwar decline of Baku’s status as an oil-producing center was in fact only 
relative to the development of oil production within the Soviet Union at large, and 
especially, worldwide. Azerbaijan’s actual production levels grew consistently (but 
slowly) until the end of the Soviet era, but a combination of wartime lessons and the 
USSR’s rapidly increasing fuel demands caused the Soviet center to begin extraction in 
earnest at previously undeveloped oil sites elsewhere in the country. These sites soon 
began to overtake Baku oil production, recruiting the top Soviet oil experts, many of 
them relocated from Baku. In the context of the Soviet system, which valued large-scale 
improvement, dramatic progress, and exceeding plan quotas, Baku was no longer a rising 
star. Between the end of World War II and the years leading up to the breakup of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, the oil industry of Baku went from producing about 70% of all 
Soviet oil to just 2.4% by 1980. By the latter year, the industry was insignificant as an oil 
producer on the world stage as well.523 The city’s status thus underwent a dramatic 
change as an oil-producing center both nationally and globally. 
Despite this decline in status, Baku retained its traditional association with oil, 
changing its particular vocation within the industry. Baku remained important to the 
Soviet oil and gas industries in capacities other than the extraction of crude. It continued 
to produce the majority of machinery used by Soviet oil enterprises around the country, 
and along with Moscow and Leningrad was one of the country’s premier educational 
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centers for oil research. It was also the Soviet Union’s primary center for developing 
offshore oil drilling technology. The Oily Rocks complex, near Baku in the Caspian Sea, 
was the country’s first foray into offshore development, and experimentation in new 
offshore technology continued in and near Baku until the end of the Soviet era. 
One consequence of Baku’s shifting role in the Soviet oil industry was the 
disconnect, to some extent, of the physical growth of the city from its previous status as a 
leading oil producer. In every era before this point, back to the mid-nineteenth century, 
Baku as a city had grown specifically because its oil production was growing. Under the 
coordinated direction of central Soviet and Baku municipal authorities in the postwar era, 
expansion of administrative and residential building continued despite the city’s 
increasingly insignificant oil production. The demographic composition of the city 
reflected this change. Whereas previously the industry had been dominated by ethnic 
Russians and Armenians, who had traditionally enjoyed best access to the education and 
training required for middle and upper positions, now native Azerbaijanis moved into 
more leading roles. Non-Azerbaijani employees moved or were transferred to new oil 
sites as Baku’s share in oil production declined. The trend compounded over time, 
affecting other administrative sectors in the AzSSR. This “nativization” of Baku and 
Azerbaijan was initially mostly demographic, under the ideological limits of the Soviet 
era, but nevertheless contributed to nationalist feeling that emerged violently in the 
1990s. 
Important here is the nature of the Soviet center’s relations with peripheral 
republics in the postwar era. As outlined by Leyla Sayfutdinova, scholars have tended to 
take either the view that the Soviet Union was ultimately beneficial to peripheral 
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republics such as Azerbaijan because it invested heavily in their “modernization,” 
including the development of industry, education, and urbanization, or the view that it 
was harmfully exploitative, investing in peripheral republics only so long as they were 
able to produce raw materials such as oil. Sayfutdinova concludes that Azerbaijanis in the 
postwar era tended to see the center-periphery relationship from a mixture of both views. 
The Soviets indeed contributed to Azerbaijan’s modernization, and valued the 
contributions of Azerbaijanis to the Soviet system, but ultimately treated Azerbaijanis as 
inferior to Russians.524 My own examination of the Baku oil industry in the postwar 
Soviet context leads to similar conclusions; that is, although the Soviet center diverted 
resources away from oil extraction efforts in Baku, the city and its oil industry were 
recognized as important still to the Soviet oil industry, and were ultimately not in a state 
of decline until the very end of the Soviet era. 
Baku in the postwar era did not achieve anything like the “success” that it had had 
as an oil center in the mid- to late nineteenth century and during the first three decades of 
Soviet rule. The Soviet system implicitly placed more value on those peripheral sites that 
could yield measurable commodities for the national good. Baku continued to contribute 
to the Soviet energy scene, but in less flashy ways than it had before World War II. 
However, the city continued to grow and change rather than deteriorate as a result of 
changes in the Soviet system more broadly and due to the gradual repossession of Baku 
by ethnic Azerbaijanis. 
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Postwar Decline of the Baku Oil Industry 
 
In the spring of 1945, World War II effectively ended for the western regions of 
the Soviet Union, including Azerbaijan. As explored in the previous chapter, it had 
become apparent to Soviet authorities during the war that there was real risk associated 
with having the country’s oil industry so heavily concentrated in one location whose 
connections with the center might easily be cut off. Emerging Cold War anxieties only 
further added to the national security considerations at stake. By 1952, Turkey had 
become a NATO ally; Baku remained within easy range of its air force and missile 
sites.525 In the immediate postwar period, Soviet authorities sought to monopolize oil 
agreements with Middle Eastern powers on the southern borders of the USSR so as to 
prevent NATO powers from drawing too near.526 If another war were to break out, even a 
minor regional conflict, the Baku oil industry would be far too vulnerable.527 
Beyond the issue of national security was the international posturing that 
characterized Cold War relations between, on the one hand, the USSR and its allies, and 
on the other, the US and its allies. Oil and natural gas had a vital role to play here. 
Production of these commodities was both an indicator of national health, thus reflecting 
the relative superiority or inferiority of the two sides, and crucial to the advancement of 
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key sectors such as heavy industry, weapons and other military production, and 
chemicals. In the words of American oilman Everette Lee DeGolyer in 1953, oil was “a 
war munition of decisive importance….[It] is not the infantry but gasoline which is now 
queen of battles.”528 For the Soviet system to progress and to have a chance at world 
dominance, unimpeded growth in the oil and gas industries was necessary. 
The first major expansion of Soviet oil came in the final stages of the Second 
World War. Soviet forces seized all oil fields, refineries, and oil in storage that they came 
upon as they moved west toward Berlin in 1944. The most productive areas were in 
Poland and Romania; the Soviets were also interested in controlling oil and the oil trade 
also in Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans.529 In subsequent arguments 
over these oil resources, the British and other former Allied Powers claimed that the 
seizures had been illegitimate and that the Soviets now enjoyed unfair control over all oil 
resources in Eastern Europe. Soviet representatives asserted that because the Third Reich 
had been primarily responsible for the development of oil fields and infrastructure in 
these regions, the seizures constituted a valid claiming of “war booty” from its enemy.530 
Ultimately, the inability of the Soviet Union’s Cold War opponents to disrupt the 
economic, political, and infrastructural consolidation between the USSR and its bloc 
meant that Eastern European oil production remained as much in the Soviet sphere as any 
other key commodity there. 
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These seizures helped make up for a marked drop in Soviet domestic oil 
production over the course of the war, the reasons for which are noted in the previous 
chapter. In 1943, total production for the USSR was 28.3 million tons; in 1944, this had 
risen to 38.5 million tons, much of the difference a temporary boost from seized oil and 
oil products in storage. During postwar settlements and establishment of new 
administrative divisions, Soviet output again dropped (to 21.3 million tons in 1945).531 
More stable and enduring sources of oil within the Soviet Union were needed. In contrast 
to the sometimes wildly unrealistic goals of prewar economic plans, the oil quotas for the 
Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-1950) were relatively modest. Planners aimed to reach just 
35 million tons of oil by 1950.532 The country reached and somewhat surpassed that goal, 
however, producing roughly 37.6 million tons in that year. Baku remained the single 
largest producer in the country (40-45% of the total) (Table 8) at that time, but other sites 
were making up more of the remainder than ever before.533 
Table 8. Crude Oil Output, Total USSR and AzSSR, 1937-1970 
(selected years) (millions of tons)534 
Year Total USSR AzSSR 
1937 28.5 21.4 
1945 19.4 11.5 
1950 37.8 14.8 
1955 70.8 15.3 
1960 147.8 17.8 
1965 242.9 21.5 
1970 353.0 20.2 
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The first major oil sites outside of the Caucasus to undergo extensive 
development were in the Volga-Urals Basin, a region of about 200,000 square miles on 
the central-western flanks of the Urals Mountains that includes the cities of Perm, Ufa, 
Kazan, and Samara.535 As in the Baku region, inhabitants had recognized signs that oil 
and gas were present at various sites in the Volga-Urals Basin for perhaps centuries. As 
long as Baku continued to produce sufficient oil and gas, however, Soviet authorities felt 
no pressing need to direct mass resources to extensive development of new sites.536 In the 
late 1920s, after exploration by Soviet geologist I. M. Gubkin, oil was struck near 
Molotov in the Volga-Urals area.537 The results were promising enough to prompt the 
17th Party Congress in March 1939 to order the creation of a new oil base—the “Second 
Baku.”538 By the 1940s, this designation was commonly used; it was a quasi- 
propagandistic label that suited common Soviet messaging practices by saluting a site 
foundational to the Soviet Union while emphasizing newness and improvement.539 In the 
years before the German invasion of 1941, the oil ministry made a few more advances in 
the region, striking oil in several more fields and constructing refineries and pipelines. 
Because of Baku’s preeminence and due to infighting among Soviet geologists, however, 
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oil production from the Second Baku remained comparatively low until after the war 
(roughly 14% of total Soviet production in 1942).540 
Following the exposure of Baku’s vulnerabilities during the war, the shift in 
relative production was swift. By 1954, the Volga-Urals region and the Baku region were 
producing roughly equal amounts of oil per year.541 The Volga-Urals sites quickly began 
to draw a greater share of the state’s investment in oil and gas.542 By 1965, the Second 
Baku produced over 70% of Soviet oil, decisively displacing Baku as the country’s center 
of oil production.543 Of the 5500 planned wells to be drilled during the period of the 
Fourth Five-Year Plan, 3500 were to be in the Volga-Urals region.544 In addition to the 
area’s safe distance from enemy attack, the fields of this region had advantages in terms 
of location and transportation. Not only was the Second Baku closer to the central 
industrial region of the Soviet Union, it had better access to water routes (including the 
Volga and Kama Rivers) and to existing railway networks.545 
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The primacy of the Volga-Urals region, the Soviet Union’s “second phase” of oil 
production, did not last past 1975, for a third major oil region had emerged (Figure 7). 
The West Siberian Oil Basin, covering roughly 850,000 square miles, was and remains a 
largely uninhabited area just east of the Ural Mountains. Unlike the fairly easily 
accessible Volga-Urals Basin, the West Siberian Oil Basin was distant and undeveloped. 
Thousands of miles of rough terrain, much of it swampland, separated the main oil sites 
from major existing transportation routes and population centers. The Soviets had plenty 
of experience overcoming such obstacles, having constructed no small number of 
challenging railway and water route projects over the decades, but authorities had to be 
Figure 7. Major Eurasian oil basins. 
Source: http://priceofoil.org/2013/04/02/as-russia-fracks-poland-outlaws-anti- 
fracking-protest/major-russian-oil-basins/ 
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fairly certain that the results would warrant the necessary investment of resources and 
manpower. Speculation about the quantity of oil in West Siberia had remained largely 
unsubstantiated until the late 1950s and early 1960s.546 The shift in emphasis toward 
West Siberia in the mid-1960s was in part political. Party and state elites were split 
between those who believed that it was an unnecessary use of resources, and those who 
believed that it was vital to maintaining the Soviet Union’s powerful place in the world. 
The division was based less on true commitment to the fate of West Siberia, and more on 
existing political connections. In the political shifts that came with the ouster of Nikita 
Khrushchev as General Secretary in 1964, those who had an interest in oil development 
in the east managed to position themselves advantageously.547 In 1965, the West Siberian 
Oil Basin had barely begun to produce oil, but was by 1975 producing 30% of all Soviet 
oil, and was rising rapidly to overtake the Volga-Urals region.548 
However, the move into West Siberia was also necessitated by an unexpected 
drop in production from older oil sites as well as from newer fields in Central Asia that 
had proved unsuccessful.549 The need for West Siberian oil became more acute when in 
1977 the CIA produced a widely-circulated memorandum titled “The Impending Soviet 
Oil Crisis”; the report predicted that the Soviet oil industry was on the brink of a sharp 
decline and would soon be unable to compete with OPEC and western states.550 It is 
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difficult to assess the accuracy of the report; the USSR had definitively surpassed the US 
in oil production in 1975, so Cold War bluster and fear may have prompted the CIA to 
create such an appraisal.551 Nevertheless, being self-conscious of the Soviet bloc’s 
standing in the world, Soviet planners drastically upped production quotas for the West 
Siberian fields and directed additional resources and personnel accordingly.552 By 1986, 
West Siberia produced nearly two-thirds of Soviet oil, and remained on top for the rest of 
the Soviet era.553 
The Baku oil industry, which in 1901 had produced just over half of world oil and 
had been one of Hitler’s primary objectives in invading the Soviet Union during World 
War II, produced by 1960 an amount of oil that was insignificant on the national and 
global scales. In 1971, the Baku oil industry limped past a major milestone—it had, 
according to official records, produced 1 billion tons of oil for the Soviet state.554 
However, it was then producing just 5% of Soviet oil and 0.008% of world oil per 
year.555 
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A New Vocation in Oil 
 
The precipitous drop in Baku’s share of oil production for the Soviet Union did 
not eliminate, however, the close connection of the urban-industrial site with oil. Not 
only did Baku continue to educate oil engineers who went on to work in all parts of the 
country, it also remained the primary producer of equipment and machinery for the oil 
industry, and it became the primary site for testing new oil-related technology. 
In the first place, Baku remained one of the Soviet Union’s top three centers, 
along with Moscow and Leningrad, for education and training in the oil industry. Baku’s 
Polytechnical Institute, which had opened in 1920, continued to expand, adding more 
departments and personnel. In 1959 it was renamed the Azerbaijan Oil and Chemistry 
Institute in order to reflect better its function.556 Other educational institutions included 
the Azerbaijan Scientific Research Institute on Oil Processing and the Azerbaijan 
Scientific Research and Project Institute of Oil Machine Building, both of which had 
been established in the late 1920s or early 1930s, as discussed in chapter five. These and 
other oil-related educational and research institutions continued to draw thousands of 
engineering students every year in the postwar era, even as Baku itself declined in status 
as an oil-producing center.557 The majority of graduates from these institutes were 
assigned jobs in Azerbaijan, but the most prestigious might move on to further education 
or careers in other parts of the Soviet Union.558 
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Due to more extensive educational and training opportunities, Azerbaijanis were 
more heavily represented in the leadership of the Azerbaijan oil industry than ever before, 
although the national industry leadership consisted almost entirely of European 
Soviets.559 This situation gradually began to change over the following three decades, 
during which time several Bakuvians rose to prominent positions nationally. Valentin 
Dmitrievich Shashin was the USSR Minister of the Oil Industry from 1965 to 1977, Sabit 
Ataevich Orudzhev was Minister of Gas from 1972 to 1981, Farman Kurbanovich 
Salmanov headed the Tyumen region’s geology unit during that region’s period of 
highest productivity in the 1970s and 1980s, and Valerii Isaakovich Graifer led 
Glavtyumenneftegaz, the oil and gas production unit for Tyumen, between 1985 and 
1989.560 
In addition, Baku continued to contribute materially and technologically to the 
Soviet oil industry, but in new ways, specifically in terms of equipment and in new 
methods of oil extraction. Baku industrial enterprises in the postwar era produced the 
majority of machinery needed for the Soviet oil industry, including equipment for 
extraction, refining, and transportation of oil and gas products.561 This included 
pumpjacks (“nodding donkeys”), hydraulic and air compressors, pipes, land and sea 
platforms, and the various measuring instruments required by oil and gas enterprises 
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around the country.562 Before the 1930s, the Soviet Union had imported nearly all of its 
oil equipment from abroad, lacking the technology and resources to manufacture it 
domestically. During the course of the early Five-Year Plans, in order to reduce 
dependence on foreign powers, Soviet authorities began devoting part of Baku industry to 
equipment manufacturing under the Central Administration for Oil Engineering 
(Glavneftemash). During the war, Baku manufacturing capacity had largely been turned 
over to weapons production. This was reversed in the immediate postwar era.563 By the 
1950s, the oil equipment manufacturing sector in Baku was growing quickly, employing 
tens of thousands of workers.564 
Finally, Baku remained a key location for testing oil technology and methods new 
to the Soviet Union. After the Second World War, Soviet oil authorities recognized that 
oil production in Baku was flagging, in large part due to exhaustion of wells and damage 
done during the war. Around 1960, the average oil well in the Baku region was producing 
just 3,000 tons of oil per year, below the national average of 5,650 tons per year, and well 
below the average of 17,000 tons per well per year in the Volga-Urals region.565 Several 
thousand wells in Azerbaijan produced less than 100 metric tons per year, the greatest 
concentration of “low-productivity” wells in the country in 1959.566 Authorities 
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addressed this sluggish growth in three primary ways that boosted production and 
continued Baku’s role as a site of industrial experimentation: deep drilling, hydraulic 
fracturing (“fracking”), and offshore drilling and extraction. Soviet geologists recognized 
that plentiful oil reservoirs still existed in the Baku region, but that new methods, 
applicable also to other oil regions, were needed to reach them. “Deep drilling” in the 
Soviet context meant wells that delved deeper than the traditional average of 1000-2000 
meters. Wells at that depth in the Baku region were not producing enough to satisfy 
demand, so experts began to attempt more ambitious drilling efforts, using enhancements 
of existing technology. In 1960, Baku drillers completed a well nearly 5,000 meters deep. 
Soviet planners aimed to sink 120 more wells of similar depth in Azerbaijan by 1965, and 
proposed to begin work on wells of 6,000 to 10,000 meters in the longer term.567 In 1960, 
hydraulic fracturing worldwide was still in its infancy, subject to some skepticism among 
oil experts regarding its ability to improve significantly the production of gas and oil. 
However, some experimentation with the process, which involves fracturing rock with 
highly pressurized liquid in order to release trapped gas and oil, took place in Azerbaijan 
beginning in 1954. Over the course of the 1950s, several thousand hydraulic fracturing 
operations were carried out in Azerbaijan, resulting in nearly 500,000 tons of crude oil. 
Further operations were planned for the coming years.568 
However, far greater production was expected from offshore oil production. Baku 
became and mostly remained the center of Soviet offshore oil production, under the 
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Caspian Sea Oil and Gas Industry (Kaspmorneftegazprom).569 It had long been known 
that oil and gas reservoirs existed beneath the waters of the Caspian Sea—travelers had 
for centuries marveled at the oil and natural gas that floated on the sea’s surface, making 
it possible for one to set the sea on fire near Baku.570 However, it was not until the mid- 
twentieth century that Soviet technology developed the means to extract oil from 
reservoirs lying under even very shallow water without flooding the well. The 
construction of offshore platforms also involved an immense investment of resources, 
which was not worthwhile as long as sufficient oil was available from other sites. 
Out of a desire to keep up Azerbaijan’s oil production numbers after World War 
II, authorities began to pursue oil resources in waters up to 150 meters in depth, where 
infill was simply not practical. In November 1948, development commenced on an oil 
platform along the Absheron sill, led by Azerbaijan Oil Exploration (Aznefterazvedka) 
head Sabit Ataevich Orudzhev; by the next year, offshore oil development had 
progressed sufficiently that AzSSR Communist Party head Mir Jafar Baghirov explicitly 
commended all involved.571 In 1951, a large group of offshore oil specialists was 
awarded the Stalin Prize in the first degree.572 The project received extra support from the 
Soviet center beginning in 1955, when N. K. Baibakov, who had overseen Baku’s partial 
wartime evacuation, became the first Azerbaijani head of Gosplan, the Soviet economic 
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planning committee.573 By 1967, about half of Azerbaijan’s oil production came from 
offshore oil enterprises, roughly 10 million of 20 million tons per year through the 
1970s.574 Several “offshore” sites were merely extensions of wells along the Absheron 
coast, such as the Artyom (now Pirallahi) field just north of the Absheron Peninsula’s tip, 
but authorities did begin exploitation of fields far out to sea.575 
The most promising spot for Caspian oil extraction, and the most productive 
Caspian site for decades, was Neft Dashlari or Neftianye Kamni (“Oil Rocks” or “Oily 
Rocks”), located several miles off the coast of Baku.576 The site lay along the Absheron 
Sill, an oil- and gas-rich geological structure that ran east-west underneath the Caspian 
Sea and was recognized by Soviet geologists to be part of the same structure that supplied 
Baku oil fields on land.577 In 1949, construction began on a ramshackle platform that 
would house extraction equipment and workers, building from the sunken wrecks of 
seven decrepit tanker ships (including the world’s first proper oil tanker, the Zoroaster, 
so the story goes).578 As time went on, steel and then concrete pilings were sunk into the 
seabed to provide stability for an expanding makeshift settlement that eventually came to 
include barracks and apartments, gardens, shops, cafeterias, a hospital, and a variety of 
recreational spaces for workers. Among the various buildings and other structures ran 
 
 
573 Gustafson, 215. 
 
574 Campbell, Trends, 32-33. 
 
575 Ebel, The Petroleum Industry, 90. 
 
576 In 1955, Neft Dashlari produced roughly 60 percent of all Azerbaijan oil. Ibid., 97. 
 
577 Stephen Lewarne, Soviet Oil: The Move Offshore (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 38. 
 
578 Robert Corzine, “Waterworld in the Caspian (Oil Rocks Complex in Caspian Sea off Azerbaijan),” The 
Financial Times, September 20, 1995, 18. 
221  
extensive networks of raised roads and walkways, giving the settlement the appearance 
from the air of a clumpy spiderweb.579 The entire complex covered over 300 square 
kilometers.580 It was to be a “modern socialist city on the high seas,” fully planned and 
rationalized.581 Although Neft Dashlari was not quite an independent city, remaining 
heavily reliant on nearby Baku to send supplies, to process and transport its oil, and to 
house the families of its several thousand workers, it did constitute (per architectural 
historian Eve Blau) a “new form of urbanism,” yet another variety of oil-generated 
settlement in the region.582 Encouraged by the success of this experiment, Azerbaijan’s 
oil authorities pursued similar structures along the Caspian coast, including the complex 
of the A.P. Serebrovskii Oil Directorate about twelve miles south of Baku, which by 
1975 employed some 1500 workers.583 For its part, Neft Dashlari began to feel the effects 
of the Caspian Sea’s harsh weather and salinity not long after its completion, but it 
remained in operation through the end of the Soviet era and still produces oil today.584 
 
 
579 T. Sharinskyi, “Housing Complex ‘Oily Rocks’ on the Open Sea,” Arkhitektura SSSR 8 (1961). Excerpt 
included in Blau, Baku: Oil and Urbanism, 165. 
 
580 Blau, Baku: Oil and Urbanism, 168. 
 
581 Slavkina, Baibakov. 
 
582 Neft Dashlari employed 3000 oil workers in 1975, working in shifts of ten days on, ten days off the 
settlement. “Travel Report: Caucasus,” in Oil Resources in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, British 
Documents 1885-1978, Volume 8, 1967-1978 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 561; Blau, 
Baku: Oil and Urbanism, 162; Maya Przybylski, “Re-Rigging Transborder Logics across the Bounded 
Site,” in The Petropolis of Tomorrow, edited by Neeraj Bhatia and Mary Casper, 258-271 (New York: 
Actar D, 2013), 260-263. 
 
583 “Travel Report: Caucasus,” 561. 
 
584 In a 1960 visit to Neft Dashlari, Khrushchev commented on the severe corrosion of the steel pilings on 
which much of Neft Dashlari rested. Many subsequent reviews of the complex have noted its dilapidation. 
Ebel, The Petroleum Industry, 98; Arno Frank, “Rise and Fall of Stalin’s Atlantis of Oil,” Der Spiegel 
(November 15, 2012), https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/exploring-the-crumbling-soviet-oil- 
platform-city-of-neft-dashlari-a-867055.html. 
222  
 
 
 
 
Azerbaijani oilmen’s experience in offshore extraction was beneficial in some 
ways as the Soviet Union considered expanding into the Arctic, Barents, Baltic, Black, 
and Okhotsk Seas. In September 1973, an all-Union conference on offshore oil 
exploration and development was held in Baku, drawing scientists and other experts from 
all parts of the Soviet Union that had the potential for offshore extraction. Per a glowing 
article in Bakinskii Rabochii of the time, “It is hard to overestimate the contribution made 
by the Azerbaijani oil workers to the business of harnessing off-shore oil and gas 
deposits….[Neft Dashlari] epitomises…the inventive spirit and working valour of the 
Caspian conquerors.” Following this collaboration, Soviet oilmen began further 
Figure 8. Neft Dashlari. 
Source: https://architectureau.com/calendar/film/dado-film-oil-rocks-city-above-the- 
sea/ 
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investigating the country’s offshore oil resources, including the possibility of ice-resistant 
platforms for the Sakhalin region.585 
However, the Caspian Sea for decades remained the Soviet Union’s only notably 
foray into offshore oil extraction, despite Soviet authorities’ wish to expand. In 1976, 
economist Robert W. Campbell noted that the Soviets still lacked the proper drilling 
equipment for most of its accessible bodies of water. Neft Dashlari was a useful initial 
venture into offshore oil extraction, but experts recognized that, fragile and rambling as it 
was, it would be neither practical nor desirable to replicate the structure in other bodies of 
water (the settlement has generally been regarded as an oddity among offshore oil 
platforms). The Soviets for a time continued with fixed offshore oil platforms, but these 
were worth construction only when experts felt sure that sufficient quantities of oil 
existed in a particular location.586 By the mid-1970s, the USSR was in the process of 
experimenting with mobile offshore oil rigs in the eastern Caspian Sea, but the going was 
relatively slow due to the increasing technological lag between the USSR and the West. 
By 1974, the USSR had just two working prototypes, the “Absheron” and the 
“Azerbaijan,” neither of which could operate in water deeper than 15 meters, and which 
could drill just 1,800 meters, far shallower than the depths at which Caspian oil was 
expected.587 
Thus, the Baku oil industry retained some importance in the Soviet Union, 
providing education and training, oil industry equipment, and a site for experimentation 
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with offshore oil extraction. It retained its traditional close association with oil. On June 
17, 1978, the opening ceremony for the first International Oil and Gas Exhibition took 
place on the grounds of the Exhibition of National Economic Achievements in Baku. 
Heydar Aliyev, who had been First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party since 
1969, read aloud a greeting from USSR General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev that 
endorsed the exhibition as a means of uniting the international scientific community. The 
exhibition was truly an international affair, drawing delegations from the United States 
and several European countries, a moment of apparent harmony during the temporary 
easing of Cold War relations. It was also a celebration of the Soviet Union’s immense 
success as an oil producer on the global scale. With the expansion of oil extraction in the 
Volga-Ural region and West Siberia, the USSR had surpassed US levels of oil production 
in 1975.588 Although by 1978 Baku was producing just a small fraction of all Soviet oil 
and was insignificant as a producer on the international scale, the city’s long history as an 
oil center made it the natural choice to play host to such an exhibition.589 
 
Baku’s Changing Character 
 
Alongside Baku’s changing status in the Soviet oil scene came a transformation in 
the character of the city itself. The balance of the ethnic makeup of the city’s population 
and local oil industry personnel tipped gradually away from nonnatives such as Russians 
and Armenians, and toward local ethnicities, primarily Azerbaijanis. The “nativization” 
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of Baku, which was not just demographic but also political and aesthetic, was not entirely 
connected to its oil industry, however, but represented a broader change in center- 
periphery relations in the post-Stalin era. 
There was a clear demographic shift in Azerbaijan and Baku in the postwar era 
toward a predominantly Azerbaijani urban population, another phase of population 
change associated directly with the oil industry. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, 
the Russian and Armenian populations of Baku had begun to grow substantially, reaching 
35.5% and 19.4% of Baku’s population by 1913, respectively, while Azerbaijanis made 
up just 21.4%.590 The trend continued through the end of World War II, as long as Baku 
remained an important oil producer for the country. However, in the postwar years the 
number of jobs associated with the oil industry in Baku began to decline. This was due in 
part to greater automation and increased use of labor-saving technology in the oil 
industry. Increasingly, processes related to pumping oil and gas from wells, including 
flood control, the frequency of pumps’ strokes, and measurement of production, could be 
automated.591 
As jobs in the oil industry began to dry up, Russians and other ethnically 
European Soviets either began to return to find work in their places of origin or 
transferred (voluntarily or involuntarily) to the newer oil sites. In 1959, Russians still 
made up 32.9% of Baku’s population. By 1989, that number had dropped to just 16.5% 
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of the population (Table 9).592 For some ethnic Azerbaijanis as well, especially those 
interested in making a career in the national oil industry, Baku’s reputation was losing its 
shine. Increasingly, postings in the oil and gas industries in Baku came to seem less 
desirable than those in the more exciting new oil regions. Baibakov recalled receiving a 
telegram in 1954 from a young Bakuvian named Farman Salmanov, who had recently 
graduated from the Azerbaijan Oil Institute. Salmanov lamented having received a post in 
Baku, and asked for Baikabov’s help in obtaining a job offer in West Siberia, which had 
better prospects as an oil-producing region. Baibakov arranged for Salmanov to be 
transferred to the Western Siberia Oil Geology unit (Zapsibneftegeologiia).593 
Table 9. Baku Population by Nationality (%), 1939-1989594 
Nationality 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 
Azerbaijani 27.3 32.9 46.3 55.7 66.0 
Russian 43.5 34.7 27.7 22.0 16.5 
Armenian 15.0 21.3 16.3 14.0 10.0 
Other 14.2 11.1 9.7 8.3 7.5 
 
Associated with the demographic de-Russification of Baku was a gradual and 
subtle “nativization” of the city’s government and culture. The beginning of Azerbaijan’s 
very gradual course back to national self-consciousness was associated with the “Thaw” 
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(krome RSFSR) po polu i natsionalnosti, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/resp_nac_59.php?reg=65; 
Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1989 goda. Raspredelenie gorodskogo i selskogo naseleniia oblastei 
respublik SSSR po polu i natsionalnosti, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/resp_nac_89.php?reg=68. 
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that set in throughout the Soviet Union upon Khrushchev’s accession to power in the 
mid-1950s. This ushered in a reinvigoration of political, academic, and cultural life in the 
country due to the relaxation of the repressive policies of the Stalin era.595 The departure 
of Russians and other non-Azerbaijani residents of Baku only increased the cultural and 
political effects of the Thaw. Further, under Khrushchev, who was in power from roughly 
1955 until his ouster in 1964, reform extended to a decentralization process that gave 
more decision-making power to the leaders of the various republics. The position of First 
Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party had been occupied by ethnic Azerbaijanis 
since the beginning of the Soviet era, so the accession of Heydar Aliyev in 1969 was not 
initially notable. However, Aliyev managed to tread a careful path toward subdued 
cultural nationalism and connection with ethnic Azerbaijanis’ possessiveness for Baku 
and the republic of Azerbaijan.596 The Soviet nationalities policy, which had been 
introduced under Stalin to promote “nations in form, but not in content,” now found new 
life as non-Russian cultural elements found more room to expand.597 During the 
Brezhnev era (1964-1982), there was some reversal of republics’ autonomy, but in 
general the republican leaders had far more local control than they had had under Stalin. 
 
595 For instance, in 1956 Azerbaijani was designated the state language of the republic. The transition in 
power nationally was mirrored in Azerbaijan as Stalin’s crony Mir Jafar Baghirov, the head of the 
Azerbaijan Communist Party, was removed, arrested, charged with “anti-Soviet activity” along the same 
lines as Lavrentii Beria, and eventually executed. Jamil Hasanli, Khrushchev’s Thaw and National Identity 
in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2015), 9, 73. 
 
596 In Azerbaijan, the effect continued until the end of the Soviet era, as Aliyev filled the most important 
governmental posts with his own loyal supporters (common practice in the late Soviet era). Aliyev 
remained in positions of power until the height of corruption purges in the Gorbachev era, and returned as 
the authoritarian president of independent Azerbaijan in 1993, a position he held until his death in 2003. 
Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, 178-181. 
 
597 Martin, 18. From the 1960s onward, most government letterhead circulated in the Azerbaijan SSR was 
written in both Russian, in Cyrillic, and Azerbaijani, in the Latin-Cyrillic hybrid from the early twentieth 
century (from my own experience working in the Azerbaijan state archives). 
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It was implicitly understood that such an arrangement would last only as long as the 
republics and their leaders remained explicitly loyal to the center and did not take steps to 
promote true political nationalism. In Azerbaijan, the effect continued until the end of the 
Soviet era, as Aliyev filled the most important governmental posts with his own loyal 
supporters (a common practice in the late Soviet era).598 
The nativization of Baku in the postwar Soviet period should not be overstated, 
however. Due in large part to the exceptionally strong influence of non-Azerbaijanis for 
many decades, Azerbaijan lagged behind a number of other Soviet republics in 
developing a politicized nationalism of any consequence until the 1980s.599 The Russian 
language had been the lingua franca in all parts of the Soviet Union since the country’s 
inception, and remained so. Russian was especially heavily used in scientific and 
technical fields, including the oil industry, because it had been adapted to such purposes 
for far longer and more actively than languages such as Azerbaijani.600 Furthermore, 
complete fluency in Russian and familiarity with Russified elements of the Soviet system 
remained important to anyone who aspired to rise above the lowest stratum of society.601 
With an increasing number of bureaucratic positions being vacated by European Soviets, 
more Azerbaijanis had a chance to rise to higher posts with the right training. The number 
of Russian schools only increased in the postwar period, and the Azerbaijani language 
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was taught poorly despite being the state language.602 Baku was becoming Azerbaijani in 
character and demography in some ways, but the Azerbaijani intelligentsia and anyone 
else hoping to achieve respectable status in Soviet society were compelled to attend and 
send their children to Russian educational institutions.603 
Despite the gradual exodus of non-Azerbaijanis, Baku’s population continued to 
grow steadily after the war (Table 10). While for most of its modern history fluctuations 
in Baku’s population had been directly associated with the health of its oil industry (and 
vice versa), in the postwar era the two gradually became more detached. There was no 
longer a strong correlation between urbanization and the growth of the oil industry. Oil 
extraction required fewer hands due to technological advances, Baku was not a 
particularly important source of oil, and the extraction that continued in the region was 
increasingly distant from the city itself. Baku continued to grow as a city for the same 
reasons that urbanization was increasing throughout the world in the second half of the 
twentieth century, namely, increasing numbers of industrial jobs and decreasing numbers 
of agricultural jobs. Although its oil industry had shrunk in status, the republic of 
Azerbaijan possessed a number of other industries that were remarkably successful in the 
late Soviet era, particularly in the late 1970s, including agriculture and textiles.604 
 
 
 
 
 
602 Ibid., 91. 
 
603 Khrushchev himself, ever volatile, in 1959 railed against the notion that non-Azerbaijanis should have to 
learn the Azerbaijani language, or that Azerbaijanis did not have sufficient cultural representation in their 
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Table 10. Total Baku Population by 
Census, 1939-1989605 
1939 787,623 
1959 642,507 
1970 1,265,515 
1979 1,533,235 
1989 1,794,874 
 
 
The growing population of Baku necessitated continued construction, regardless 
of the city’s success or failure as an oil center. In the 1950s, a 1937 city plan devised by 
Lev Aleksandrovich Ilyin, an architect of Leningrad, and put on hold for the duration of 
the war was finally executed. Its primary aim was to increase drastically the amount of 
working and living space in the central part of Baku in an orderly way. The new plan 
involved both upward and outward construction. A number of late-nineteenth-century 
buildings near central Baku received between one and three additional stories, usually but 
not always executed in a seamless and faithful style. Furthermore, the “buffer zone” of 
wastes and slums that had long separated central Baku from the Black Town a few miles 
to the east was given new life as administrative and residential structures arose within 
it.606 
During the first two decades or so of the postwar era, between the late 1940s and 
the late 1960s, there was generally a balance in Baku between the monumental buildings 
of the Stalin era and the mass housing projects that were a priority of the Khrushchev 
administration. Several of Baku’s largest projects from this period had been conceived of 
during Baku’s second boom in the 1930s, but only in the postwar period were the 
 
605 Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1939; Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1959; Vsesoiuznaia perepis 
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resources and manpower available to realize these projects. The Azerbaijan Palace of the 
Soviets (now simply called the Government House [Hökumət Evi]), which was started in 
1936 and put on hold during the war, was completed in 1952.607 In 1967, the Baku metro 
opened for service, thirty-five years after initial plans for it had been laid. Were it not for 
repeated construction delays, it would have been the third metro system in the Soviet 
Union, after Moscow and Leningrad (ultimately it was the fifth, following Kiev and 
Tbilisi). As it was, after construction commenced in the late 1940s, the project halted 
repeatedly due to unexpected geological, hydrological, and administrative disruptions 
(including upset over Stalin’s death in 1953). In the years following the maiden run 
between Baki Soveti (now Icheri Sheher) station and Narimanov station in 1967, new 
stations were gradually brought online through the end of the Soviet era.608 
It was during the postwar era also that the major public leisure sites in Baku 
began to receive full attention from municipal authorities, part of a general trend in the 
late Soviet era. Beaches along the northern coast of the Absheron Peninsula, most of 
them well away from offshore extraction sites, became popular recreational spots as 
transportation routes to them improved.609 Tsypylma Darieva’s history of the renovation 
of the Baku promenade in this period offers a remarkable example of socialist “organized 
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leisure” intended to “demonstrate state power, socialist achievements, and new 
technologies.” The promenade had been popular among Europeans during the imperial 
era, an example of 
their preference for 
open spaces and 
chic waterfront 
strolls, but its 
upkeep had not 
been a concern for 
early Soviet 
municipal leaders 
after the 1920s. During the relative ease of the postwar period, improvements to the 
promenade were intended to make it more available for egalitarian public leisure: 
extension and repaving, with the addition of a puppet theater, a parachute tower (closed 
in the 1960s after several fatal accidents), a complex of miniature Venetian canals, shade 
trees, and many teahouses and snack bars. The message was that the regime valued its 
citizens’ leisure. The Soviet context remained alive here, however, as nearly all state 
celebrations took place on the promenade, and the entire complex was supervised from a 
nearby hill by a massive statue of Sergei Kirov.610 
 
 
 
 
 
 
610 Tsypylma Darieva, “Reconfiguring a Public Place. Baku Promenade between Europe and Asia,” in 
Orient on Orient: Images of Asia in Eurasian Countries, eds. Koshino Go and Tetsuo Mochizuki (Sapporo: 
Hokkaido University Press, 2013), 124-125. 
Figure 9. Statue of Sergei Kirov overlooking Baku Bay and the 
Bulvar, mid-twentieth century. 
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Figure 10. Soviet-era apartment complex with 
Azerbaijani motifs in the concrete cladding. Photo by 
author, 2017. 
Finally, beginning in the late 1950s, Baku’s residential areas were renovated and 
expanded according to the Khrushchev-era mikroraion (“microregion”) approach. The 
mikroraion was essentially a planned, autonomous neighborhood, including apartment 
buildings and all of the facilities and services that one might find in a moderately-sized 
town: schools, medical clinics, shops, and so on. The apartment buildings themselves 
were often the type eventually known as khrushchevka or khrushchoba—a low-cost, 
prefabricated concrete structure, sometimes very shoddy, associated with Khrushchev’s 
mass housing initiative.611 According to Blau, “the urban spatial logic underlying the 
organization and size of the urban conurbation was that each microregion would be 
equipped to meet the daily and weekly needs of its inhabitants,” reducing the need for 
urbanites to travel long 
distances except for work.612 
Neft Dashlari was one 
example of a mikroraion; 
others began to fill Baku’s 
outskirts. These housing 
blocks were often an eyesore 
and did not improve in 
appearance with time. In 
Baku, however, some local 
architects in the 1960s and 
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1970s made attempts to enhance the buildings’ facades by integrating Azerbaijani 
decorative motifs into the outer concrete slabs (Figure 10). Per Blau, “the result was a 
techno-aesthetic hybrid in which traditional local ornamental motifs were assimilated to 
Soviet standardized building typologies and prefabricated construction technologies.”613 
This manner of expanding Baku’s residential capacity continued as long as the city’s 
population increased, that is, until the end of the Soviet era, when tastes changed 
considerably. 
The perception of decline in late Soviet-era Baku stems largely from the physical 
deterioration of the city and industry in the last decade or so of Soviet rule. Until the 
1980s, Baku retained an air of prosperity and contentment, as reflected in its population 
and spatial growth. However, hasty construction and the corrupt, corner-cutting 
tendencies of those embedded in the Soviet economic system started to become evident 
as time wore on. The cheaply-built khrushchevki that housed likely a majority of the 
city’s residents were visibly decaying by the year; in Baku and elsewhere, they have 
become a symbol of the Soviet regime’s shortcomings in its facilities and products. The 
failures of the oil industry were becoming more apparent as well, the result of chronic 
underfunding during the later Brezhnev era. Glavneftemash, the oil equipment-making 
association that employed a large share of Baku oil workers, came under scrutiny during 
the 1980s for weaknesses in production. Political scientist Thane Gustafson 
communicated the findings of the Soviet press: “it painted a sorry picture of inefficiency 
and disarray. Glavneftemash’s plants were primitive and dirty, its machinery out of date, 
its operations poorly mechanized, and its research and development facilities, such as 
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they were, taken over for current production. Glavneftemash was working at 99 percent 
capacity, but its output was antiquated and substandard.” Despite increased inspections, 
Glavneftemash’s failures were not corrected; the systemic shortcomings that had led it to 
that state could not be overcome in a matter of a few years.614 
Finally, it was in the 1980s that experts, the press, and local residents finally 
began to come to grips with the extent of the environmental damage wrought by over a 
century of intensive urbanization and industrialization around the Absheron Peninsula. 
Awareness of the problem seems to have set in gradually. Concern for environmental 
impact until the late Soviet era had been minimal; imperial-era industrialists and Soviet 
authorities generally had a utilitarian understanding of nature that valued maximum 
extraction and production regardless of the effects. Nature protection groups remained 
fringe movements and generally ineffective until the end of the Brezhnev era, when 
relatively clear-eyed environmental study became permissible, and therefore 
professionalized.615 
The proliferation of offshore oil activities in the postwar period over time resulted 
in a level of contamination of the Caspian Sea that became impossible to deny. The 
pollution that had long been regarded as an unpleasant but ultimately not worrisome side 
effect of “business as usual” was increasingly recognized as a sign of hazardous 
ecological damage that threatened the health and wellbeing of all living things in the area. 
The occasional oil slicks that had once arisen naturally in the Bay of Baku by the 1970s 
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covered its surface constantly, coating the shore and suffocating marine life. Sturgeon 
catches declined consistently, depressing production of the sea’s prized black caviar.616 
A far more alarming development was the unexpected rise in the level of the 
Caspian Sea of about ten feet between 1978 and 1995, which resulted in a variety of 
messes that local authorities could not contend with, and which added to a sense of 
physical decline in and around Baku. It is not entirely clear why the sea level rose during 
this period, but it was likely some combination of normal long-term cycles of rising and 
falling, climate change, and precipitation patterns elsewhere (the sea is fed by five major 
Eurasian rivers).617 Between the 1930s and the late 1970s, the Caspian sea level had 
continuously dropped, about ten feet total, in part due to increased agricultural irrigation; 
in less than two decades, it rebounded to its 1930 level.618 The relatively sudden rise 
resulted in additional water pollution as the water table rose to meet toxic waste sites that 
had accumulated along the shore in the previous fifty years.619 Ecologist Henri Dumont 
presents the example of Sumgait as one of the worst scenarios—during the 1950s and 
1960s, when the Caspian Sea was at its low point, additional industrial facilities were 
added to Sumgait’s coastline, most of them related to the chemical and metallurgical 
industries, all of them producing toxic waste. When the sea began to rise in 1978, 
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authorities failed to clean up the site, and thus the facilities flooded, sending the toxic 
waste out to sea.620 Furthermore, the rising sea levels flooded low-lying settlements and 
damaged large portions of Baku’s famous promenade.621 
Ultimately, the environmental issues afflicting the Baku region, most especially 
the pollution of the Caspian Sea by the oil industry, could no longer be ignored. In this 
regard, the late Soviet era was a time of growing awareness and study of the problems, 
but not yet corrective action. One of the earliest studies of environmental issues in the 
Baku region came in a 1982 monograph, Economic and Social Development in Baku 
(1981-1985) (Ekonomicheskoe i sotsialnoe razvitie Baku) by Soviet scientists Z.A. 
Samed-zade, B.E. Akhundov, and E.N. Khanlarov. It included assessments of 
atmospheric pollution levels in the Baku area as compared to international standards of 
permissible concentrations of various pollutants.622 Numerous other studies and press 
reports assessing the state of the environment around Baku, especially the health of the 
Caspian Sea, emerged during this period, the result of Brezhnev’s general engagement 
with the sciences and the increasing transparency of the glasnost years. Devising, 
implementing, and paying for solutions became the task of the independent state of 
Azerbaijan. 
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Conclusion 
 
Between the 1870s, when the Baku oil industry got its start, and the end of World 
War II, oil production had overwhelmed the urban-industrial center. The exploration, 
drilling, extraction, and processing of crude oil had caused the city to expand as hundreds 
of thousands of workers traveled there from all parts of Eurasia, and as private investors 
and the state poured resources into construction to accommodate the industry and its 
workers. Baku had been a treasure for modernizing and warring states including the 
Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and Nazi Germany. 
The waning of Baku’s relative share of national and global oil production after 
World War II ate away at its fame and led to the gradual departure of most nonnative 
workers. When considered on the national scale, in a country that valued quota- 
surpassing and the spread of central Soviet influence, Baku seemed to be taking a turn for 
the worse. However, the industrial side of Baku continued to contribute to the Soviet oil 
sector material, methods, and technology, therefore retaining its traditional identity as an 
oil center. Furthermore, the city persistently expanded as its industrial base diversified, 
coming to include textiles, air conditioners, and other consumer goods, industries that 
drew workers from the surrounding regions more than from the distant Soviet center. 
From the end of World War II to the end of the Soviet period, Baku continued to mature 
in ways similar to the Soviet Union’s other major cities, with the addition of large-scale 
public works that flaunted the superiority of the Soviet system, and the construction of 
cheap mass-housing projects meant to accommodate the country’s growing urban 
population and send the message that its leadership cared about attending to the public’s 
comfort. However, there were signs that the city was better able to embrace its 
239  
Azerbaijani nature, from the makeup of its population and local leadership to the 
appearance of its buildings. The urban center’s development was no longer so directly 
dominated by oil production. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
BAKU AND OIL IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA 
 
 
Oil is the main national wealth of Azerbaijan and its people. Azerbaijan [has 
been] the land of oil since ancient times. That is why Azerbaijan is called the land 
of fire. 
—Heydar Aliyev, “Contract of the Century” signing (1994)623 
 
 
On August 30, 1991, following the August coup in Moscow, the Supreme Council 
of the Republic of Azerbaijan declared independence from the Soviet Union. The formal 
breakup of the Soviet Union four months later made Azerbaijan’s independence official 
in all eyes. It was a proud moment for the country, one lavishly celebrated in the years 
since, but in many other respects Azerbaijan had fallen to one of its lowest points. 
Nationalist rumblings had disturbed the country for at least three years before 
independence, stemming from dissatisfaction with Soviet rule and a territorial conflict 
with neighboring Armenia. The most visible unrest took place in Baku, which hosted a 
series of crises in the final few years of the Soviet era. Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts to 
correct the Soviet economy’s plateau destabilized the local economy, in particular Baku’s 
oil equipment industry. There is a marked correlation between these economic reforms 
and the decline in both the quality and quantity of the equipment manufactured in 
Baku.624 The city’s economy, and the associated quality of life there, fell into a slump 
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that was not remedied until the mid- to late 1990s. Increasing alienation between 
Azerbaijani and Armenian residents of Baku, not unconnected to the stagnation of the oil 
industry, built into outbreaks of violence starting in the late 1980s.625 When the two sides 
entered into open war over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory (a conflict that continues 
today), and subsequently declared their independence from the Soviet Union, the 
longstanding transportation routes and supply chains that had embedded Azerbaijan in 
the Soviet system were ruptured. Not long thereafter, the Soviet Union broke up along the 
borders of its republics, and Azerbaijan was effectively left to its own devices. 
However, the independent Republic of Azerbaijan still possesses vast reserves of 
oil and natural gas, resources that the country’s leaders have been able to exploit quite 
successfully in their endeavor to enrich Azerbaijan. In the first few years following the 
Soviet breakup, political and industry leaders pursued development deals with foreign 
companies; as in the Russian Imperial era, foreign money has poured into oil 
exploitation, but primary decision-making power now lies in Baku. Azerbaijan rose out 
of its depression in the late 1990s, and although it is not and will likely never be as 
widely familiar in the west as it was in the early twentieth century, it has found the means 
to make its citizens comfortable, and to make itself important in its own region of the 
world. Its oil and gas are limited resources, and will someday run out, but in terms of 
affluence, Azerbaijan is thus far a post-Soviet success story. 
Although oil and gas extraction has largely moved offshore, Baku remains the oil 
center of Azerbaijan. Much as in the Soviet era, the industry is headquartered there, and 
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the city’s character remains heavily influenced by its oil legacy, as reflected in its 
architecture and events—oil is its “brand,” so to speak. More than ever before, however, 
Baku directly benefits from oil revenues. The return to capitalism and the infusion of 
Azerbaijani nationalism are expressed in an ongoing revamp of the nation’s capital, a 
statement of wealth, pride, and self-importance, boasting of success while attempting to 
attract further investment. In the era of independence and nationalist self-absorption, oil 
has a place deeper in the Azerbaijani identity than ever before. 
 
 
Years of Crisis: Interethnic Strife and Economic Depression in Baku 
 
As in the rest of the Soviet Union, conflict and uncertainty consumed Baku in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s; its specific crises had to do with aggression between 
Azerbaijanis and Armenians, an unstable political scene, and a major downturn in its oil 
industry. The end of apparent stability and prosperity in Baku came years before the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The faltering of the oil industry due to Gorbachevian 
tinkering played a relatively small direct part in fomenting the turmoil, which was the 
consequence of larger, longer-developing political and ethnic circumstances. The 
diversity of Baku’s population rapidly weakened as nationalist, exclusionary forces took 
hold in the city, targeting particularly the Armenian population, which was ultimately 
expelled from the urban-industrial center altogether. Consumed by war and cut off from 
the Soviet system, Azerbaijan’s main industry flailed, dropping to its lowest point since 
1920 and plunging the entire country into an economic depression as it entered 
independent statehood. Azerbaijan’s new leadership remained fragile for the first few 
years after the Soviet breakup, uncertain and effectively directionless, and unable to bring 
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security to the oil industry. Until 1994, when the new president, Heydar Aliyev, began 
securing major international oil production agreements, and along with them an 
authoritarian regime and personality cult, Azerbaijan’s future remained unpromising. 
The conflict that erupted between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in Baku and then 
across Transcaucasia in the late 1980s was only indirectly related to the Baku oil 
industry, but ultimately changed the character of the city and industry regardless. As 
described in previous chapters, ethnic Armenians had migrated to Baku to work in oil and 
related industries since at least the 1850s. In Baku, never much of a “melting pot,” 
Armenians were a constant and significant separate presence, usually living in 
communities insulated from the Azerbaijani and Russian majorities. A combination of 
strict policing and the assurance of Azerbaijanis’ ascendancy in their own republic kept a 
lid on open ethnic conflict during the Soviet era; acceptance and fellowship between the 
two groups developed to some degree.626 Disruptions in the local oil economy, greater 
laxity in policing nationalist sentiments, and the breakdown of authority in the Soviet 
center all contributed to the resumption of ethnic hostilities in the late 1980s. As in the 
conflicts of 1905 and 1918, the violence began in Baku, a packed urban center where 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis had long lived side by side. It became clear that Armenians, 
regardless of how many generations they had lived in the city, were still considered 
visitors, and increasingly unwelcome. 
The surface stability that had endured in Baku throughout the Soviet period was 
first troubled in the late 1980s by the rise of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA), a 
nationalist and separatist organization that opposed both Soviet control and the strong 
 
626 De Waal, 100. 
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presence of Armenians in Azerbaijan. The organization was one manifestation of broader 
trends in the Soviet Union during that period, as nationalist groups felt emboldened by 
perceived weakness at the center of the system. The issue that most effectively roused 
support for the PFA’s anti-Soviet, anti-Armenian position was control of the Nagorno- 
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, a 1700-square-mile region lying within the borders of 
Azerbaijan, but populated mostly by Armenians.627 In 1987, some prominent Armenians 
began to demand that Nagorno-Karabakh be brought under the control of the Armenian 
Soviet Socialist Republic; in turn, some prominent Azerbaijanis began to assert that the 
territory in fact belonged to Azerbaijan, and that Soviet territorial divisions were 
interfering with Azerbaijan’s potential prosperity. Formed by a group of academicians at 
the republic’s top institutions, the PFA delved into Azerbaijani and Armenian history for 
evidence to support their claims that Azerbaijan should rightly be an independent country 
and that Armenia’s attempt to annex the Nagorno-Karabakh territory was yet another 
manifestation of that people’s long history of unjust territorial claims (so the narrative 
goes).628 
The tension between the two groups in Baku was decisively broken in 1988 with 
the Sumgait pogrom. In February 1988, in the city of Sumgait, effectively a workers’ 
suburb some 20 miles northwest of Baku, daily demonstrations related to the Nagorno- 
Karabakh dispute were stirred to violence by Azerbaijani speakers who broadcast rumors 
 
 
627 As a result of the Soviet nationalities policy (to oversimplify greatly), the region, which had had an 
Armenian ethnic majority for many centuries, was defined as an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijan 
Soviet Socialist Republic. It is now simply Nagorno-Karabakh (Dagliq Qarabag in Azerbaijani, Artsakh in 
Armenian). 
 
628 Audrey L. Altstadt, Frustrated Democracy in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2017), 10-11. 
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(only partially true) of Armenian atrocities in the western territory. The demonstration of 
February 28 became a mob procession through Sumgait. Azerbaijani assailants killed 
between 30 and 200 Armenians, raped Armenian women, and destroyed Armenian 
property. Other Azerbaijani residents of Sumgait did what they could to protect their 
Armenian neighbors, some of whom engaged in the fighting, resulting in the deaths of 
several Azerbaijani attackers. Sumgait was soon forcibly pacified by Soviet troops sent in 
by Gorbachev, but this was only the first of several bloody incidents between Armenians 
and Azerbaijanis in the Baku area.629 
The situation in Baku continued to deteriorate in the following two years. In 
December 1988, tens of thousands of Armenian refugees arrived in Baku, fleeing the 
shattering destruction of the 1988 Armenian earthquake, increasing Azerbaijani 
nationalists’ resentment of both Armenians and the Soviet system.630 In December 1989, 
the Armenian Church of Gregory the Illuminator, an icon of Armenian faith that has 
survived Baku’s many imbroglios since 1869, was targeted by arsonists, one of several 
sporadic attacks by Popular Front extremists that year.631 Also in December, unclear 
messaging from Moscow regarding control of Nagorno-Karabakh gave Armenia another 
opening to claim the territory as its own, outraging Azerbaijani nationalist partisans. 
Organized attacks on Armenians living in Baku proper began in January 1990; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
629 The interpretation of this clash that emphasizes Azerbaijani aggression and Armenian victimhood was 
reinforced at the time by Soviet media, and in years since by Western reporting. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani 
Turks, 196; De Waal, 32-37. 
 
630 Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, 203. 
 
631 De Waal, 103; Altstadt, Frustrated Democracy, 12. 
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Figure 11. Soviet tanks in Baku, January 1990. 
Source: https://www.facebook.com/oldazerbaijan 
Armenians defended themselves and launched their own attacks. Between January 13 and 
January 15, 1990, dozens of Armenians and Azerbaijanis died in Baku.632 
Shortly after the mid-January clash between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Soviet 
authorities finally took action to reassert control in Baku, which had become consumed 
by Popular Front enthusiasm. Mass demonstrations were taking place daily in the city’s 
open spaces, most visibly in Lenin Square (now Freedom Square, or Azadliq Meydani), 
along the main waterfront boulevard. On the night of January 19-January 20, 1990, 
Soviet troops cut primary communications to the city and moved on groups of 
demonstrators, shooting and killing perhaps 100 Bakuvians in the turmoil that followed. 
In Azerbaijan, the event is remembered as Black January, and is central to the country’s 
independence mythology.633 The Azerbaijanis who died that day are interred in Martyrs’ 
Lane, a long walkway lined with glossy black headstones along the city’s western ridge, 
overlooking the Caspian Sea. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
632 The accuracy of reports of the number of dead and wounded is difficult to assess. 
 
633 Altstadt, Frustrated Democracy , 13-14. 
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The period after Black January was Azerbaijan’s final stretch toward 
independence, and the beginning of Armenians’ last major exodus from Baku. Originally 
drawn to the city in large numbers to work in the oil industry, ethnic Armenians had 
made up a significant minority of the Baku populace since the mid-nineteenth century, 
enduring two major clashes with their Azerbaijani neighbors in the early twentieth 
century and multiple changes in government. Intermixing between the two groups was 
always limited, but Armenians had long been part of the city’s life, appearance, and 
distinctiveness from the rest of Azerbaijan. In 1990, masses of Armenians left Baku and 
the rest of Azerbaijan in haste, returning to their own country. Evidence of the 
Armenians’ presence in Baku was gradually erased, deemphasized, or recontextualized. 
De Waal reported in the early 2000s that some twenty thousand Armenians still lived in 
Baku, most of them the wives of Azerbaijani men; they attempted to bury their Armenian 
identity.634 The 2009 census showed just 104 Armenians living Baku (existing prejudices 
likely resulted in underreporting).635 Tens of thousands of Russians also departed, as did 
other ethnic minorities who felt alienated by the city’s changing course. In turn, 
Azerbaijanis who had lived in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and other parts of the Soviet 
 
634 In the early 2000s, journalist Thomas de Waal visited the Armenian section of one of Baku’s cemeteries 
so that he might report back to an Armenian contact about her relatives’ resting places. After being 
menaced by Azerbaijani cemetery wardens, de Waal ventured on and found many of the headstones 
vandalized (in this book, de Waal understatedly sides with Armenia and Armenians). De Waal, 103-104. 
This report accords with other reported vandalism of Armenian sites in Azerbaijan. The medieval 
Armenian cemetery in Julfa (Jugha in Armenian), a town located in the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan, 
was known to exist intact in 1990. By 2009, the 2,000 medieval headstones had been destroyed, and the 
cemetery completely leveled. “Azerbaijan: Famous Medieval Cemetery Vanishes,” IWPR staff, Institute 
for War & Peace Reporting, April 27, 2006, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/azerbaijan-famous-medieval- 
cemetery-vanishes; “High-Resolution Satellite Imagery and the Destruction of Cultural Artifacts in 
Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan,” American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
https://www.aaas.org/resources/high-resolution-satellite-imagery-and-destruction-cultural-artifacts- 
nakhchivan-azerbaijan. 
 
635 2009 Azerbaijan Census, http://pop-stat.mashke.org/azerbaijan-ethnic2009.htm. 
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Union returned to Azerbaijan (sometimes violently expelled, mirroring Armenians’ 
departure from Azerbaijan), many of them to Baku.636 In its ethnic makeup, Baku became 
more Azerbaijani than it had been in at least two centuries. 
Into the early 1990s, Azerbaijan and Armenia remained openly at war with one 
another, and the conflict has continued to shape the two countries over their three decades 
of independence. The Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994) and related spates of violence 
in the years since are less political disputes than expressions of deep and long-held ethnic 
and religious prejudice. Heydar Aliyev, who was elected president of Azerbaijan in 1993, 
is credited with having stabilized relations with Armenia. In 1994, the two countries 
declared a formal ceasefire, but the conflict is far from resolved.637 Azerbaijan continues 
to commit a not-insignificant share of funds to defense spending related to the conflict 
with Armenia, occasional skirmishes still take place in the disputed regions, and 
Azerbaijani citizens are constantly encouraged to develop animosity toward 
Armenians.638 As recently as 2017, large illuminated posters sponsored by the Baku 
Metro appeared in the metro station entrances around the city, declaring “Karabakh is 
ours, and ours it will remain!” (“Qarabağ bizimdirç bizim olacaq!”). Many young 
schoolchildren are shown images of mass graves and decomposing corpses, the 
 
 
 
636 De Waal, 105. 
 
637 Alexander Zotin, “Azerbaijan: A Thirty-Year Fairy Tale,” in In Managing the Resource Curse: 
 
Strategies of Oil-Dependent Economies in the Modern Era, eds. Vladimir Grigoryev, Andrey Movchan, 
and Alexander Zotin (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 36. 
 
638 Azerbaijan’s defense spending in 2018 was 3.8% of GDP (following a peak of 5.5% of GDP in 2015); 
Armenia’s defense spending in 2018 was 4.8% of GDP; for the purposes of comparison, the US’s defense 
spending was 3.2% of GDP in 2018. “Military expenditure by country as a percentage of gross domestic 
product, 1988-2018,” SIPRI databases, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. 
249  
Azerbaijani victims of clashes with Armenians, as part of their history education. 
Particularly compelling for Azerbaijanis have been gruesome images and other 
propaganda surrounding the 1992 Khojali massacre, in which Armenian fighters killed 
between 100 and 700 Azerbaijani civilians, including children, in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
village of Khojali.639 Government-run news sites daily report Armenian ceasefire 
violations.640 The Armenian counternarrative of the conflict hits similar notes. Despite 
multiple attempts at mediation by neutral parties, the two countries continue to pour 
resources into the standoff and to stake their pride on ultimately prevailing. 
The active war with Armenia, combined with Azerbaijan’s fairly rapid departure 
from the Soviet system, left Azerbaijan disordered and financially drained for several 
years. The country also lacked secure leadership. Between Azerbaijan’s declaration of 
independence on August 30, 1991, and Heydar Aliyev’s election in October 1993, the 
country had multiple turnovers in power. Ayaz Mutalibov held power for six months 
before being forced out by the APF. His successor, Yagub Mammadov, lasted just two 
months before the APF overthrew him. Mutabilov then took over for less than a week 
before being ousted, again by the APF. Isa Gambar acted as interim president from May 
1992 until Azerbaijanis elected Abulfaz Elchibey to the presidency in June 1992. Another 
coup, this time led by Heydar Aliyev and the New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azərbaycan 
Partiyası, or YAP), took place in late 1993. Aliyev solidified his hold on power by 
various means, enfeebling opposition parties, using reported assassination and coup 
 
 
639 This is another instance in which the death toll is difficult to assess. Those on the scene had ample 
reason to inflate or deflate the number of casualties, and the region has been officially closed to outsiders 
ever since. De Waal, 312-313, n25. 
 
640 For instance, azernews.az and news.az. 
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attempts as justifications to increase his executive powers, and portraying himself as 
personally responsible for the oil industry’s eventual renewal.641 
War and unstable leadership acted as sharp deterrents to foreign involvement in 
the Azerbaijan oil industry in the early 1990s. Without foreign money, Azerbaijan was 
incapable of effectively profiting from its oil industry, having in the past relied on larger 
systems of finance, supply, and transportation. In participating in the reinvigoration of the 
Azerbaijan oil industry, foreign investors would already have been engaging in a certain 
amount of uncertainty, given that the Caspian oil and natural gas reserves were mostly 
unproven, oil and gas transportation from Baku to the west was still quite limited, and 
upfront investment requirements were substantial and would not result in profits for 
several years. The added risk of failure and financial loss posed by war and changing 
leadership were intolerable for foreign oil interests in the early 1990s. 
For most, life in Baku in the early to mid-1990s was a trial. Industries that had 
most relied on the Soviet supply chain, particularly equipment and chemical 
manufacturing, declined, their factories abandoned. Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia 
and Nagorno-Karabakh strained the city’s resources. The Khrushchev-era apartment 
blocks, which continued to deteriorate, were forced to accommodate ever more residents. 
Organized and everyday crime flourished, consuming some neighborhoods, such as the 
Sovetskii district to the west of central Baku.642 As in many of the other former Soviet 
 
 
 
641 Cynthia Croissant, Azerbaijan, Oil and Geopolitics (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 
1998), 41-43. 
 
642 Nataliya Gumenyuk and Bohdan Kutiepov, “Baku: City of Millionaires and Slums,” Hromadske 
International, January 7, 2020, https://en.hromadske.ua/posts/baku-city-of-millionaires-and-slums-special- 
report. 
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states, everyday goods were in short supply or appeared at random.643 Many middle-aged 
and older Bakuvians remember this period as taxing and stressful, but in the sense that 
they were making necessary sacrifices when any new country would be inherently 
vulnerable.644 As the country has won itself pride and prosperity over the past two 
decades, the few years of suffering in the 1990s have fallen into a new narrative, one that 
emphasizes Azerbaijan’s purportedly inevitable upward trajectory. 
 
 
The Resurgence of the Azerbaijan Oil Industry 
 
Since the mid- to late 1990s, Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon industries have seen 
remarkable success, making it the richest of the three Transcaucasian states. Azerbaijan’s 
ability to make the most of its oil and gas resources was in part lucky timing: between 
1991 and 2010, when the country was increasing its production, global hydrocarbon 
prices also happened to be on the rise.645 Better than chance, however, were the 
determined efforts of the Republic of Azerbaijan’s leaders to attract new partners in oil 
and gas extraction. The success of the Azerbaijan oil industry has relied on heavy foreign 
investment, a return to the sort of extranational involvement common in the Imperial 
Russian era. Now as then, Azerbaijan lacks the funds, equipment, and expertise to push 
 
 
 
 
 
643 Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter's Adventures in an Oil-rich, War-torn, Post-Soviet 
Republic (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 91-92. 
 
644  Based on my own extemporaneous conversations. 
 
645 Per Zotin, “the combination of a low starting base from the 1990s, the growth of production, and high 
hydrocarbon prices led to spectacular GDP growth rates. While in the 1990s, average annual GDP growth 
was negative, by the 2000s the annual average was 14.6 percent, exceeding 20 percent in some years.” Oil 
and gas accounted for the overwhelming majority of its annual exports. Zotin, 39. 
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its own oil industry to its greatest potential, and so relies on the investments and 
partnership of better-established oil concerns. 
The greatest moment for the post-Soviet Azerbaijan oil industry came in 1994, 
when President Heydar Aliyev concluded the “Contract of the Century” (formally the 
Agreement on the Joint Development and Production Sharing for the Azeri and Chirag 
Fields and the Deep Water Portion of the Gunashli Field in the Azerbaijan Sector of the 
Caspian Sea), a production-sharing agreement signed by members of the newly created 
consortium Azerbaijani International Operating Company (AIOC) to develop three major 
oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea: Azeri, Chirag, and Gunashli (collectively, ACG). 
Heydar Aliyev is credited with personally having leveraged to Azerbaijan’s greatest 
advantage this oilfield complex, roughly 75 miles off Azerbaijan’s coast, the country’s 
most valuable asset in the post-Soviet period.646 The original contract was valid through 
2024, but in September 2017, the members agreed to extend the contract through 2050. 
The main shareholder in AIOC remains British Petroleum (BP); the remaining members 
have changed over time, but in 2020 included the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan 
Republic (SOCAR), ExxonMobil, Chevron, and Statoil (of Norway).647 
The Contract of the Century was one indication of international excitement about 
the potential of the Caspian oilfields in the mid- to late 1990s. In May 1997, the US State 
 
 
 
646 Oksan Bayulgen, “Foreign Investment, Oil Curse, and Democratization: A Comparison of Azerbaijan 
and Russia,” Business and Politics 7, no. 1 (2005): 15. 
 
647 Bayulgen notes that production-sharing agreements have helped Azerbaijan to overcome some of the 
instability and unpredictability associated with the region, because such agreements bind all parties to the 
stated contractual obligations, rather than giving the host state (Azerbaijan, in this case) any discretion to 
change terms, which reassures investors. Bayulgen, 8; Abdul Kerimkhanov, “Nation’s Oil Production Sees 
Slight Decline in 2019,” January 13, 2020, Azernews https://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/160585.html; 
Zotin, 36. 
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Department’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated that the Caspian 
region could contain up to 200 billion barrels of oil and 8 trillion cubic meters of natural 
gas (in the same year, the Middle East’s oil reserves were estimated at 676 billion barrels, 
and its natural gas reserves at 45 trillion cubic meters).648 The newness of the region to 
the world market and to international oil expertise after decades of Soviet exclusion, and 
knowledge that Soviet authorities had nearly abandoned Caspian oil after the 1950s, built 
an optimistic “mythology” about the region.649 Expectations have since been tempered by 
more extensive and accurate estimates of the region’s oil reserves, which have varied 
widely, but nearly all of which fall well below the US State Department’s 1997 estimate. 
In 2013, the EIA estimated that there remained in Caspian reserves 48 billion barrels of 
oil.650 
Regardless of reserves estimates, Azerbaijan’s production of both oil and natural 
gas has risen drastically in the new millennium. The country experienced a production 
slump in the 1990s, falling to 9-10 million tons of crude oil per year and 5 billion cubic 
meters of natural gas per year in the mid- to late 1990s. Various international production- 
sharing agreements, including the Contract of the Century, have since shown positive 
results. Since 2008, Azerbaijan has produced roughly 40-50 million tons of crude oil per 
 
 
 
 
648 Maureen S. Crandall, Energy, Economics, and Politics in the Caspian Region: Dreams and 
 
Realities (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 10-11; “World Oil Reserves 1948-2001: 
Annual Statistics and Analysis,” Energy Exploration and Exploitation 19, no. 2-3 (2001): 262, 267. 
 
649 Crandall, 10-11. 
 
650 Estimates of natural gas reserves have remained quite consistent at roughly 8 trillion cubic meters. 
“Overview of oil and natural gas in the Caspian Sea region,” Energy Information Agency, August 26, 2013, 
https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/Caspian_Sea. 
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year, and 15 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year.651 By about 2007, Azerbaijan 
reached its third major peak in production (the first two being the initial oil boom of the 
late nineteenth century and the production surge of the early Soviet decades). 
Concurrent with Azerbaijan’s oil success was its relentless campaign to ensure 
that it was allocated an advantageous portion of the Caspian Sea’s resources. Until the 
second half of the twentieth century, the division of the Caspian Sea’s subterranean 
hydrocarbon resources was not a pressing issue; before offshore oil exploration, drilling, 
and extraction became common in the later decades of the Soviet era, the geographical 
demarcation of the sea was relevant only to matters of shipping and fishing, which could 
be regulated by the registration of vessels and the exercise of free navigation beyond ten 
miles from shore. Until the end of the Soviet era, there were only two states in 
competition for the sea’s resources at any given time: the Soviet Union (preceded of 
course by the Russian Empire) and Iran. In 1970, the Soviet Union made an essentially 
unilateral determination that the Soviet-Iran split of the Caspian seabed would lie along 
the line between Astara, Azerbaijan, on the western coast, and Hosseinqoli, Turkmenistan 
(now Esenguly), on the eastern coast, giving Iran control of roughly 11% of the 
seabed.652  Still uninterested in offshore oil extraction, Iran did not contest the 
designation. 
 
 
651 For comparison, in 2018 the US produced over 750 million tons of oil and 830 billion cubic meters of 
natural gas. “Statistical Review of World Energy,” BP Statistical Review, June 2019, 
https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html. 
 
652 Ziyad Ziyadzade, “Drilling for Black Gold: The Demarcation of Hydrocarbon Resources in the Caspian 
Sea,” Chicago Journal of International Law 16, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 317-318; Bahman Aghai Diba, The 
Law and Politics of the Caspian Sea in the Twenty-First Century: The Positions and Views of Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, with Special Reference to Iran (Bethesda, MD: Ibex Publishers, 
2003), 72-73. 
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Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, all littoral states, now five rather than 
two, threw themselves into negotiations regarding the legal status of the sea and their 
access to its resources.653 Each state’s desire for oil and gas fields underlay the complex, 
shifting debates that took place between 1991, when the Soviet Union began to break up, 
and 2018, when the five littoral states (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and 
Turkmenistan) came to an agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are situated near the richest fields along the sea’s 
 
latitudinal midsection; these 
states have argued for a sectoral 
partition of the seabed. Russia 
and Iran, at the sea’s northern 
and southern edges, 
respectively, are quite distant 
from those fields; they pursued 
a shared-ownership 
agreement.654 In the summer of 
2018, the five states came to a 
preliminary agreement that 
roughly accords with the 
sectoral partitioning avenue, but 
 
 
 
 
653 Ziyadzade, 319-320. 
 
654 Ibid., 325-326. Please note that I am vastly oversimplifying the countries’ respective stances. 
Figure 12. Caspian region oil and natural gas 
infrastructure. 
Source: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Caspian_r 
egion_oil_and_ natural_gas_infrastructure.png 
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the details of the deal remain vague.655 All through these debates, Azerbaijani oil 
authorities have continued to operate under the assumption that Azerbaijan has sole 
ownership of the profitable resources in its sector of the sea. 
Ensuring continued investment from foreign parties has relied on a careful 
counterbalancing of Azerbaijan’s drawbacks with a dedicated drive to make Azerbaijan 
as attractive an investment environment as possible. Three matters have at one point or 
another posed a potential threat to foreign direct investment: the ongoing conflict with 
Armenia (most worrying to investors only in the 1990s, when sustained fighting made the 
region markedly unstable), Azerbaijan’s tendency toward corrupt authoritarianism, and 
the region’s never-ending struggle to transport oil and gas to markets. Azerbaijan has 
taken steps to overcome all three. 
Corruption issues have deterred investment only from parties that care deeply 
about moral and ethical reputation, and in fact the country’s authoritarian turn has only 
smoothed the path for many investors.656 Political scientist Oksan Bayulgen in 2005 
 
655 Olzhas Auyezov, “Russia, Iran, and three others agree on Caspian status, but not borders,” Reuters, 
August 12, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kazakhstan-caspian-borders/russia-iran-and-three- 
others-agree-caspian-status-but-not-borders-idUSKBN1KX0CI. 
 
656 During his ten years in power (1993-2003), Heydar Aliyev made great strides toward eliminating 
opposition, political or otherwise, and cultivating a cult of personality. In 2003, recognizing that his health 
was failing, Heydar Aliyev appointed his son Ilham as his successor. In successive manipulated elections 
and referenda, Ilham Aliyev has been elected and reelected as president, had term limits removed, and had 
the presidential term extended from five to seven years. He appointed his wife, Mehriban, to one of two 
vice presidential spots in 2017; the other is thought to be reserved for one of his sons. Independent 
Azerbaijan has been recognized by organizations such as the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting 
Project, Freedom House, and the Human Rights Watch as corrupt, unfree, and nontransparent, with a 
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wrote, in reference to Russia and Azerbaijan, “The flow of foreign investment into 
countries with significant natural resources should not be taken as a given. Foreign 
investors prefer that such countries also have stable and predictable investment 
environments that provide general standards of treatment and have predictable legislative 
and regulatory frameworks in which channels of negotiation are clear.”657 The 
governmental apparatus of Azerbaijan has done its utmost to create an attractive 
investment environment in those terms. Authoritarianism in oil-rich countries is far from 
uncommon, and in fact can increase a state’s attractiveness to investors, as the absence of 
multiple centers of power creates a “one-stop shopping” situation, in which an investor 
must negotiate directly with only one party: effectively, the president of Azerbaijan. 
Success in attracting investment further reinforces the authoritarian regime’s hold on 
power, both in terms of financial resources and external legitimation.658 
Azerbaijan’s continued record of corruption and civil rights violations has in only 
one sense stood in the way of full entrance into the global oil and gas market. In 2003, the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) formed, seeking to establish “a 
global standard to promote the open and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral 
resources.” At that time, Azerbaijan announced that it would commit itself to upholding 
EITI’s standards of transparency and fair governance in its oil industry. It achieved 
“candidate” status in 2007 and “compliant” status in 2009. However, after several 
successive annual reports indicating that Azerbaijan had failed to remedy reported 
 
657 Bayulgen, 4. 
 
658 As in most authoritarian governments, the legislative and judicial bodies of Azerbaijan exist to support 
the executive. Bayulgen, 15-16, 29. See also Audrey L. Altstadt, “Azerbaijan: The Rich Get Richer and the 
Poor Get Nothing,” Emerging Europe, July 25, 2017, https://emerging-europe.com/voices/azerbaijan-the- 
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problems with “civil society representatives’ ability to operate freely,” Azerbaijan was 
downgraded to “candidate” status in 2015, and was finally suspended from EITI in 2017. 
Shortly thereafter, the government of Azerbaijan decided to withdraw from the body, 
losing the international credibility that came along with its EITI membership.659 
However, loss of its EITI status does not seem to have affected the Azerbaijan oil sector 
one way or the other. On balance, neither the Nagorno-Karabakh War nor ongoing 
corruption in the Azerbaijan government has acted as a truly significant deterrent to 
investment in the past two decades. 
The most important obstacle for the Azerbaijan oil industry, one that it has come 
up against repeatedly in its long history, is connecting the Baku oil hub to the outside 
world. As far back as the 1870s, foreign investors complained about the difficulty of 
transporting oil from source to market, the “midstream” component of the oil and gas 
industry. The railways, tanker shipments, and oil pipelines that had come into service 
between the nineteenth century and the end of the Soviet era had been largely directed 
toward Russia and subsequently the USSR, and in any case lacked sufficient capacity for 
the industry’s new era. The old ties are gone; the most appealing markets lie farther west. 
Oil and gas pipelines are the most profitable means of transporting those resources to 
market. 
The two largest pipeline projects in the post-Soviet era are the Baku-Tbilisi- 
Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which transports oil from Baku to Ceyhan, near Turkey’s 
Mediterranean coast (thus bypassing the tricky Bosphorus), and the Baku-Tbilisi- 
Erzurum (BTE) pipeline, which transports natural gas from the massive Shah-Deniz field 
 
659 “Status of Azerbaijan,” EITI, 20 December 2018, https://eiti.org/Azerbaijan; Zotin, 38. 
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off Baku’s coast to a terminus in Turkey, from which point it moves on to Europe via 
other means.660 Both projects were financed, constructed, and managed by international 
consortia in which BP is the primary stakeholder, followed by SOCAR.661 The BTC 
pipeline, which was completed in 2006, has the capacity to deliver 50 million tons of oil 
per year. The BTE pipeline (also referred to as the South Caucasus Pipeline, or SCP), was 
completed in 2007, and can carry 16 billion cubic meters per year. The two pipelines, 
which run parallel to one another for much of their length, were daunting construction 
projects, as they must pass through the Caucasus Mountains and several active seismic 
zones. Further, the pipelines require constant security monitoring to deter terrorist 
attacks, adding to maintenance costs.662 Regardless, the payoff for the completion of the 
pipelines has been enormous for Azerbaijan and its oligarchs.663 
 
660 Both run through Tbilisi so as to avoid Armenian territory, a diversion of thousands of miles that added 
immensely to the cost of both projects. Emre Iseri, “Geopolitics of Oil and Pipelines in the (Eurasian) 
Heartland,” in The Politics of Oil, ed. Bulent Gokay (London: Routledge, 2006), 43. 
 
661 The United States also offered support for the pipeline project, in part to undermine Iran’s control over 
energy resources in the region, and to reduce the West’s reliance on Russia and Iran for such resources. 
Pipelines thus enter into the system of formal and informal alliances and enmities that exist between the 
United States and the West, on the one hand, and adversaries such as Russia and Iran, on the other. They 
also act as a sort of declaration of Russian or Western affiliation on the part of the small ex-Soviet 
countries. The amount of oil that the United States or its European allies might obtain from Azerbaijan is 
utterly negligible compared to the oil resources available in North America, the Middle East, and Russia. 
Few countries in the West would see any true material benefit from diversifying the oil resources of the 
Caspian region by opening up new pipelines. The only real attraction of Caspian oil for the West is that, 
except for Iran, the Caspian oil states are not members of OPEC, and therefore not subject to its controls. 
This is an advantage for states that find themselves at odds with OPEC. However, the combined production 
of non-Russian, non-OPEC Caspian oil states is not significant, equaling roughly one-quarter of the United 
States’ yearly production alone. The game is therefore a political one, a matter of establishing spheres of 
influence. Iseri, 36-37, 43; “Country Comparison. Crude Oil – Production,” The World Factbook 2020. 
 
662 Sections in both the Turkish and Georgian sections of the BTC came under attack in 2008 in separate 
incidents: the first related to the Kurdish separatist movement, the second during the Russo-Georgian war 
over South Ossetia. “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Caspian Pipeline,” Hydrocarbon Technologies, 
https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/bp/; “South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), Georgia, 
Turkey, Azerbaijan,” Hydrocarbons Technologies, https://www.hydrocarbons- 
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It is noteworthy that, as in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Azerbaijan’s most valuable partner in oil development is again Britain, specifically BP 
and its fellows. Since falling into business with Azerbaijan, BP has emphasized its deep 
connection to the country, consistently linking itself to Azerbaijan’s success. In addition 
to extending its commitment to AIOC in 2017, BP has involved itself in various 
programs and events in Azerbaijan, usually in the role of sponsor.664 In May 2017, for 
instance, BP backed Baku’s hosting of the Islamic Solidarity Games. For months in 
advance of the games, BP ran a colorful animated advertisement on television and video 
billboards around Baku that highlighted BP’s partnership with Azerbaijan. Over images 
of BP-branded oil platforms sprouting from the Caspian Sea and the Flame Towers 
taking shape above Baku, BP credits itself with “unlocking the energy under the Caspian 
Sea [and] helping the country grow,” and promises “to be committed to Azerbaijan’s 
future for many years to come.” The commercial ends with a BP-sponsored athlete 
making his way to the Baku Olympic Stadium.665 
One result of BP involvement in the Azerbaijan oil industry has been the 
development of a degree of ethnic stratification reminiscent of the oil industry’s early 
years. Decades after Britons were driven from Baku by the revolutions of 1917, their 
company buildings destroyed or ransacked, English and Scottish engineers have returned 
in force to the city. As in the past, Europeans occupy the more agreeable, higher-paying 
positions in the industry, while locals endure the less rewarding and more physically 
 
 
 
664 See the Azerbaijan page on BP’s website for examples. “BP in Azerbaijan,” BP, 
https://www.bp.com/en_az/azerbaijan/home.html. 
 
665 “BP supporting Baku 2017 – English,” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=epHHg6NNeT0. 
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intensive manual and service jobs. The European and North American expatriate 
community—mostly young to middle-aged, a bit hedonistic, tied closely to the oil 
industry—tends to remain quite insular and is largely shielded from the less comfortable 
elements of living in Azerbaijan, as BP and its associated enterprises have constructed 
self-contained apartment complexes and office buildings for employees, all supplemented 
by hotels and restaurants familiar to Europeans. The parallels to Baku’s early boom years 
are far from exact—the proportion of Azerbaijani employees in the oil industry is far 
smaller than in previous eras, largely the result of industrial automation, and more 
Azerbaijani industry employees have better opportunities for advancement and education 
than in the past. Of SOCAR’s 60,000 Azerbaijani employees, more than half work in 
overseas offices.666 The government of independent Azerbaijan is more committed to 
promoting its own citizens’ success, in part for appearance’s sake, but also because it 
contributes to the country’s enrichment and influence. 
 
 
Baku, Oil Capital 
 
In a few important senses, Baku now better expresses its Azerbaijani character 
than at any other point since the early nineteenth century. The 2009 census showed that 
Azerbaijan and Baku have the highest percentage of ethnic Azerbaijani inhabitants in 
perhaps two hundred years, at 91.6% and 90.3%, respectively.667 The resurgence of the 
oil industry and Azerbaijan’s right to capture more of its profits has resulted in a building 
boom, largely centered in Baku. A fourth “layer” is being added to Baku’s visage, 
 
666 Zotin, 43. 
 
667 2009 Azerbaijan Census. 
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buildings patently of the new millennium interspersed among the city’s ancient Turco- 
Persian base, colonial inner core, and Soviet sprawl. In the late nineteenth century, 
British traveler Henry Morton Stanley termed the city “the Paris of the Caspian,” 
remarking on its “refined society” and well-developed core and waterfront.668 The new 
additions to the cityscape are reminiscent of large contemporary statement structures in 
other world capitals: the “Gherkin” and the Shard in London, the One World Trade 
Center in New York City, and the Burj Khalifa in Dubai. However, much of Baku’s most 
prominent post-Soviet architecture has remained distinctly Azerbaijani, a “visual index” 
of the country’s new age.669 
The country’s largest and showiest construction projects have arisen in Baku, 
many of them aimed at increasing Azerbaijan’s international visibility and connections, 
and at exhibiting the country’s wealth to the world and its own citizens. Some of these 
projects are relatively characterless. For instance, the Heydar Aliyev International 
Airport, newly rebuilt with a modern design in 2014, is quite opulent, characterized by 
sweeping lines, clean white and beige surfaces, and smooth indirect lighting, but it might 
belong to any city in the Asian continent that wishes to impress its wealth upon visitors. 
The infamous Trump International Hotel and Tower, which in 2008 began life as an 
apartment building project until it was taken over by Donald Trump in 2012 (and remains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
668 Stanley, 243. 
 
669 Bruce Grant, “The Edifice Complex: Architecture and the Political Life of Surplus in the New Baku,” 
Political Culture 26, no. 3 (2014): 501. 
263  
Figure 13. Baku’s architectural layers. Photo by author, 2017 
unfinished), vaguely resembles a ship’s sails or a lemon wedge.670 Many of the office 
buildings that have sprung up near the waterfront are basic metal and glass cuboids. 
 
 
 
More notable are the structures and other projects that make a clear attempt to 
place Azerbaijan’s history and culture in the modern world. Around 2010, city authorities 
 
670 Adam Davidson, “Donald Trump’s Worst Deal,” The New Yorker, March 6, 2017, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/13/donald-trumps-worst-deal. 
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completed a renovation of the famous Fountains Square and the surrounding pedestrian 
areas. In addition to laying miles of stylish new paving stones and hanging strings of 
lights and elaborate chandeliers above walkways, the project’s directors paid close 
attention to the neighborhood’s buildings, nearly all of which belong to the Russian 
colonial era, their distinctive cornices and wrought-iron balconies spruced up and artfully 
lit from below at night. The Flame Towers, perched atop the hills to the west of the city 
core, have dominated Baku’s skyline since 2012. The three towers are in the shape of 
flames, a direct reference to Azerbaijan’s ancient moniker, “the land of fire.” At night, 
the LED panels that cover the surfaces of the three towers display animations of fire and 
the Azerbaijan national flag. Not far away, directly along Baku’s famous waterfront 
boulevard, is the Azerbaijan National Carpet Museum. Azerbaijan’s long history of 
carpet-making, recognized by UNESCO in 2010, was originally exhibited in one of the 
city’s mosques. In 2014, the museum moved into the new building, which resembles a 
partially-rolled carpet lying on its side, covered with a design characteristic of 
Azerbaijan.671 Finally, the Heydar Aliyev Center, which was completed in 2013, may 
well be the architectural pride of modern Azerbaijan. Designed by Iraqi-British architect 
Zaha Hadid, the structure brings to mind the clean folded cloth of a head covering, the 
dunes of the Absheron Peninsula, or the whitecaps of the Caspian Sea. On permanent 
display are an exhibition of the country’s oil history and a series of miniatures depicting 
the famous sites and structures of Azerbaijan.672 Much of Azerbaijan’s oil money has 
 
671 “Carpet Museum in Azerbaijan,” aasarchitecture, https://aasarchitecture.com/2014/10/carpet-museum- 
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gone toward making its capital city an expression of the country’s history, its culture, and 
the future its leaders want. 
These projects have come at great expense, and have been paid for, directly and 
indirectly, by the profits of the oil and gas industries. The government of Azerbaijan has 
spent perhaps billions of dollars on the construction of the Crystal Hall for its hosting of 
the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest; multiple sports venues for the 2015 European Games, 
the 2017 Islamic Solidarity Games, and Azerbaijan’s failed bid to host the 2020 Summer 
Olympic Games; grand architectural statement buildings such as the Flame Towers, the 
Heydar Aliyev Center, and the Heydar Aliyev International Airport; and, since 2016, a 
temporary motor racing street circuit through downtown Baku, the Baku City Circuit, to 
host annual Formula One races.673 Hosting these events, which involves lavish opening 
and closing ceremonies and performances by relatively well-known acts such as the 
Black-Eyed Peas and Lady Gaga, comes at additional cost. Construction, three-quarters 
of which was financed by the government, and tourism have helped to increase non-oil 
GDP, but the payoff for much of this spending otherwise remains to be seen.674 
The beautification of the city has been spotty, limited mainly to the most highly 
visible areas along the waterfront and the major transportation routes. For the first time in 
many decades, urban development in Baku follows no general plan. Municipal authorities 
to some degree held to the urban plan drawn up in 1989 even after the break from the 
 
673 Zotin, 44; Alan Taylor, “Baku 2017: The Islamic Solidarity Games,” The Atlantic, May 23, 2017, 
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Soviet Union, but when it expired in 2005, no new plan took its place. Perhaps in an 
attempt by the country’s leaders to remove associations with the Soviet past, the city for 
the time being develops beyond the logic of comprehensive urban planning.675 Oil wealth 
pours into the construction of modern high-rise apartment buildings, giant architectural 
statements, and massive parks; transportation, utilities, service industries, 
communications, and low-cost housing in some cases adjust to the building boom, in 
other cases prove inadequate. For instance, although the state has invested in the 
construction of large new highways around Baku, city authorities have made little 
headway in modernizing the inner urban surface transportation network; medieval, 
colonial, and Soviet-era street systems must now accommodate hundreds of thousands of 
cars every day.676 
A few steps north of the renovated Fountains Square neighborhood lie several 
blocks of colonial Russian buildings of the same generation, but not subject to the same 
attention. Rather, municipal authorities have left the management of the buildings largely 
to the inhabitants of their many small apartments. The result is a more lived-in 
appearance, one that in some ways more honestly depicts the history of the city’s 
residents: the colonial-era ornamentation, down to the inscribed year of construction, is 
still apparent; midcentury balcony additions hang over narrow streets lined with Ladas; 
satellite dishes and wires straggle across roofs. A similar sort of improvisation is evident 
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in neighborhoods dominated by massive Soviet-era apartment buildings and in the slums 
that were once widespread in the city’s middle districts. 
These less-attractive neighborhoods, often a mixture of structures with real 
historical value and unsafe makeshift dwellings, always densely inhabited, have been 
subject to demolition rather than renovation when they stand in the way of the city’s 
grand construction projects. The Institute for Peace and Democracy in Baku, the 
headquarters of which were aggressively bulldozed in August 2011, estimated that by 
2008, 60,000-80,0000 Bakuvians had been relocated, their neighborhoods destroyed to 
make way for new structures.677 Just north of the Inner City, the ancient nucleus of Baku 
that will forever remain safe from alteration due to its historical value, two dozen blocks 
of Sovetskii district homes inhabited since the nineteenth century were bulldozed to make 
way for several large boulevards and a sprawling park, which opened in 2019 (Figure 
14). Its residents were compensated and moved to new high-rise apartments on the city’s 
outskirts.678 Anthropologist Bruce Grant compares the eviction of longtime Baku 
residents from the city core to the relocation or dislocation of Parisians during Baron 
Haussmann’s renovation of that city.679 A more apt comparison might be the demolition 
of large neighborhoods in Sochi, Russia, in preparation for the 2014 Winter Olympic 
Games, another case in which urban development and the desire for international regard 
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Figure 14. Older neighborhoods bulldozed to make way for new parks and 
boulevards. Photo by author, 2017. 
displaced thousands of residents.680 This constitutes a form of gentrification, one that 
leaves some Azerbaijanis feeling alienated from the city, while others see the process as a 
proud rejuvenation of their capital.681 
 
 
Part of the state’s project to make Baku an attractive capital once more is its effort 
to address one of the ugliest legacies of the Soviet era: extreme environmental damage. 
Negligence in the operation of the oil industry is likely the greatest culprit here, but a 
number of other factors have contributed to the pollution of the Baku environs as well.682 
Beginning in the 1930s, industry in the Baku region began to include the manufacture of 
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equipment for various non-oil heavy industries as well as non-petrochemicals such as 
chlorine and caustic sodas. That is, there has existed for many decades a fair-sized non- 
oil industrial sector in the Baku region that similarly produces large amounts of toxic 
waste that have not always been responsibly disposed of. The replacement of outdated, 
inefficient equipment in these industries has been gradual. In addition, industry is one 
among many human activities in and around the Caspian Sea that has contributed to the 
region’s status as one of the most polluted in the world. Now as in the past, there is an 
exceptional concentration of Azerbaijan’s residents in the capital. Between one-fifth and 
one-third of all Azerbaijanis live in the greater Baku area. The number of cars per one 
thousand residents has risen exponentially in the past few decades, from 34 cars per 
thousand residents in 1980, to 165 per thousand in 2006, to 250 per thousand in 2013.683 
While this is significantly below car ownership rates in US cities, low emissions 
standards multiply the environmental impact. Furthermore, much as in the case of the 
Aral Sea, the use of chemical fertilizers in intensive agriculture all around the Caspian 
Sea since the mid-twentieth century has contributed to toxic runoff that enters the water 
and negatively affects marine life and human health.684 Laxity in city planning has 
produced extensive shortcomings in proper garbage and recycling disposal, leading 
residents of Baku and surrounding villages to dump huge volumes of trash in the 
otherwise empty oilfields and other unoccupied spaces around the peninsula. 
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Cleanup ventures have been implemented unevenly, concentrated mostly around 
highly visible parts of the Caspian coast. There have been multiple pressing incentives for 
the state to address the contamination of the Caspian around the Absheron Peninsula 
specifically: pollution has a negative effect on tourism, reduces the amount and quality of 
food harvested from the sea, negatively affects recreation such snorkeling and fishing, 
wastes resources, threatens cultural and historical sites, and, not least, negatively affects 
the health of humans and marine life.685 
However, some of the worst pollution, that in the villages and former oilfields 
surrounding Baku, remains overlooked. Most of the former satellite oilfield settlements, 
including Surakhani, Sabunchi, and Ramani, have not seen the kind of urban and 
environmental renewal that central Baku has. At least half of residents live below the 
national poverty line, about half live on state welfare, and the government struggles even 
to provide residents of these villages with drinking water and natural gas.686 Several of 
these villages, which once housed the oil industry’s many workers, accommodated 
breakup-era refugees who never left, and who now make up one-fifth to one-quarter of 
those villages’ residents.687 These refugees or internally displaced persons are mostly 
ethnically Azerbaijani, but a fair number are of the Tat people, an ethnic group living 
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widely in Transcaucasia.688 According to the relatively recent surveys conducted by 
authors of The Baku Oil and Local Communities, after decades of living side by side with 
the settlements’ original inhabitants, these refugee families are still not well integrated 
into those communities.689 One author writes that these refugees “disrespect the 
environment because they regard themselves as temporary residents,” but it must be 
noted that group insularity has been a common theme in Baku’s history for centuries.690 
These are also the settlements that have seen the worst of the inland 
environmental damage from industrial activity. Sabunchi, Balakhani, and Ramani are all 
situated on the shores of Boyukshor Lake, a salty inland lake lined with industrial 
enterprises. The lake has experienced a degree of pollution that surpasses even that of the 
Caspian Sea, contaminated by a combination of oil products, sewage, and heavy metals 
well in excess of maximum permissible concentrations.691 Boyukshor Lake and other 
inland bodies of water near these population centers have been shown to have a direct 
effect on the health of residents, as water evaporation and soil and water contamination 
have led to a marked increase in chronic diseases in these areas.692 Roughly a quarter of 
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the soil in these villages has shown high contamination by oil, and they are all surrounded 
by old oilfields that are entirely permeated by industrial wastes.693 
Beginning in about 2006, the Azerbaijan government began developing and 
implementing plans to revive some of these villages, but they appear to have been 
sidelined by the worldwide financial crisis that hit shortly thereafter.694 Fikret Jafarov, in 
his thorough study of the land environments of the Absheron Peninsula, proposed that the 
state obtain funds from the World Bank, accurately inventory sources of pollution, and 
draw up a comprehensive cleanup program, steps that the state had apparently made little 
or no progress toward by 2009.695 In another survey of living conditions in these villages, 
Azer Amiraslanov argues that “every citizen should be able to feel the effect of 
Azerbaijan’s socioeconomic achievements in his or her everyday life,” but that has 
patently not been the case.696 With few exceptions, the other population centers of the 
country have not experienced the same kind of dramatic makeovers as Baku. 
The fuller picture of Baku and its environs points up the reality that the center’s 
oil wealth has not been evenly distributed by any standard, a state of affairs that applies 
to the rest of the country as well.697 This is not to say, however, that Azerbaijan’s leaders 
have abandoned the remainder of the country to poverty. In fact, after the desperation of 
the mid-1990s, when the country had yet to fully capitalize on its oil industry and was 
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still suffering the worst aftereffects of war and the breakup, Azerbaijanis in the western 
parts of the country have increasingly benefited from government projects such as 
electrification and the spread of Internet access. International aid, including assistance 
from the Asian Development Bank and the Peace Corps, has helped with smaller 
infrastructural projects and healthcare services. Less regular have been the government’s 
improvements to transportation infrastructure. New highway openings are celebrated with 
some fanfare, attended frequently by the president or vice president and lauded by 
government-owned news services as moments of national pride. Meanwhile, non- 
highway roads are rarely attended to unless they pose an imminent danger. Other means 
of transportation also tend to see improvement depending on their “closeness” to 
international commerce and the oil industry; air services are frequently updated and 
expanded, while passenger rail is decades out of date. 
A sufficient number of Azerbaijanis and Bakuvians seem content to ride out the 
train of progress, or feel acute pride in these representations of the country’s economic 
successes, that widespread public objections are not obvious.698 The destruction of older 
neighborhoods, while a historical loss, has removed tens of thousands of poorer 
Bakuvians from dangerous and unhygienic housing, it is reasoned. Those in the middling 
classes have a better chance of leaving the deteriorating Soviet apartment blocks for 
newer residences, perhaps even a house in the sprawling housing developments that are 
continually added to Baku’s surroundings. Recent costly improvements to the Baku 
metro, including new carriages and escalators, benefit all of the city’s occupants. Greater 
comfort and beautification at the heart of the country, while certainly laden with misery 
 
698 Ibid., 504, 508, 516 . 
274  
Figure 15. Soviet-era mural near Fountains 
Square. Photo by author, 2017. 
and inequality, generates genuine pride. A favorite among locals is Baku’s waterfront 
boulevard complex, which around 2010 underwent its (at least) fourth major renovation, 
replete with new attractions such as a mall and a Ferris wheel. A glance at the city skyline 
reassures residents that their country is wealthy and growing. The building boom is an 
assertion of confidence that Baku and its leadership lacked between the end of World 
War II and the mid-1990s, and an aspirational symbol for Azerbaijanis. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The renovation of the city of Baku is part of the country’s attempt to distance 
itself from the Soviet past. Azerbaijanis repulsed the presence of nonnative residents as 
part of the transition to nationhood; there was evidently little fusion among the city’s 
various ethnic groups over the course 
of seventy years of imposed ethnic 
tolerance, as demonstrated during the 
years surrounding the Soviet breakup 
when each group returned to its 
respective homeland. Independent 
Baku has also gradually erased Soviet 
aesthetic remnants. Socialist-themed 
murals still hide in corners, and many 
residents remain housed in 
Khrushchev-era apartment blocks, but 
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the most visible parts of the city are undeniably an expression of new wealth and 
nationhood. 
The independent state of Azerbaijan has in a variety of ways sought to leave 
behind the Soviet era, as have most former Soviet states. This path has been complicated 
in large part by the legacies of the role that it was forced to assume in the structures of the 
Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. In those contexts, Azerbaijan did not function as a 
self-supporting unit, but as a supplier of raw materials to a system greater than itself, a 
habit of devotion to oil that has proven difficult to break. The country’s non-oil sectors 
have not seen the same sort of growth, indicating Azerbaijan’s utter commitment to and 
dependence on hydrocarbons.699 
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future use is likely to bring the country to a crisis once ACG begins to decline. As of 2019, Azerbaijan has 
made little meaningful progress in that regard. Zotin, 39-43; “Regional Economic Outlook,” International 
Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2019/04/17/reo-menap-cca-0419. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
As an oil center, Baku today remains as embedded in the convergence of 
international systems of commerce and infrastructure as it was at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Due to an inability to diversify economically, Azerbaijan’s economic status is 
acutely attuned to the health of the global oil industry. Lowered oil prices in the wake of 
the 2007-2008 global financial crisis resulted in stalled construction projects around the 
city of Baku. The full results of the current global crisis, which has already created 
significant upset in the oil world, remain to be seen. Regardless of Azerbaijan’s 
significance or insignificance on the global oil scale, oil matters deeply to the state and its 
capital. 
The long history of Baku as an oil center reveals a number of limited and cyclical 
themes relevant to the history of this location in particular and the history of the oil 
industry in general. Recurrent is the importance of large economic systems in sustaining 
and advancing the oil industry. In the imperial and post-Soviet eras, mass foreign 
investment has been nearly a requirement. The Soviet regime was in most periods able to 
operate its oil industry independent of foreign aid, but in the 1920s relied heavily on 
foreign equipment and expertise to pull the Baku oil industry out of its slump. This 
reflects an ongoing reality for all oil states, which must either be so large and wealthy as 
to possess great amounts of capital and manpower, or rely on foreign intervention. This 
accounts for Baku’s necessarily strong international connections today, and its rough exit 
from the Soviet system. 
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Relevant to the international nature of oil business in Baku are issues of ethnicity 
that have consistently appeared in this history. In some respects, the ethnic makeup of the 
city and industry have been specific to this locale, where Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and 
Russians (among others) meet, but in any case mirror ethnic stratification and tensions 
evident in other oil centers as well—ethnic stratification of labor must be a central 
consideration of the “energy humanities.” In the case of Baku, the ethnic makeup of the 
city and industry have affected everything from labor relations to the health of the oil 
industry itself. Because Azerbaijan in the modern era has not had the capacity or freedom 
to run its oil industry independently, and because outside investment has tended to come 
from wealthy but oil-deficient entities based in Europe, leadership and control of the 
industry has frequently lain in the hands of ethnic Europeans. Due to the ethnic makeup 
of the Transcaucasian region, the manpower drawn by the industry was almost 
necessarily quite diverse. Preexisting ethnic differences and some degree of racism built 
into industrial employment were stoked into violence repeatedly, setting off a chain of 
confrontations primarily between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, and between Russians and 
Azerbaijanis more minorly. The growth and evolution of the Baku oil industry has played 
no small part in the development of Azerbaijani national sentiment over the past century 
and a half, as the former “Tatars” drew into closer contact with other national groups; 
developed national grievances as a result of mistreatment by the tsarist regime, conflicts 
with Armenians, conquest by the Soviets, and the mixed results of the Soviet nationalities 
policy; and learned to link their own national identity with oil and fire in the post-Soviet 
era. Ethnic stratification in the oil business is not unique to Baku, but its particular 
contours and results have been. 
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Some of the patterns of migration and demography as connected to the health of 
the industry over the decades have been relatively straightforward. As the capacity of the 
industry grew, in the late nineteenth century, the early Soviet decades, and the mid-1990s 
to the present, more men and women made their way to Baku for work. When the oil 
industry faltered in production, as in 1901-1905, 1917-1920, and the end of the Soviet 
period, workers left, either to shelter from disorder in the city or to seek new work. 
However, the declining relative importance of the Baku oil industry on the global scale 
over the decades has resulted in greater ethnic homogeneity among industry employees 
and city inhabitants. That is, nonnative parties became less interested in what Baku had to 
offer, both in terms of resources and of employment opportunities, and moved to greener 
pastures. Baku is larger than ever, now populated overwhelmingly by native 
Azerbaijanis. 
The ecological dimension of Baku’s history follows a trajectory that has been 
quite common in heavily industrialized locales. Until the post-Soviet era, no checks 
existed on the discharge of the oil industry’s toxic messes, except that industry leaders 
wanted to preserve the profitability of the industry by avoiding waste and disruptive 
disasters. Pollution was rarely equated with environmental damage in the current sense. 
The quality of the soil, air, and water in the area steadily worsened for more than a 
century due to oil extraction first on land, then at sea; increasing population density 
without adequate urban planning; and the myriad other industrial activities taking place 
nearby. Attitudes began to change only after the problem was recognized as a problem in 
light of evolving prevalent understandings of environmental studies. The current regime 
has made attempts to clean up the most blighted areas, especially the Caspian Sea around 
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the Absheron Peninsula, in no small part because pollutive activities waste valuable 
resources and discourage lucrative tourism. Perceptions of pollution and environmental 
damage have shifted in the past few decades, but some of the basic motivations for 
avoiding it remain similar to those in previous eras. 
The extended chronological scope of this dissertation therefore shows that, 
despite several extraordinary changes in power over the past century and a half, the 
imperatives of the oil industry and its unique geopolitical situation have produced 
patterns and cycles of behavior broadly common to each era. However, I do not discount 
the outcomes that have remained limited to specific administrative regimes, each of 
which has operated according to different ideologies and responded to different 
circumstances. Without delving too deeply into the political ramifications of these shifts 
in industry administration for energy history more broadly, it can nevertheless be said 
that the quite different political, economic, and social priorities of each regime 
materialized in their approaches to the oil industry. In each era, new principles shaped 
labor relations, urban planning, management hierarchies, marketing, and the wellbeing of 
Baku’s inhabitants, to name just a few of the major elements of the Baku urban-industrial 
complex that shifted according to administrative regime. 
For its part, the physical environment of the city has reliably reflected each 
change in administration, in that each new regime has sought to distinguish itself from 
the previous by embracing architectural styles and urban planning approaches indicative 
of its ideals. Even as leaders in each era were challenged by unmanageable population 
increases and unsightly industrial outgrowths, they have imposed their own visions on 
Baku without fully erasing those of previous eras. The Turco-Persian Inner City became 
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surrounded by Russian and Western European attempts to replicate their ideas of 
civilization; Soviet planners and architects envisioned a workers’ paradise with generous 
public works projects and nonconformist styling; leaders of Azerbaijan in the current era 
want to demonstrate the country’s wealth and modernity, connections between Baku and 
other world capitals, and the leadership’s embrace of Azerbaijan’s national history. A 
great part of Baku’s current tourist appeal is the careful presentation of the city’s visible 
record of successive regimes, the vividly differing styles giving Baku its exceptional 
“layered” look. 
Perhaps the most consequential “regime-limited” theme has been the shifting 
degree of state control in each phase of Baku’s oil history. Tsarist-era administration of 
the Baku oil industry was characterized by light state regulation and strong control by 
private oil companies, many of them foreign. The accumulated wealth was in some cases 
reinvested in irregular improvements to the Baku area, and but mostly left the region for 
good. The combination of unchecked capitalist exploitation, unregulated migration, and 
weak policing by the state caused Baku to become a city of crime, potent labor 
organization, and interethnic strife. The Soviet regime’s deep-cutting nationalization of 
the industry ensured that all of the wealth and commodities that it yielded in some way 
served the Soviet system, a degree of control made possible only by the USSR’s self- 
sufficient economy. The use and threat of violent law enforcement tamped down 
organized labor activity and open, large-scale interethnic conflict in the city. The Soviet 
approach initially further tied together city and industry under the common goal of 
producing oil, at least until other Soviet oil centers emerged. The independent state of 
Azerbaijan now directly administers the oil industry, reining in the domestic power of 
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foreign oil companies while profiting immensely from their partnership. The state’s 
alienation of Armenians has moved that conflict away from Baku to the country’s 
western borderlands. A new brand of oil-dependent authoritarianism continues to evolve 
in Azerbaijan, one committed to ensuring the appearance of peace and wealth in Baku. 
It has been my goal in this dissertation to develop some conclusions about the 
history of the oil industry and its local effects through a long-term study of Baku, one of 
the two oldest oil centers in the world (along with Pennsylvania) and a uniquely 
concentrated oil-based urban-industrial complex. This study has focused on the 
sometimes clashing, sometimes melding influences of Baku’s place in the international 
oil trade and its local ethnic, geological, and geographical circumstances. Over one 
hundred and fifty years of industrialized oil production, and across at least three major 
regime changes, Baku’s character has remained tied to its peculiar role as a producer of a 
commodity increasingly critical to the modern world. This outward-facing quality has set 
Baku apart from the other urban centers of Azerbaijan and the rest of Transcaucasia, but 
local influences have nevertheless been inescapable. 
While broad surveys of oil history more effectively speak to the upper reaches of 
international politics and commerce, regional studies better grasp the extent to which 
human communities tied to the “upstream” elements of oil are shaped by this connection. 
This study of Baku should indicate to scholars in energy humanities that the effect of oil 
in the modern world is equally as profound in producing societies as it is in consuming 
societies, and that the coming expiration of sustainable oil and natural gas production 
may spell the end not only of certain modern modes of life in the developed world, but 
also of entire national economies upstream. In addition, this history indicates, as does 
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Alison Flieg Frank’s study of Austrian Galicia, that oil dependence is a created state, not 
an inevitability. Finally, by focusing on one site from the beginning of the industrial 
extraction of oil to the present, rather than examining an oil industry in a single era or 
attempting to pull together the many strands of global oil history, I hope to have shown 
that while some expressions of particular controlling regimes’ approaches to oil 
production are important to the producing societies, there is a fundamental sameness to 
oil production regardless of time or place: a basic motivation to obtain as much energy as 
cheaply as possible, challenges of geology and geography in getting oil from the ground 
to the consumer, and deeply unequal power structures. As Timothy Mitchell and the 
contributors to Petrocultures have emphasized, as an energy resource and as a 
commodified natural resource, oil makes its own worlds, quite different from other 
extractive industries, even other hydrocarbons, due to the particular processes related to 
its location, extraction, refining, transportation, and consumption.700 It is possible that 
such understandings of oil-producing sites may help guide the world’s transition away 
from heavy oil dependence in the coming decades. 
In this dissertation, I have argued that the development of Baku as an urban- 
industrial site has been an embodiment of the convergence of international and local 
imperatives around the production of oil. Oil and natural gas are finite resources; it is 
predicted that Azerbaijan will be able to rely on the economic sustenance of oil incomes 
for perhaps another thirty years, with the natural gas industry likely to last a bit longer.701 
 
 
700 Mitchell,1-2; Wilson, Carlson, and Szeman, eds., 3-11. 
 
701 Wade Shephard, “What Azerbaijan Plans to do When the Oil Runs Out,” Forbes, December 3, 2016, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/12/03/what-azerbaijan-plans-to-do-when-the-oil-runs- 
out/#7dc028e83780. 
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Azerbaijan’s massive construction projects (including the planned $100 billion Khazar 
Islands development), enhancement of Eurasian transportation networks, and bids to host 
international sports and cultural competitions have all been part of the current regime’s 
endeavor to raise the country’s profile and attract new sources of revenue, following the 
successes of capitals such as Dubai. But the short-term benefits of continued oil reliance, 
as well as the legacies of Azerbaijan’s role as an oil supplier to larger states, have made 
economic diversification a worryingly slow and limited process. Every economic 
downturn that affects oil prices portends future dangers. 
For the time being, however, Baku remains a thriving city, the beneficiary of 
Azerbaijan’s remarkable accumulation of wealth from oil and natural gas. Even as new 
high-rises further embellish the skyline, the city’s past international and local interactions 
are evident today, a physical record of Baku’s oil history: the colonial-era Russian and 
European buildings, the erasure of the Armenian presence, the monuments to the 
philanthropy of oil magnate Taghiyev, the towering oil rigs that float just offshore in the 
Caspian Sea, and the pumpjacks on the city’s outskirts that relentlessly attempt to extract 
the last traces of oil from the fields where the industry started a century and a half ago. 
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Figure 16. Map of Baku and Absheron Peninsula districts, official and traditional. 
Source: Blank map from 
https://www.wikiwand.com/az/Şablon:Yer_xəritəsi_Bakı_Rayonları. Names inserted 
by author. 
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